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INTRODUCTION 
It is a defining characteristic of modern Western culture that Science^ holds 
the most esteemed position in regard to forms of knowledge and "ways of knowing." 
How this came about is a focal point in the history and philosophy of science and can 
be traced back to the early Greeks circa 600 B.C. Of all the various ways of knowing, 
science also provided the model adopted by the social sciences during the 
Enlightenment. In spite of numerous postmodern critics and an ongoing 
hermeneutical self-reflection and critique, "normal science" continues to form both 
the academic and applied foundation for the social sciences. Such a contention, of 
course, shall not go undefended. However, of greater interest in the development of 
Science and its influence on the social sciences is the emerging shift in scientific 
paradigms from a mechanical-reductionist and deterministic Newtonian 
understanding of the ontological world to a non-deterministic and more holistic view 
of the world in general (Capra, 1991; Herbert, 1985). This shift can be seen in the 
increasing popularization of quantum theory, its derivatives (e.g., catastrophe theory, 
chaos theory, self-generating systems, complexity), and their ever-broadening range of 
application. Most interesting in these developments is that, while the natural sciences 
are seeking to integrate sociological variables (e.g., observation, human action, 
consciousness, interpretation) into their methods and analyses, the social sciences 
^ Herein "Science" (with an upper case "S") will refer to the epistemological dimension of Science as a 
"way of knowing." The term begin with a lower case letter when in reference to specific scientiHc 
areas, divisions, methods, applications, etc. of the larger epistemological dimension. 
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have, for the most part, disregarded any implications the post-Newtonian scientific 
revolution might have for their own development. 
The purpose herein is neither a critique of normal science nor of positivism. 
Given the assumption that the social sciences, and sociology in particular, are 
founded on the ontological premises of the Classical Newtonian scientific paradigm,^ 
the question arises as to what the social sciences, and sociology in particular, might 
look like if rebuilt from a post-Newtonian foundation. Might some of the existing 
ontological, epistemological, and practical problems in the social sciences (e.g., order 
vs. disorder, the mind-body problem, macro-micro gap, object-subject fragmentation, 
cause-effect indétermination) be overcome given a new scientific paradigm? What 
implications does the post-Newtonian paradigm have for overcoming the limits of 
understanding existing now in the social sciences? 
In pursuing the answers to these questions it is first necessary to outline the 
meaning and development of what Kuhn (1970) and others have come to call "normal 
science." Implicit in that outline are epistemological questions concerning alternative 
ways of knowing and the rise of Science to its lofty ideological position in modern 
Western culture, including its place within sociology and the social sciences. 
Similarly, the meaning and development of post-Newtonian science must be explored 
along with its potential implications for a new social "Science." A new model of the 
^ The influence of Newtonian physics on the social sciences is not accidental - August Comte patterned 
"social physics" (later to be called "sociology") after Newton's original distinctions between "statics" and 
"dynamics." 
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social sciences can then be constructed which takes into account the new premises of 
the emerging post-Newtonian paradigm. The application and utility of such a model 
for the social sciences can then be tested and evaluated. 
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REVIEW OF THE HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF 
WESTERN SCIENCE PART I: THE CLASSICAL PARADIGM 
Paradigms, Normal Science, and Ways of Knowing 
Paradigms and the predominance of normal science 
Normal science is defined by Kuhn (1970, p. 10) as "research, firmly based on 
one or more past scientific achievements, achievements that some particular scientific 
community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further 
practice." According to Kuhn (1970), in any scientific field of endeavor, normal 
science is contingent upon the emergence of a predominant paradigm in that field. 
Such paradigms can be thought of as "models from which spring coherent traditions 
of scientific research" in regard to the specification of "law, theory, application, and 
instrumentation" (Kuhn, 1970, p. 10). Paradigms evolve from theories, yet are 
considered to be more general and more encompassing than any single theory within 
a specific scientific field (Kuhn, 1970, pp. 17-18,182). What saves Kuhn from a 
tautological argument is the assertion that new paradigms emerge not from the 
accumulation of the everyday scientific activities of which he speaks, but from 
scientific "revolutions" in which a new theory "requires the reconstruction of prior 
theory and the re-evaluation of prior fact, an intrinsically revolutionary process that is 
seldom completed by a single man and never overnight" (Kuhn, 1970, p. 7). 
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Such an observation is essential in understanding the development of science 
at the community (or within-disciplines) level of analysis. However, it is here that a 
sense of ambiguity enters the notion of scientific paradigms. As Kuhn's postscript in 
the second edition (1970, p, 177) of his book points out, scientific communities exist 
on several different levels of analysis. Much of Kuhn's work admittedly speaks to 
theories and paradigms within specific academic and/or applied disciplines and sub-
disciplines "consisting, perhaps, of fewer than twenty-five people" (1970, p. 181). The 
question arises as to the sociological utility of a concept which addresses itself to such 
relatively limited units of analysis—particularly given the high regard and esteem 
Science enjoys in modem Western culture. Kuhn (1970, pp. 17,179) makes a 
distinction between pre-paradigm and post-paradigm "schools." Yet the schools of 
which he speaks were actively engaged in the delineation of laws, theories, 
applications (methods), and instrumentation, i.e., Kuhn's original definition of a 
paradigm. Sociologically, perhaps, it could be postulated that Kuhn's pre-paradigm 
and post-paradigm examples are really part of a larger epistemological unit of 
analysis called Science, while his community-level paradigms exist in reference to 
what he previously defined as "normal science." The question still remains: Can the 
notion of scientific paradigms be extended to more general levels and units of 
analysis? 
The word science comes directly from the Latin scientia, being derived from 
the Latin verb scire, meaning "to know" (American Heritage Dictionary: Microsoft 
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Bookshelf 1992 Edition. 1992). Thus, given the original meaning of the term, might 
Science be viewed as a particular paradigm within the larger context of ways of 
knowing? Where does Science fit within a larger epistemological context? 
Ways of knowing and normal science 
No consensus exists among philosophers, much less among social scientists, in 
regard to the process and scope of knowledge and its acquisition. Nonetheless, a 
broad review of the epistemological literature identifies severaP ways of knowing. 
One manner of acquiring and assimilating knowledge that is commonly described in 
the literature is aesthetic/ecological. Dewey (1920/1968, p. 115) defined knowledge 
as "beholding and noting" and comparatively discussed "the right way to know" in 
terms of aesthetical considerations. 
In fact, the whole conception of knowledge as beholding and noting is 
fundamentally an idea connected with esthetic enjoyment and appreciation 
where the environment is beautiful and life is serene, and with esthetic 
repulsion and depreciation where life is troubled, nature morose and hard. 
(Dewey, 1920/1968, pp. 115-116) 
Aesthetics refers to the "study or theory of beauty and of the psychological responses 
to it; specific., the branch of philosophy dealing with art, its creative sources, its 
forms, and its effects" (Webster's New World Dictionary. 1988, pp. 21-22). The 
aesthetic way of knowing refers to knowledge based on distinctions about and 
qualitative references to beauty, shape, and form. Aesthetics, according to the 
^ These are listed alphabetically in the text. The sequential order of presentation is not meant to 
indicate a hierarchy of importance or position. 
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American Heritage Dictionary: Microsoft Bookshelf 1992 Edition. (1992), refers to 
the "perception" of the "innate qualities" of an object or thing.'* Quality could thus 
be considered an aesthetic type of knowledge. Society itself can be described as an 
aesthetic form (e.g., Marcuse, 1969, p. 49; Featherstone, 1992). According to Dewey 
(1920/1968), and Milbrath (1989), ecological awareness also derives from the 
aesthetic way of knowing—the result is a motivation to alter (or not to alter) the 
shape and form of nature to meet alternative aesthetic or otherwise pragmatic ends. 
Though notions about what is "beautiful" and "not beautiful," like descriptions of 
most qualitative characteristics, are for the most part socially constructed and thus 
vary between cultures—an aesthetic way of knowing appears to be common to most, 
if not all, cultures. This aesthetic/ecological way of knowing is indelibly intertwined 
with our socially constructed system(s) of values (Milbrath, 1989, pp. 5-6)—we tend 
to value that which is beautiful, moral, ethical, and desirable while devaluing that 
which is considered ugly and undesirable in shape or form. This idea of values has 
very important implications for science. These implications will be examined later. 
Another way of knowing found in epistemological literature, and sociological 
writings in particular, is affective-emotive. This way of knowing associates 
Herein the aesthetic way of knowing could also include perceptions and the appreciation of culturally 
defined "innate" qualities such as moral, good, pleasing, etc. The broader sense of the term includes 
those perceptions and appreciations which elude references to both sensory experience (sight, hearing, 
touching, smell, taste) and emotional conditions (fear, anger, love, elation, etc.). 
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phenomena with feeling states, emotions, and cognitive gratification,^ Weber 
(1921/1978, pp. 24-25) distinguished the affective way of knowing from other (e.g., 
rational) forms in his analysis of the various influences on social action. According to 
Weber, 
Purely affectual behavior also stands on the borderline of what can be 
considered "meaningfully" oriented, and often it, too, goes over the line. It 
may, for instance, consist in an uncontrolled reaction to some exceptional 
stimulus. It is a case of sublimation when affectually determined action occurs 
in the form of conscious release of emotional tension. (1921/1978, p. 25). 
Examples of affective-emotive knowledge would include love, fear, anger, etc. 
Though emotion and affectivity are frequent objects of analysis in the social sciences, 
affective-emotion as a way of knowing is, for the most part, rejected in "scientific" 
disciplines in favor of more "rational" modes of inquiry (see Weber, 1903-1917/1949), 
From an epistemic and ontological perspective, this exclusion results in somewhat of 
a schizophrenia in normal science (especially the social sciences). Not to mention 
certain scientists. 
Another way of knowing addressed by Weber (1921/1978) and also discussed 
in mainstream philosophical texts (e.g., Hospers, 1967) is authoritative knowing. This 
refers to knowledge acquired and assimilated from respected external sources. 
Authoritative knowledge, by definition, assumes the source to be reliable and the 
content to be valid. Though authoritative knowledge is not a primary form of 
^ Emotional gratification, as is often distinguished from sensual and physical gratification. It is 
recognized herein that any sharp distinction between physical and cognitive phenomena may have limited 
utility. 
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knowledge, as a result of the massification of culture through electronic and print 
media, it is becoming an increasingly significant way of knowing as compared to 
alternative primary forms (see Marcuse, 1964, p. 4). Much of our knowledge— 
especially formal education—is rooted in authoritative knowledge. Science is 
typically comfortable with authoritative knowledge—as long as science is the 
authority involved. Of course, the definitive way of knowing in the sciences is 
empirical-kinesthetic. 
Empirical-kinesthetic knowledge is knowledge obtained through and 
associated with the immediate sensory experiences of sight, smell, hearing, touch, and 
taste. Of all ways of knowing, "sense experience is the most obvious" (Hospers, 1967, 
p. 122). Empiricism, as a way to knowledge, 
is based on the belief that only that which can be experienced by the senses is 
real, and that the final test of scientific truth is the experience of the senses ... 
In this sense empiricism is basic to most scientific thought. (Theodorson & 
Theodorson, 1969, pp. 130-131) 
Kinesthetic refers to information processing and memory functions stored in the 
muscles of the body. The term has two Greek roots: kinein, meaning "to move," and 
aisthesis, meaning "perception" (Webster's New World Dictionary. 1988, p. 744). Our 
senses not only process information, but provide a means of storage and retrieval by 
means of kinesthesia. An example of the kinesthetic dimension of knowledge is 
found at the end of your wrist. Try writing with the opposite hand that you are 
accustomed to writing with. You will find that although you "know" how to form the 
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letters and words, your alternative hand does not possess the same ability 
(knowledge?) to form them as your accustomed one (unless, of course, you're 
ambidextrous). It is a curious trait of modern Western science that empiricism, as a 
way of knowing, is considered superior to all other forms of knowledge. If the goal of 
Science is an ontological and/or epistemological understanding of the world,^ 
empiricism immediately excludes a major part of the "reality" one is trying to observe, 
describe, and understand. Nonetheless, the empirical-kinesthetic way of knowing 
forms the very foundation upon which modern Western scientific thought is built. Far 
removed from empiricism as a way of knowing, we find faith. 
Faith is "a firm belief in something for which there is no evidence" (Hospers, 
1967, p. 141). It typically involves a belief or nonrational trust in some external 
person, will, or force. The belief in God is an example of knowing through faith.^ 
While faith cannot be a true source of knowledge (see Hospers, 1967, pp. 140-141), a 
significant part of our everyday ways of knowing nonetheless involve the invocation of 
faith. A more meaningful example might be the fact that certain positivists invoke 
faith in Science and materialism in much the same way that practicing Christians 
invoke faith in Christ or God (see Outwaithe, 1987, pp. 29-31, for an enlightening 
^ The pragmatic school of scientists (e.g., Weinberg, 1992) minimize any ontological or epistemological 
agenda for science. This crass realist approach contends that the fundamental goal of science is to 
discover the underlying laws of nature and that science need not and should not be concerned with 
philosophical issues such as knowing and being. 
^ Admittedly, religious faith will significantly overlap with authoritative ways to knowledge; the critical 
distinction might be made that faith could be thought of as primary knowledge while authority is derived 
from secondary sources. 
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critique). The extent we are motivated by faith and trust, however, is usually taken 
for granted until that trust or faith is broken. For example, the postmodern critique 
of science provides a hermeneutical challenge to the faith in normal science as it has 
been historically practiced in addition to a "loss of faith in the self as a social object" 
and the loss of faith in the "possibilities for enlightened social action" (Katovich & 
Reese, 1993, pp. 391-392). In the same maimer as emotive-affective and most other 
ways of knowing, the social sciences recognize faith as an object of study and 
knowledge but reject it as a valid means or way of knowing. The schizophrenia of 
normal science is thus exacerbated. 
Max Weber (1921/1978) proposed that tradition also exerts a significant 
influence on social action. An important way of knowing and coming to knowledge 
could thus be called historical-traditional. Our success as a species is due not so 
much to our complex reasoning abilities, but to our ability to transmit acquired 
knowledge across geography and time and to then act based on that accumulated 
knowledge within our own histories and biographies. Accordingly, intelligence itself 
is comprised largely of the ability to recognize and associate patterns from past 
experiences (one's own and the experiences of others). One must conclude that the 
influence of history is paramount at both the individual and cultural levels of analysis. 
According to Weber, "The great bulk of all everyday action to which people have 
become habitually accustomed approaches this [traditional] type" (1921/1978, p. 25). 
Kuhn points out that normal science is based on the cumulative findings of past 
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scientific research (1970, p. 10). While many of the natural sciences are, by necessity, 
historical (e.g., geology, archaeology, paleontology), history is seldom seen as a 
significant way of knowing in and of itself. In the social sciences, history as a way of 
knowing is most often transformed into one of two types of historicism: (a) Popper's 
(1957) critical term for the search for historical evidence of laws of social 
development, or (b) hermeneutics and the deconstruction of historical textual 
materials (see Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner, 1988, p. 114; also Ross, 1991, pp. 4-7). 
In all cases, tradition as a form of knowledge and basis for action is cast aside and 
subsequently transformed into logical-empirical types of analyses. History as a means 
to knowledge is typically seen as incompatible with empiricism, that way of knowing 
which remains the foundation for all inquiry in modern Western science. Thus, the 
vast influence tradition, habit, and history play on our lives remains an occasional 
object of scientific study, yet is seldom if ever recognized as a valid epistemic way of 
knowing within the context of modern Western science. 
According to Kuhn (1970), one way of knowing with the potential to give birth 
to new scientific paradigms is intuition-revelation. This takes the form of "novelty" 
within normal science, occasionally to the degree that it results in a paradigmatic 
crisis which demands either resolution or revolution. The most obvious example in 
recent history is Einstein's "thought experiments" leading to his special theory of 
relativity. To arrive at the special theory of relativity, Einstein imagined himself 
riding on a beam of light. In doing so, he had the revelation that time and space are 
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mathematical functions of each other, dependent upon the relative velocity and 
coordinates of an observer with the speed of light as a mathematical constant. Even 
so, intuition and revelation lack recognition, description, and support by the 
community of normal science practitioners—in light of the fact that the formulation 
of scientific theories and hypotheses rely (in varying degree) on intuition, hunches, 
and guesses about the "real" causes and outcomes of events. Here, intuition and 
revelation do not even have the status of objects of inquiry—they are denied any 
existence whatsoever. If novelty is recognized at all, it is typically within the context 
of empirical observation and/or logical induction and deduction. In fact, the logical-
rational way to knowledge is the one significant remaining way of knowing to be 
discussed. 
The word "logic" comes from the Greek logos meaning "word, reckoning, or 
thought" (Webster's New World Dictionary. 1988, p. 795). It is closely related to, and 
sometimes synonymous with, what Weber (1921/1978) identified^ as rationality, i.e., 
the calculation of means and ends. As a way of knowing, logical-rational might best 
be defined as "sequential reasoning." It stands in opposition to other forms of 
rationality and ways of knowing, e.g., affective-emotive, historical-traditional, 
authoritative (see Weber, 1921/1978, pp. 22-26). In normal science, logic is used to 
® Weber's reference (1921/1978, p. 24) refers specifically to zweckrational social action, or that action 
which is oriented by calculating in advance both the means and the ends of the situation. Various 
translations of the ori^al work label this type of rationality "formal rationality," "instrumental 
rationality," or "means-ends rationality" (see Kalberg, 1980, for an excellent discussion of Weber's 
treatment and usage of the term). 
14 
impose abstract categories and conceptual order on empirical sense data. The logical 
method comes from Aristotle, 
Classical, or Aristotelian, logic is concerned with the formal properties of an 
argument, not its factual accuracy. Aristotle, in his Organon, held that any 
logical argument could be reduced to a sequence of 3 propositions (2 premises 
and a conclusion), known as a SYLLOGISM, and posited 3 laws as basic to all 
logical thought: the law of identity (A is A); the law of contradiction (A 
carmot be both A and not A); and the law of the excluded middle (A must be 
either A or not A). Aristotle assumed a correspondence linking the structures 
of reality, the mind, and language, a position known in the Middle Ages as 
REALISM. The opposing school of thought, NOMINALISM, represented by 
WILLIAM OF OCCAM, maintains that language and logic correspond to the 
structure of the mind only, not to that of reality. (Concise Columbia 
Encyclopedia: Microsoft Bookshelf Edition. 1992) 
Regardless of whether one takes a realist^ position or an alternative one in regard to 
the place of an independent objective reality, rational logic (in the Aristotelian sense 
of the categorization of and search for "real" natural forms) remains the method and 
process by which normal science finds (or alternatively, imposes) order in the natural 
world. Sometimes this takes the form of theorizing and hypothesizing, sometimes 
deduction or induction. It is a primary way of knowing in the everyday operation of 
normal science. 
^ It is acknowledged that realism has different meanings, depending on the school of thought applied. 
Aristotle's "realism" referred to the "reality" of pure forms, concepts, and qualities beyond individual 
objects and our direct observation of them - this usage is in opposition to "nominalism," which argues 
that, although material objects are real in the sense that they exist independently of the observer, the 
qualities of an object exist primarily in the mind. Alternatively, in the philosophical literature, "realism" 
refers to the idea that there is an objective "reality" that easts completely independent of human 
observation - this usage is in opposition to "idealism," which suggests that any independent objective 
reality is a necessary fiction created by our minds (Concise Columbia Encvclopedia: Microsoft 
Bookshelf Edition. 1992). Finally, a sociological usage of realism exists in reference to "uncovering the 
(real) underlying and often unobservable mechanisms that connect phenomena causally, not merely in 
showing that the phenomena are instances of some observed regularity" - this stands in opposition to 
crass positivism which rejects anything unobservable as "unreal" (Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner, 1988, p. 
203). 
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Table 1. An epistemological model of alternative ways of knowing 
Ways of Knowing 
Aesthetic-Ecological 
Affective-Emotive 
Authoritative 
Empirical-Kinesthetic 
Faith 
Historical-Traditional 
Intuition-Revelation 
Logical-Rational 
Description or Example 
Iimate qualities of beauty, shape, form 
Emotions; e.g., love, anger, fear 
Accepted external source; e.g., media 
Sense data; see, hear, touch, smell, taste 
Trust or belief in external will, force, etc. 
Habits and unquestioned conventions 
Hunches or guesses in absence of reason 
Sequential reasoning; e.g., theory, 
deduction, induction, hypothesizing 
An epistemological and ontological model which can provide a context for the 
operation of Western normal science is summarized above. These "ways of knowing" 
are not intended to be mutually exclusive nor logically exhaustive. Many overlap, 
additional ways of knowing could be argued for, any of those identified above could 
be argued against. There is, of course, a multitude of articles, books, and arguments 
with alternative—even contradictory—epistemological and ontological models. The 
goal of this discussion is not to resolve any age-old questions about knowing and 
being; instead, an attempt has been made to place science within a larger 
epistemological and ontological context. 
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The emerging crisis in normal science 
To the end of placing normal science in a larger context of knowing and being, 
one can make a rather mundane conclusion about the epistemological and 
ontological limits of Western normal science: As a way of knowing, normal science 
relies almost exclusively on empirical and logical ways and means of knowledge.^" 
Empirical, in the exclusive reliance on immediate sense data, and logical, in the sense 
of Aristotelian categorization, deduction and induction, theorizing, and hypothesizing. 
Other ways of knowing, e.g., aesthetic-ecological, affective-emotive, authoritative, 
faith, historical-traditional, and intuition-revelation are sometimes objects of 
scientific study. However, seldom, if ever, are these alternative ways of knowing 
accepted as valid means to knowledge and understanding. 
As will be discussed later, in Newtonian normal science, ontological reality 
exists and operates independent of the observer. In Post-Newtonian quantum 
science, the observer chooses the "reality" observed through her or his own presence, 
methods, measuring instruments, and attributive perceptions. This problem of 
epistemology and ontology has always existed in the social sciences: How can the 
observer "objectively" be both subject and object of investigation? Here the 
epistemological and ontological limits of Classical Newtonian normal science become 
apparent. A schizophrenia is thus manifested first in Science, as a way and means of 
Most any introductory social science text identifies these two ways of knowing as the foundation for 
science (e.g., Macionis, 1993; McConnell, 1986; Robertson, 1987). 
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understanding and appreciating ontological reality and, consequently, in science as a 
way and means of accomplishing that goal. How did this schizophrenia develop? 
What are the origins and historical precedents of what might be called Classical or 
Newtonian "normal science?" Can normal science in general—herein meaning "the 
assumptions and methods of science inherited from Galileo and Newton which rely 
explicitly on logical and empirical ways of knowing", i.e., the Classical Paradigm— 
reject or ignore most of our other primary ways of knowing and still provide an 
adequate ontological and epistemological understanding of reality? 
The Historical Origins of the Classical Paradigm 
Ancient Greek roots 
By most accounts, the roots of Western science are found in Ionia, a part of 
Ancient Greece, around 600 B.C. According to Burke (1985), the ancient lonians 
were descendants of hardy Greek mainlanders who took to the sea about 1000 B.C. 
Thaïes of Miletus, 625-545 B.C., is credited with the invention of natural philosophy, 
which was later to be called science (Mason, 1962, p. 25). It was a unique 
combination of sociocultural and environmental factors that precipitated the rise of 
science in Ionia at that time. 
Both [Egyptian and Babylonian] cultures developed mythical explanations for 
Creation which, they felt, had happened not long before each of them had 
come into existence. With gods responsible for all aspects of the world and 
with minimal science and technology developed for practical necessities, their 
simple cosmology was complete. The environment made no demands on them 
which they were not able to meet The uneven nature of [the Ionian] 
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physical environment, with marginal agricultural productivity, little room for 
landward expansion, hostile neighbors, and the need to trade, made the 
colonial Greeks dynamic in outlook. (Burke, 1985, pp. 14-15) 
It may have been because of their economic circumstances that the lonians 
took a radically new view of the world These lonians began, ahead of all 
others, to ask fondamental questions about how the universe worked. Where 
the older [Egyptian and Babylonian] had been content to refer to custom, 
edict, revelation and priestly authority. Thaïes and the others looked to 
naturalistic explanations for the origin of the world and eveiything in it. They 
began to find ways of exploring nature, in order to explain and control it, the 
better to ensure their survival. (Burke, 1985, p. 15) 
The social and ecological conditions within which the lonians^^ had to meet their 
subsistence resulted in their need to find alternative ways of understanding nature 
other than traditional authority and faith in the gods. While the understanding of 
nature in Ancient Babylon and Egypt was the privilege of priestly scribes and 
forbidden to craftspeople, the lonians viewed the workings and understanding of 
nature from a more pragmatic perspective. 
The analogies used by the Miletian philosophers to explain the structure and 
workings of the world differ markedly from those employed in the creation 
stories of the Egyptians and the Babylonians. The Greeks regarded neither 
organic procreation nor the magic word of command as world-building 
principles, relying more upon analogies based upon craft processes. (Mason, 
1962, p. 27) 
According to Burke, 
The Ionian interest in practical answers to questions about the world led to the 
first, crude attempts to find mechanisms, rather than gods, responsible for 
natural phenomena. (1985, p. 16) 
Also known as Milesians, since Milesia was the capital of Ionia at that time. 
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This prompted the lonians to develop an almost exclusive interest in physics or (what 
we now refer to as) cosmology (Sahakian, 1968). 
Cosmology is that branch of metaphysics which deals with the nature or 
essence of the orderly universe—the cosmos. The Ionian philosophers set for 
themselves the task of ascertaining the nature of substance, of cosmic matter, 
of the very stuff out of which the entire universe is composed. (Sahakian, 1968, 
p. 1) 
Epistemologically, during the time of the lonians, logical rational thought surpassed 
authority, tradition, and faith as a primary way of knowing. However, it is interesting 
to note that the rise of Ionian science and the very existence of competing ways of 
knowing resulted from the existence of persistent unanswered questions—this is 
congruent with Kuhn's premises about how paradigms and worldviews tend to shift. 
The lonians, for the most part, felt the five senses were fairly reliable indicators of 
events in the natural world. At least in terms of written records, the lonians were the 
first to combine logical and empirical ways of knowing as primary means to 
knowledge. The result was the birth of Science as an epistemological and ontological 
way of understanding the universe and our place in it—even though this new 
ontological perspective still lacked some of its more modem methodological 
characteristics, i.e., experimentation, deduction, induction, hypothesis testing. 
Nonetheless, many of our modern assumptions about Science and the reality it seeks 
to understand can be traced back to the lonians. 
Thaïes, though none of his original writings have been found (see Donner, 
Eble, & Helbling, 1967, pp. 60-61), is considered to be the first to propose that nature 
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is made up of a fundamental substance, in his case, water. His conclusions were 
formed, in part, on empirical observations. 
[Thaïes] and his students examined beaches, clay deposits, phosphorescence 
and magnetism. They studied evaporation and condensation, as well as the 
behavior of the winds and the changes in temperature throughout the year, 
from which they deduced the dates of the seasons. (Burke, 1985, p. 16) 
Thaïes is credited with predicting the first solar eclipse. He also traveled to Egypt 
where he studied Egyptian geometry^^ ^nd subsequently introduced those ideas to the 
West. Thaïes offered the first geometric proof that a circle is bisected by its diameter. 
As the first recorded natural philosopher. Thaïes thus introduced logic, empirical 
observation, and mathematical geometry to what would later be called Science. 
Anaximander, 611-547 B.C., Thaïes' pupil, deduced that all life originated in 
the sea and that higher life forms evolved from lower forms. He also proposed a 
theory of the transfiguration of matter which was similar to the laws of 
thermodynamics in Newtonian systems: Matter is never completely destroyed but 
continually changes from one form into another.^^ Like his teacher. Thaïes, 
Anaximander felt the five senses were reliable indicators of the "real." The 
ontological and epistemological conflicts now associated with crass empiricism were 
resolved by assuming that all matter originated in God, which (whom?) was 
imperceptible and thus unquestionable. Anaximander, like Thaïes and the other 
The great pyramids are but one example of the scope and depth of the knowledge of geometry 
flourishing in Ancient Egypt. 
In actuality, given the hylozoistic assumptions of the early lonians, this transfiguration of matter could 
be considered to be more like the Hindu belief in reincarnation than the first law of thermodynamics. 
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Ionian natural philosophers, was a hylozoist, meaning he believed that all "life is a 
property or derivation of matter, that life and matter are inseparable, or that matter 
possesses a spiritual component" (American Heritage Dictionary: Microsoft 
Bookshelf Edition. 1992). This led to the idea that natural processes operated 
"according to laws of trespass and retribution And into that from which things 
take their rise, they pass away once more, as is meet, for they make reparation and 
satisfaction to one another according to the order of time" (Anaximander in Mason, 
1962, p. 27). Mason describes this anthropomorphic tendency: 
Thus in winter, cold commits an injustice to heat, and in summer, heat exacts 
its retribution. All things are transient, for when an object comes into being, it 
commits an injustice against things already existing and a reparation must be 
made. The notion that there was a principle of retribution in natural processes 
was derived by analogy from the customs of human society in which the 
practice of vengeance preceded that of the due process of law. Thus the early 
meaning for the Greek word for cause, 'aitia', was guilt. Such a notion was 
replaced ultimately by the conception that nature, like human society, was 
governed by laws. (1962, pp. 27-28) 
Thus, the very idea of natural laws comes indirectly from the Ionian anthropomorphic 
perspective called hylozoism—and was intended as an analogy to human societies. In 
the absence of experimentation, it seems such observations relied more on intuition 
than they did logic or empiricism. Nonetheless, it is remarkable how close the 
intuition of the lonians comes to our modem "objective" empirical models. 
Heraclitus of Ephesus, 544-484 B.C., did not see absolute natural laws as the 
inevitable outcome of hylozoistic retribution. Instead, Heraclitus proposed that 
retribution resulted in an ongoing process of change and flux in nature, i.e., becoming 
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(Sahakian, 1968, p. 7). Structure, to Heraclitus, was the inevitable yet transitive result 
of the process of change (Mason, 1962, p. 28). "You could not step in the same river 
twice, for other and yet other waters are ever flowing on" is the most famous remnant 
of Heraclitus' natural philosophy (Heraclitus, in Donner, Eble, & Helbling, 1967, p. 
65). Heraclitus proposed that natural change, however, proceeds in accordance with 
an innate rationality: 
To Heraclitus, therefore, we must grant the distinction of having been the first 
to discover natural law, the laws of science. This natural principle, reason (or 
the law of nature), which he termed Logos, is the rational principle which 
dominates immutable law. The Logos of the world makes possible the orderly 
behavior of cosmic processes of action and reaction. These processes combine 
to make things grow and then to disintegrate in a ceaseless cycle from life to 
death, from composition to decomposition, from creation to destruction, from 
chaos to cosmos and vice versa, all in a sequence of rhythmical change. 
Everything in the universe undergoes this procedure of change and counter-
change in a cyclical order, and only the law of change abides—that is, the 
Logos. (Sahakian, 1968, p. 8) 
With the assumption that all is in a process of Becoming, as opposed to existing in a 
structural condition oi Being, Heraclitus argued that the empirical way of knowing did 
not offer much insight into understanding the ongoing process of change. "Eyes and 
ears are bad witnesses for men, since their souls lack understanding" (Heraclitus, in 
Donner, Elbe, & Helbling, 1967, p. 65). The ideas of Heraclitus were not well 
received by the Ancient Greeks and stand in an uncomfortable contrast with today's 
general framework(s) of modern Western science. 
[It was] Heraclitus' belief that everything was in a state of flux, that change was 
the basic certainty of the universe. A belief of this sort, contradicting one of 
man's most deeply felt convictions, inevitably produced philosophic 
controversy. For ordinary men as well as philosophers, the search for 
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something permanent seems to be a necessary part of being. The eternal 
nature of God and the spiritual world is probably the most widely held answer 
to this search in Western thought. (Donner, Elbe, & Helbling, 1967, p. 61) 
Donner, Elbe, & Helbling {ibid.) offer a profound insight into the development of 
Western thought: Our success as a species relies on our ability to control and predict 
the outcome of natural events. This requires the assumption of some a priori 
structure and permanence. Though change is inevitable, it is not always welcomed. 
As will be discussed later, the Classical paradigm sees change primarily as the motion 
of the hands on the clockwork of the universe—with the clock itself, operating 
according to innate natural laws, as an a priori concept. Heraclitus did not assume 
structure a priori', instead he proposed that structure is tentative and derives from 
dynamic processes (when this conclusion re-emerged 2500 years later in quantum 
mechanics, it was received with—and still elicits—comparable trepidation). 
Within the philosophical literature, the ideas of Parmenides, circa 515 B.C., 
and Zeno, circa 490-430 B.C, are usually cast in direct opposition to those of 
Heraclitus. 
Parmenides, who became the second great leader of the Eleatic school, 
developed a view in direct antithesis to Heraclitanism. Whereas Heraclitus 
interpreted all reality as change, Parmenides pictured the universe as a single, 
permanent substance (the theory of Metaphysical Monism). (Sahakian, 1968, 
p. 9) 
Among the pre-Socratics, both Parmenides {fl. 475? B.C.) and Zeno, his 
disciple {b. 490? B.C.), opposed Heraclitus' changing world with the assertion 
that nothing changes. Parmenides based his belief on the argument that since 
our thoughts and our words are about real substances which have to exist, 
which still exist, and which will go on existing, all things must be unchanging. 
Zeno, slightly younger than Parmenides, opposed the idea of change by 
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creating his famous paradoxes in which motion itself—the flight of an arrow, 
for instance—is regarded as being simply a succession of static moments. 
Further, since an arrow aimed at a target must pass through a series of 
infinitely divisible distances, it will never reach its target. (Donner, Elbe, & 
Helbling, 1967, p. 61) 
Parmenides still did not resort to empiricism to refute the assertions of Heraclitus. 
Parmenides, like Heraclitus, found sense data unreliable, like the illusion one enjoys 
while watching a series of rapidly moving yet carefully coordinated picture frames 
(i.e., watching a movie). Zeno also challenged the empirical way of knowing with the 
same revelation that Einstein had 2400 years later: Motion is relative to the observer 
and it always expresses a relationship between two objects in time and space. The 
ideas of the Eleatic philosophers (Parmenides, Zeno, etc.) only thickened the 
metaphysical soup. An alternative way of resolving the conflict between Being and 
Becoming (and the still unhappy marriage of empirical and logical ways of knowing) 
was offered by the Pythagorean philosophers. 
Pythagoras, 580-497 B.C., combined faith, logic, aestheticism, and intuition in 
his model of ontological reality. At the foundation of Pythagorean philosophy is the 
supremacy of ideas above immediate sense perceptions (Sahakian, 1968, p. 20). 
According to the Pythagoreans, there exists an innate order in the world which is 
grounded in "pure" mathematical and geometric forms. 
For the Pythagoreans numbers provided a conceptual model of the universe, 
quantities and shapes determining the forms of all natural objects. At first 
they thought of numbers as geometrical, physical, and arithmetical entities 
made up of unit points or particles. They arranged such units at the corners of 
various geometrical figures and spoke of them as triangular numbers, square 
numbers, and so on. Thus, for the Pythagoreans, numbers had a geometrical 
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shape as well as a quantitative size, and it was in this sense that they 
understood numbers to be the forms and images of natural objects. (Mason, 
1962, p. 29) 
It is a legacy of the Pythagoreans that gives nature the quantitative character which 
predominates today's modern Western normal science. Dualism and reductionism 
were also part of the Pythagorean system. To the Pythagoreans, stemming from their 
focus on the aesthetic way of knowing, nature was comprised of opposites. "The 
opposing objects co-operate to produce a harmony; and just as in music harmony 
emerges from opposites, so the opposing forces in the universe are reconciled by a 
harmony of numbers" (Sahakian, 1968, p. 22). Yet another alternative to reconciling 
Parmenides' Being with Heraclitus' Becoming was proposed by the Ancient Greek 
Atomists at Abdera. 
The founder of the Atomist school was Leucippus of Abdera, circa 440 B.C. 
Leucippus supported Parmenides' contention that Being characterizes ultimate 
reality. This Being, according to the Atomists, consisted of fundamental particles 
which they called atoms ("a" meaning not, and "tom" meaning divisible, thus 
translated "not divisible"). Democritus, circa 420 B.C., student of Leucippus and the 
father of Materialism, proposed that the "natural order of the world" and the 
"characteristics of nature" were innate in these atoms. "Mechanistic causes (atomic 
force or weight) account for all phenomena Atoms alone exist, possessing motion 
and filling empty space" (Sahakian, 1968, pp. 17-18). From the Atomists (and later, 
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from a deal Descartes cut with the church), Western science inherited the dualism of 
mind and matter, 
[The Atomists] assumed that the Being is manifest in certain invariable 
substances, the mixture and separation of which gives rise to the changes in the 
world. This led to the concept of the atom, the smallest indivisible unit of 
matter The Greek atomists drew a clear line between spirit and matter, 
picturing matter as being made of several 'basic building blocks'. These were 
purely passive and intrinsically dead particles moving in the void. The cause of 
their motion was not explained, but was often associated with external forces 
that were assumed to be of spiritual origin and fundamentally different from 
matter. In subsequent centuries, this image became an essential element of 
Western thought, of the dualism between mind and matter, between body and 
soul. (Capra, 1991, p. 21) 
According to Democritus, hedonism results from the false information given by 
senses: "The true joys are those of the spirit, attained through knowledge of truth, 
not through sense experience" (in Sahakian, 1968, p. 19). Democritus began the 
search for a "deep reality" beyond the reach of our immediate senses but still 
perceptible with the aid of reason and logic. The schizophrenia of modern Western 
science begins with this dualism of thought. 
The dualistic thought which runs throughout the philosophy of Democritus, 
beginning with the distinction between two basic types of knowledge (between 
sense experience [empirical] and rational intellect [logical]) culminates in two 
interpretations of ethics (Hedonism and Eudaemonism) and two views of 
reality: as phenomenal reality and as metaphysical (or ontological) reality. 
Phenomenal reality refers to our knowledge of appearances, while 
metaphysical reality refers to our knowledge of real objects, the true essences 
of objects. The term phenomenal reality, apparently first used by Democritus, 
became part of the permanent vocabulary of philosophers. In modern 
philosophy it has come to mean our relative knowledge of sense objects—the 
world which the senses depicts for us—in contrast to general reality. By 
metaphysical reality Democritus meant the absolute, not relative, knowledge 
of Being or of the essences of objects [It] was Democritus who set the 
stage in metaphysics for the eventual development of two diametrically 
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opposing points of view: Platonic Idealism, and Metaphysical Materialism 
coupled with Relativism. (Sahakian, 1968, pp. 19-20) 
The Atomists, upon closer examination, did not resolve the dilemma between Being 
and Becoming. Instead, they pursued a reductionist argument which resulted in a 
dualistic understanding of ontological reality. It was an ontology separated from its 
own epistemological foundations—a "reality" of the senses which differed a priori 
from the "reality" of the mind. The path of the idealists (e.g., Plato) would combine 
logical with intuitive ways of knowing under the assumption that the senses provided 
an unreliable foundation for perceiving the world. The metaphysical materialists 
(e.g., Democritus) would combine logical and empirical ways of knowing under the 
assumption that "reality" was an objective material phenomenon that could (at least 
in its practical or secondary forms) be perceived by the senses and understood (in 
terms of fundamental, non-reducible, or primary forms, i.e., atoms) using reason (see 
Sahakian, 1968, pp. 18-20). 
With the fall of Ionia to Persia in 530 B.C., Athens came to be the center of 
intellectual activity in the Ancient World. The Sophists in Athens shifted their 
philosophical concerns from cosmology and ontology to epistemology and problems 
of man.^4 
The leading Sophist philosopher, Protagoras [481-411 B.C.] applied the 
[Heraclitean] idea of change to epistemology—the study of knowledge and 
The use of the term "man" is not to indicate a preference of gender. Though the term "human" would 
be more politically correct, in this context the term "man" should be taken in its generic gender-free 
sense. The intent is to reflect the tone, feel, and form of the original writings, free from the modem 
political ideological contexts of today. 
28 
how it is obtained. He concluded that knowledge and truth are both 
dependent on judgments by the individual. (Sahakian, 1968, p. 25) 
The questions shifted from laws of nature to laws of civil society; from a focus on the 
nature of man to the focus on how man should live. 
Socrates, 470-399, B.C. accorded logical and empirical scientific knowledge an 
important place in the hierarchy of knowledge, but gave supremacy to insight as a 
primary form of knowing. Socrates detested emotions and the affective way of 
knowing, arguing that such mental conditions blocked the paths to truth and virtue. 
According to Socrates, logic and debate provide a test for truth—yet insight provides 
the ultimate ways and means of all knowing. 
Socrates considered himself to be a sort of midwife, drawing truth from its 
repository in each man's soul, where truth is dormant and simply needs to be 
awakened. He concluded that all truths have been inherited from the 
individual at birth, that is, from an existence prior to his earthly existence ... 
Truth is laid bare through the Socratic dialectic, a method of conversation by 
which all possible points of view regarding a problem, issue, or subject are set 
forth and debated from every angle. (Sahakian, 1968, p. 33) 
Plato of Athens, 427-347 B.C., revived the paradox of Being and Becoming, but from 
an ethical concern more so than an ontological one. The self, in Plato's ideal 
conceptualization, had a phenomenological component in addition to an ideal (read 
real) component. 
According to Plato the transient sensory life of the individual, consisting of his 
thoughts, perceptions, and experiences which comprise his phenomenal or 
tangible world, ceases at death, and he then returns to existence in the ideal 
world, the real universe, from which he came and to which he must conform. 
(Sahakian, 1968, p. 55) 
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For Plato there existed two worlds: one of the mind, the other of material things. 
Apparently, the hylozoistic principles of the early lonians had been discarded by 
Plato's time. Now the question was not whether nature sought retribution in the 
same manner as humans, but whether social laws could operate in the same manner 
as do (now taken a priori) natural laws. Plato's writings have significant implications 
for social philosophy in particular—the interest in a pure "natural" philosophy was 
not revived until later by Plato's pupil, Aristotle of Stagira in Thrace, 384-322 B.C. 
Aristotle has been referred to as ""the philosopher^ whose influence has "permeated 
the work of scientists and philosophers throughout the ages" (Sahakian, 1968, p. 62). 
The first enduring scientific paradigm began with Aristotle (Einstein & Infeld, 
1938; Kuhn, 1970). At the foundation of Aristotle's work lay logic. The method of 
scientific inquiry devised by Aristotle relied on the use of logic to derive inferences 
about the objective world. This inferential process could take either of two forms, 
either deductive or inductive. The deductive form, or syllogism, made inferences 
about particular cases based on the properties and appearance of the whole. The 
other type, induction, examines the parts or individual cases and makes logical 
inferences about the properties of the whole or universal (Sahakian, 1968, p. 63). 
Aristotle understood truth to mean the agreement of knowledge with reality; 
truth exists when the mind's mental representations (ideas) correspond with 
things in the objective world. On the other hand, error (falsehood) occurs 
when our judgment (the combination of ideas in the mind) does not occur with 
the genuine relationships among things in the outer world Genuine proof 
results when valid inferences are drawn from true or ultimate premises (self-
evident propositions), or from premises which are based on true or self-
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evident propositions—ultimate statements or axioms that must be taken for 
granted because they cannot or need not be proved. (Sahakian, 1968, p. 63) 
Logical reasoning makes us certain that our conclusions are true, and thus 
provides us with accepted scientific proofs of universally valid propositions or 
statements. Scientific inference thus consists of conclusions based on true and 
certain principles or premises. (Sahakian, 1968, p. 63) 
Aristotle's logic was based on intuition as a primary source of knowing. He 
distinguished between the "essence" of an object (the real ontological being in the 
Platonic sense) and its "accidental" characteristics which do not form part of the 
defining characteristics of the object (Sahakian, 1968, p. 65). This does not, however, 
imply that Aristotle was an idealist. Aristotle was uncomfortable with the dualism of 
Platonic thought and shifted away from Plato's idealism toward a more naturalistic 
understanding of the world. 
For Plato, the sense world realized itself by imitating the ideal world, whereas 
for Aristotle, the Platonic ideals realize themselves through the phenomenal 
world. For Aristotle, Plato's universals (Ideals) were always to be found in 
particulars (empirical objects). Plato's ontologically real object—Ideal—was 
given the term essence by Aristotle; at other times he called it form, intelligible 
essence, or notional essence. Whereas for Plato, the essence (ideal object) is 
actually independent of particular things, for Aristotle essence is real only 
when it is actualized, that is, only as it realizes itself in phenomenal objects 
and therein takes on some appearance detectable by sense experience. 
(Sahakian, 1968, p. 67) 
While Plato explained reality in terms of ideal forms, Aristotle proposed a reality of 
ultimate objects and categories. The Aristotelian logical method was also a method 
of classification. He formulated ten "categories" of concepts (or defining attributes) 
by which to categorize empirical objects: "substance, quantity, quality, relation, 
location, time, position, possession, active, and passive" (in Sahakian, 1968, p. 64). 
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[An] object is adequately defined when its specific characteristics shared by all 
members of its species are combined with the qualities shared by all members 
of its genus or general class [Furthermore, a] general or universal concept 
is classifiable with more general concepts, and these with still more general 
concepts until at last one arrives at final or ultimate concepts. (Sahakian, 
1968, p. 64) 
Similar to, and connected with, Aristotle's description of ultimate concepts was his 
description of ultimate and final causes. 
To Aristotle, unlike Plato and most of the metaphysicians before him, god was 
not the active director of the universe. 
Platonic theology had its mythical apparatus of the divine artist, fashioning the 
order of Nature, after the pattern of a perfect model, which includes the 
Forms of animal species. But Aristotle has renounced this expedient: he 
denies the separate existence of ideal Forms, and with the disappearance of 
the model, the creator too must disappear, (Cornford, 1968, pp. 97-98) 
Aristotle's god was a perfect and fully realized god, and thus did not need to fiddle 
with the clockwork of the universe. Aristotle's god is the first and final cause of 
everything in the universe—everything has a place and purpose in the grand design. 
According to Aristotle, matter itself is an initial cause (material cause), and the 
form that matter takes constitutes the essence of that material (formal cause). 
Motion, according to Aristotle, is the efficient cause, and finally, the ultimate purpose 
or "realization" of the material form is tho final cause (in Sahakian, 1968, p. 68). 
Aristotle replaced an active god with a systemic teleology of matter and form. This 
removal of divine intervention from the everyday experiences of man laid a new 
foundation and orientation for science. Assuming the world was shaped by a 
32 
predetermined rational design, humans could realize their "final cause" through the 
rational pursuit of "self-contemplative existence"^^ (Sahakian, 1968, p. 70). This was 
the beginning of science as an "autonomous activity"—"they [the Greeks] wanted to 
know—for the sake of knowing" (Sullivan, 1933, p. 9). 
Though Aristotle relied increasingly on empirical observation as a 
methodological tool (Mason, 1962, p. 41), he never did fully reconcile the empirical 
and logical ways of knowing into a formal scientific methodology, instead, preferring 
to rely on simple observations, intuition, and formal logic (Einstein & Infeld, 1933; 
Sahakian, 1968). 
The [Aristotelian] method of reasoning dictated by intuition was wrong and 
led to false ideas of motion which were held for centuries. Aristotle's great 
authority throughout Europe was perhaps the chief reason for the long belief 
in this intuitive idea.... The discovery and use of scientific reasoning by 
Galileo was one of the most important achievements in the history of human 
thought, and marks the real beginning of physics. This discovery taught us that 
intuitive conclusions based on immediate olîservation are not always to be 
trusted, for they sometimes lead to the wrong clews. (Einstein & Infeld, 1933, 
pp. 6-7) 
Aristotle and his students left a substantial record of empirical observations, the most 
impressive being a complex classification of over 540 animals, many of which were 
carefully dissected and anatomically illustrated. The first record of experimentation, 
St. Thomas Aquinas, 1125-1274, later revived these ideas of Aristotle and popularized scholasticism. 
Scholasticism combines religious faith as a way of knowing with logical-rational ways for the purpose of 
realizing and understanding god and divine purposes and will. Today most Western scientists see faith as 
antithetical to the logical empirical methodology of normal science. 
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however, came from one of Aristotle's successors at the Lyceum from 287 to 269 B.C., 
Strato of Lampsacus. 
Strato appears to have gone beyond observation to experiment. He weighed a 
piece of wood before and after heating, and he found that the charcoal 
produced had the same volume as the wood but possessed a smaller weight. 
Strato presumed therefore that matter had departed from the wood, leaving 
small vacuous pores. In another experiment he showed that partially 
evacuated vessels would pick up water, an effect which he ascribed to the 
water filling the voids between the particles of air. Strato was of the view that 
bodies in general consisted of minute particles with voids between them. If 
there were no such voids, he argued, light would not be able to pass through 
water and air, nor would heat be able to flow from body to body. (Mason, 
1962, pp. 46-47) 
By most accounts (e.g., Mason, 1962; Sullivan, 1933), intellectual activity was in 
decline in Athens by the time of Strato. The Athenians were defeated by the 
Spartans in 404 B.C., and again by Philip of Macedonia in 338 B.C. The result was a 
general shift in their world views from scientific curiosity to either superstitious 
Stoicism or Epicurean detachment (Mason, 1962, p. 48; McKay, Hill, & Buckler, 
1983a, pp. 130-131). After the vast military conquests of Aristotle's pupil (and son of 
Philip of Macedonia), Alexander the Great, the intellectual center of the Western 
world moved from Athens to the new city of Alexandria in Egypt. 
Alexander's armies took with them engineers, geographers, and surveyors. 
According to Mason, this provided "the means, and perhaps the stimulus, for the 
change in Greek science from the speculative to the empirical which occurred in the 
lifetime of Aristotle" (1962, p. 48). Alexander's reign lasted but a decade, and 
another of Aristotle's pupils, Ptolemy, gained power in Egypt. Due in part to 
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Ptolemy's building of the great library at Alexandria, combined with his efforts to 
collect not only the great writings but the great minds of the era in one place, science 
was kept alive at Alexandria for almost two centuries. The Athenians stigmatized the 
practical arts, but science in the Alexandrian period found new applications in 
medicine, engineering, architecture, geography, and surveying. Many of the scientists 
of this era were also engineers and/or physicians (e.g., Archimedes of Syracuse, 287-
212 B.C.; Herophilus of Chalcedon, circa 300 B.C.). It was during the post-Athenian 
Hellenistic period that the military came to drive scientific and technological pursuits. 
Archimedes developed a number of machines to thwart the Roman army 
In the Hellenistic period the practical applications of the principles of 
mechanics were primarily military, for the building of artillery and siege 
engines. Archimedes built such machines out of necessity, but they were of 
little real interest to him. (McKay, Hill, & Buckler, 1983a, p. 134) 
Archimedes is credited with several inventions still in use today including the 
Archimedian screw for raising and lowering water, and the compound pulley. His 
interests may have been practical, but his methods were decidedly scientific. 
In his works Archimedes presented scientific knowledge as a deductive system 
of theorems from self-evident propositions, like the geometry of Euclid. It is 
possible however that he first obtained his results experimentally, and then 
deduced them from the postulated axioms, for he tells us in his work On 
Method that he made thought experiments in the investigation of areas and 
volumes. He measured the areas of plane figures by weighing, in imagination, 
their shapes cut out of uniform material, thus gaining some insight into their 
relationships, which he then proceeded to demonstrate mathematically. 
(Mason, 1962, p. 51) 
Archimedes befriended Eratosthenes of Cyrene, 285-204 B.C., who is credited with 
the first accurate measurement of the circumference of the earth. Another 
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Alexandrian astronomer, Aristarchus of Samos, 310-230 B.C., measured the distances 
between the earth, moon, and sun, and was the first to propose a heliocentric model 
of the solar system.^^ Erasistratus of Chios, 300-260 B.C., a student of Stratos, 
pursued crude yet scientific experiments, mostly in the area of physiology and 
respiration. Alexandrian contributions to the growth of Western scientific thought 
may have been practical, but that is not to deny them a place of importance. 
Late Alexandrian and Hellenistic contributions to natural philosophy were few 
and seldom original (Mason, 1962). By 200 B.C., the Romans had spread across the 
Mediterranean and extended their arm into Africa, the Far East, and Western 
Europe. Under external pressures, Alexandria went the way of its intellectual 
predecessors Ionia and Athens. "The school of Alexandria declined in the second 
century B.C." (Mason, 1962, p. 57). With its decline, and the subsequent rise of 
Rome's political power, came the decline and decay of science as a means of 
understanding the world. 
Rome and the decline of Western science 
By most accounts, Rome contributed little if anything to the advancement of 
modern Western science. 
The Romans did not add a great deal to science. Their contribution lay 
elsewhere, in the field of organization—the formation of a public medical 
service, the building of roads and aqueducts, the introduction of the Julian 
The influence of Aristotle and his theory that the heavens and earth were separate realms which 
obeyed different laws resulted in the open rejection of the heliocentric model. This rejection would last 
for over a millennium. 
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calendar, and the formulation of Roman law to regulate their organizations. 
(Mason, 1962, p. 61) 
The early Romans had little respect for literature, art, and science; these were 
not the proper concerns of a Roman gentleman. When they did become 
popular, it was largely through the influence of Greek house slaves, following 
the conquest of south Italy. Therefore it was the Greek forms which became 
fashionable; old Roman work was almost wholly lost. (Garraty & Gay, 1972, 
p. 200) 
Sullivan also denies the existence of any scientific contributions made by the Romans. 
In the meantime the [Greek] spirit of disinterested curiosity, and man's delight 
in this new and wonderful mathematical faculty, withered and died under the 
cold blight of the Roman Empire. The Romans were essentially practical 
people, and they adopted the 'What is the use of it?' attitude towards all 
abstract speculation. Such science as they had was borrowed from the Greeks, 
and they seem to have valued it solely for its practical applications in 
medicine, agriculture, architecture, and engineering. As a natural 
consequence of their obsession with practical affairs the Romans created 
nothing in science. (Sullivan, 1933, p. 10) 
Thus, apparently, the Roman emphasis on practical affairs did not result in an 
ongoing focus on the empirical way of knowing in regard to science. 
The strength of the Greek intellect was the awareness and reliance on a 
variety of competing ways of knowing, including faith, logic, aesthetics, revelation, 
etc.—the Romans lacked this flexible worldview. The Romans eventually came to 
appreciate Greek art and literature but had little appreciation for the intellectual 
culture that produced it—especially Greek natural philosophy and the "curious 
delight" the Greeks found in pursuit of nature's secrets (Sullivan, 1933, p. 10; Mason, 
1962, p. 62). Roman science was a practical political science of governmental, 
military, and economic means and ends. As such, it built the largest empire the 
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Western world had yet known. The many administrative problems of ruling the 
largest empire in the world need not be outlined here. The greatest of these 
problems was maintaining a credible ideology in the face of a multitude of cultural 
influences and political problems. This was accomplished by elevating the 
importance of faith as a way of knowing. Other-worldly Christian faith—not a faith 
in this-worldly science— would provide the framework within which the Roman 
government could assert its credibility and mobilize its subjects (McKay, Hill, & 
Buckler, 1983a, pp. 187-188). 
The medieval period 
Thus, logic and this-worldly empiricism faded as predominant ways of knowing 
and were replaced by faith and the authority of the church. It was St. Augustine, 354-
430 B.C., who finally consolidated the various Christian sects into a unified church 
and ideology. St. Augustine's goal was to take the philosophy of the earlier Greeks 
and "remove all elements except for faith" as the primary way of knowing (St. 
Thomas Aquinas in Donner, Eble, & Helbling, 1967, p. 265). 
With one mighty stroke of his pen, the great saint [Augustine] had banned an 
almost complete catalogue of the ancient sciences he told [his 
contemporaries] to raise up their eyes to heaven and, most explicitly, forget 
about the things of this earth. (Goldstein, 1980, p. 57) 
St. Augustine and the medieval fathers of the Roman Catholic Church rewrote 
history to reflect Platonic idealism coupled with an omnipotent other-worldly god. 
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According to Goldstein, only an other-worldly ideology such as that of St. Augustine's 
medieval Christianity could rebuild the ruins of the Roman Empire. 
The end of Roman civilization in the West... would have left a mood of 
collective despair, an orgy of bleak and impenetrable hopelessness, had it not 
been for the inspiration of Christianity. (Goldstein, 1980, p. 55) 
Christian teachings offered a hope for the victims of the catastrophe [of the 
fall of the Roman Empire]. The hope—the only hope the gigantic disaster 
could conceivably leave in its wake—rested in the conviction of the essential 
unreality of the things of this world, in contrast to the abiding reality of an 
invisible world that, by its very nature, had to remain immune from the shocks 
of secular experience. If the original Christian faith had contained certain 
world-denying elements, a handful of religious philosophers, the Latin fathers 
of the church, reinterpreted basic Christian teachings to suit the new mood of 
the Western world in order to alleviate the despair that afflicted [the] 
community. Where original Christianity held out the hope of an afterlife by 
stressing the chance of salvation for every Christian follower of Christ who 
would mold his life to prepare himself for heaven, the new "Western" 
Christianity asked for the complete denial of the world of the senses, asserting 
that life in this world is neither of primary significance nor, in a philosophical 
sense, actually "real" it was probably the only ideology by which the West 
could hope to survive. It proved its vigor and vitality by ruling the Western 
mind for almost a thousand years. (Goldstein, 1980, pp. 55-56) 
If religious faith and authority answers all questions about the nature and origins of 
humans and the universe, science is not a necessary social construction within that 
particular culture. 
Science seems to grow most luxuriantly in cultures with a positive attitude 
toward the world of the senses; it appears to wither in cultures with an 
emphatically spiritual, otherworldly bent. (Goldstein, 1980, p. 43) 
Most sources agree that from the advent and fall of the Roman Empire to the 
Renaissance nothing of significance was produced in Western science (Sullivan, 1933, 
p. 11). 
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The ensuing centuries in Europe, up to the time of the Renaissance, also 
produced nothing in science. But this was not because the medievalists were 
exclusively absorbed by practical affairs. On the contrary, some of the greatest 
abstract thinkers the world has ever produced appeared at this time. But they 
had an outlook on life that made science unnecessary. Science could tell them 
nothing that they wanted to know, and they had no curiosity about the sort of 
things science could tell them. The medievalist lived in an orderly universe. 
He knew the principles on which it was constructed, and he knew the meaning 
and purpose of everything in it. He knew the scheme of creation; he knew the 
end that every created thing was made to serve. He derived this information 
from two sources, reason and revelation. The highest discoveries of the 
human reason were embodied in the works of Aristotle; the Scriptures 
contained divine revelations on matters not accessible to reason. By 
synthesizing these two kinds of information everything worth knowing could be 
learned.... The medievalist lived in a purposeftil universe of which he 
himself was the centre. The reason why phenomena existed was to be found in 
their bearing on the eternal destiny of man. Nothing had any meaning except 
in so far as it fitted into this great logical scheme. In this atmosphere it is 
obvious that science would appear to be a trivial activity. It could be of no real 
importance, for the reason that it was concerned with merely secondary 
questions. How things happened was of no importance compared with the 
question of why they happened. Even Roger Bacon, the one man of his time 
who insisted in the experimental investigation of nature, agreed that the 
importance of this investigation was that it would assist in elucidating theology. 
It was only when faith in the all-pervading purposefulness of natural 
phenomena had faded that the scientific method of inquiry became important. 
(Sullivan, 1933, p. 11) 
At the end of the Dark Ages^"^ faith and reasoned logic were combined to form 
scholasticism, the primary philosophy of the times. Scholasticism explained all 
purpose and origin of the origin in divine terms, however, humans, through reason, 
could come to realize and understand this divine plan. Interestingly, two ideas were 
coming together that would later provide the cracks for science to seep back into the 
The Dark Ages are usually defined as the time in the Western world from the fall of Rome to about 
1000 B.C. when the Roman Catholic Church started to promote intellectual activities and founded one of 
the first universities in Bologna circa 1088 B.C.. 
Western worldview: logic as a valid way of knowing and nature as a rational and 
predictable force. 
The influence of Islam and the East 
Meanwhile, the science of the Greeks was absorbed by the growing influence 
of Islam throughout the Middle East and Africa. This influence expanded as far west 
as Spain, where Cordova became one of the few intellectual centers of Western 
Europe at the time (Mason, 1962, pp. 100-101; McKay, Hill, & Buckler, 1983a, pp. 
248-249). In the eighth century. Islamic men of science were asked to come to both 
Damascus and Baghdad, where they studied the works of Aristotle and other Greek 
natural philosophers. Islam, from its conception, has had an unusual combination of 
both this-worldly and other-worldly concerns. The Muslim faith differs from the 
Christian faith of the Dark Ages in one important way: The Islamic religion 
encourages this-worldly scientific and political pursuits, while the focus of medieval 
Christianity was strictly other-worldly, in spite of the explicit utilization of scholastic 
"reason" in both cases. It was the this-worldly focus of Islam which kept Western 
science alive during the medieval period. 
The great influence of Islam on Western science and culture should not, 
however, overshadow the importance of Eastern science and culture to the West (see 
Mason, 1962, pp. 73-102). The Chinese, for example, developed complex irrigational 
technologies, papermaking, and metallurgy as early as 1500 B.C. Chinese medicine 
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and astronomy were considerably more advanced than those of the Ancient Greeks of 
the same era. India also was known for its metallurgy, as well as complex 
mathematics and the discovery of zero as a number. Even so, most of these 
innovations came to the West indirectly through Islam due to the fact that the broad 
scope of Islam's influence attracted important scientific ideas and practices from 
India and the Far East. According to McKay, Hill, and Buckler, "Arabic knowledge 
of science and mathematics, derived from the Chinese, Greeks, and Hindus, was 
highly sophisticated" (1983a, p. 249). Islam not only kept science alive for its later 
rediscovery in the West, but "Arabic mathematics, medicine, philosophy, and science 
played a decisive role in the formation of European culture" (McKay, Hill, & 
Buckler, 1983a, p. 249). 
The growing schism between reason, faith, and authority 
It was by accident that the eleventh century European religious scholars 
opened the door which would lead the West out of the Dark Ages and on the 
Renaissance path to Enlightenment. The existing ideology of the church, inherited 
from St. Augustine, made it clear that all ontological questions had already been 
answered through god and expressed by Platonic other-worldly idealism. Throughout 
the west, from the early conception of the Roman Catholic Church, religious scholars 
were wholly dependent upon the initial translations of Greek philosophy by the first 
fathers of the church. These translations consisted mostly of selectively edited non-
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secular Platonic idealism purged of all secular references. Furthermore, medieval 
religious scholars were required to work exclusively in their native Latin. Thus, they 
could not have read or understood ancient Greek even if such sources were available. 
The growing influence of scholasticism and the increasing support of education by the 
church led to a renewed interest in the original Greek texts (mainly to seek additional 
historical support for existing church doctrines). However, the language barrier had 
yet to be overcome. Many Western philosophers and scholars could read Arabic. 
This is where Islam found the opportunity to share the rich and vast knowledge it had 
acquired while alternative ways of knowing lay dormant in the West. 
Western philosophers still could not read Greek, but Arabic philosophers, who 
could, had begun translating Aristotle into their own language as early as the 
ninth century. Arabic and Christian culture had a meeting ground in Spain, 
where a Moslem culture had flourished alongside a Christian one since the 
eighth century. Toward the middle of the twelfth century Christian scholars in 
Spain began translating the works of Arabic philosophers into Latin, and by 
the end of the century almost the entire body of Aristotelian thought was 
available in that language. Until that time. Christian scholars had been pretty 
much confined in their knowledge of Greek thought to the adaptations of 
Platonic philosophy incorporated into the writings of the Fathers of the 
Church. (Donner, Eble, & Helbling, 1967, p. 314) 
What the Christian scholars found was not a historical foundation for existing 
"truths," but a serious challenge to the very authority that encouraged the logical 
pursuit of divine truth to start with. The knowledge possessed by the Greeks was 
comprehensive, enlightening, and empirically sound. Nature proved to be orderly 
and predictable, but not necessarily as a result of other-worldly predestination. The 
other-worldly ontology which permeated the ideology of the church for nearly a 
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millennium was now challenged by the practical this-worldly science of Aristotle and 
his pupils. 
It is the origin and the basis of the Platonic and Augustinian Catholic doctrine 
to the effect that the sensed world is not the real world, and that the sensed 
self is not the real self but merely the symbol or sign of more real or immortal 
self beyond. In fact, it was the Platonic formulation of this distinction between 
the "sensed world" and the "real world," coming through Plotinus and 
Augustine, which in considerable part defined the original orthodoxy of the 
Roman Catholic Church [Aristotle] found himself forced to say that the 
real world is the sensed world, and that there are consequently no ideas in the 
intellect which are not first given through the senses this Aristotelian 
thesis seemed to the churchmen in Abèlard's time tantamount to pulling God 
and Christ's divinity down into the gutter. (Northrop, 1946, pp. 263-264) 
The very foundations of the Roman Catholic Church were shaken. The translation of 
Aristotle and other Greek naturalists into Latin prompted a legitimation crisis in the 
church itself and raised new questions which existing dogma could not address. 
[Religious scholars] now found themselves confronted with a comprehensive, 
orderly, generally convincing philosophic system that accounted for every 
phenomenon of human experience on the basis of reason alone. It posed a 
challenge of the same kind as that met by the early Fathers—to show that the 
Christian faith was not at odds with, but was a necessary addition to, human 
reason. Establishing a harmony between faith and reason, between Christian 
theology and Aristotelian philosophy, became the main concern of theologians 
during the next few centuries. (Donner, Eble, & Helbling, 1967, p. 314) 
Nevertheless, as the centuries following the coming of the Arabs to Spain 
passed and European scholars generally, such as Albertus Magnus, became 
more and more acquainted with the original Greek scientific and philosophical 
treatises, and were therefore brought face to face with the fact that the 
Platonic [idealistic] science had broken down in Greek times before 
indisputable mathematical evidence and had been replaced by the Aristotelian 
[naturalistic] science, even Catholic scientists and theologians and the church 
itself were forced to give way to the Aristotelian scientific influence. 
(Northrop, 1946, p. 264) 
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As Kuhn might predict, the conditions were thus ripe for the emergence of an 
alternative worldview. 
The scholastic tradition 
Science owes its resuscitation at the end of the medieval period to the Roman 
Catholic Church. The main reason for this "debt" is that all intellectual activity and 
education throughout the Middle Ages was centered around the church and theology. 
One of the first challenges to traditional conservative theology occurred in France at 
Chartres—and was accompanied by other dramatic changes in the new emerging 
worldview. 
We tend to think that it was the Church as an institution that was blocking 
serious scientific progress (if not all serious rational thought), but such modern 
generalizations amount to oversimplifications. Chartres itself was evidently a 
Church-sponsored cathedral school. The teachers were frocked and robed 
members of the clergy. The new initiative for the study of science was 
developed under the protecting hand of one of the most respected bishophrics 
and cathedral chapters of Medieval France. Since the Church, way into the 
high Middle Ages, exercised an almost total monopoly over the intellectual 
life, the situation could hardly have been otherwise. Virtually any important 
new intellectual movement had to originate in some quarter of a not-as-yet 
fully centralized (or dogmatically monolithic) Roman Catholic Church. 
(Goldstein, 1980, p. 76) 
According to Goldstein, Chartres "took the lead in reconstructing the scientific 
knowledge of the Ancient World, thereby establishing a firm basis for the coming 
evolution of Western science" (1980, p. 76). This move, however, was not without its 
critics. 
[Early] conservative critics of the new scientific world-view were really little 
more than that—conservatives, people unable to adjust their thinking to new 
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insights and ideas, typical representatives of the inevitable slowness of the 
human mind.... By the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas was to show 
through trenchant philosophical argument that scientific rationalism and 
empiricism are perfectly compatible with a mystic or religious conception of 
the world, as long as rationalism remains aware of its metaphysical limitations. 
That the historic conflict did not end then and there may prove that it was 
largely nourished by mutual misunderstandings. 
Thus, St. Thomas Aquinas, 1225-1274, a Dominican friar, set out to resolve the 
growing schism between natural philosophy,faith, and authority that resulted from 
the translation of Aristotle's works into Latin. His explicit goal was to unite reason as 
a way of knowing with faith and revelation to form a "sacred science" (Aquinas, 
1967). 
Sacred doctrine is a science. We must bear in mind that there are two kinds of 
sciences. There are some that proceed from a principle known by the natural 
light of the intelligence [i.e., Aristotelian logic], such as arithmetic and 
geometry and the like. There are some which proceed from principles known 
by the light of a higher science: thus the science of perspective [i.e., empirical 
science] proceeds from principles established by arithmetic. So it is that 
sacred doctrine is a science, because it proceeds from principles established by 
the light of a higher science, namely, the science of God and the blessed. 
Hence, just as the musician accepts on authority the principles taught him by 
the mathematician, so sacred science is established on principles revealed by 
God. (Aquinas, 1967, p. 317) 
The general philosophy of Aquinas followed that of Aristotle—a teleological 
worldview in which everything exists for the "final cause" of achieving God's intended 
purpose. Since both origin and final cause of all things are divine, science itself also 
has to realize its divine origins and ends. Aquinas' first premise is that reason is a 
At this time, natural philosophy began to have the title "science" attached to it. However, note that 
this "science" still lacked the positivistic methodological characteristics that we deOne Western normal 
science by today. 
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necessary means to understanding worldly purposes and "final ends." He also accepts 
the necessity of empirical ways of knowing. 
It is befitting Holy Writ to put forward divine and spiritual truths by means of 
comparisons with material things. For God provides for everything according 
to the capacity of its nature. Now it is natural for man to attain to intellectual 
truths through sensible objects [i.e., objects perceived through the senses], 
because all our knowledge originates through sense. Hence in Holy Writ 
spiritual truths are fittingly taught under the likeness of material things. 
(Aquinas, 1967, p. 325) 
These first two premises form the basic tenets of Aristotelian science. However, 
Aquinas also adds a third premise in his search for a common ground between 
science and theology: the importance of revelation and faith as primary ways of 
knowing. 
It was necessary for man's salvation that there should be a knowledge revealed 
by God, besides philosophical science built up by human reason Certain 
truths which exceed human reason should be made known to him by divine 
revelation Although those things which are beyond man's knowledge may 
not be sought for by man through his reason, nevertheless, once they are 
revealed by God they must be accepted by faith. (Aquinas, 1967, p. 316-317) 
Found within the secular context of Aquinas' writings is the this-worldly contention 
that nature is orderly, predictable, and understandable. This, combined with logical 
and empirical ways of knowing, formed the crack in which Science seeped back into 
the general worldview of the West. This move by the church allowed for one more 
thing that had been absent for the duration of the medieval period: freedom of 
thought and the possibility of competing ways of knowing. Much like the Classical 
period in Greece where aesthetics, logic, sensual empiricism, affectivity, and other 
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ways of knowing formed a broad and rich cultural base, the road paved by Aquinas 
led to a Renaissance of culture, science, and a rich variety of ways of knowing and 
understanding the world and man's place in it. 
The Renaissance and a diversity of knowing and being 
The focus on individual reasoning and responsibility (combined with a certain 
balance between empirical observation and revelation) as the way to spiritual 
enlightenment ushered in a new emphasis on this-worldly individualism. This focus 
on and acceptance of individual—as opposed to other-worldly metaphysical— 
concerns evolved into the primary philosophical doctrine of the Renaissance: 
humanism. Humanism is concerned with the study of this-worldly human endeavors 
and accompUshments (i.e., the humanities), "a conscious return to classical ideals and 
forms, and a rejection of medieval religious authority" (Concise Columbia 
Encyclopedia: Microsoft Bookshelf Edition. 1992). It was during this period that 
sense experience may have reached its peak as a primary way of knowing. The 
Renaissance is often called the "Age of Adventure" or "Age of Discovery" (see 
Santillana, 1956). During this period 
between 1450 and 1550, America is discovered [by Europeans], together with 
the Pacific and South Atlantic oceans, the world is circumnavigated and its 
real size understood; the Copemican theory denies the common idea of a well 
enclosed universe with the Earth at the center; the Reformation breaks out all 
over Western Europe; and 20 million volumes come out of the presses to 
replace handwriting. (Santillana, 1956, p. 9) 
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In one sense the most important discovery of the time was not man's discovery of the 
world, but instead, man's [re]discovery of himself. Renaissance philosopher Pico, 
1463-1494, succinctly outlined the humanist worldview in his assertion that 
The true distinction of man... [is that] he has no fixed properties but has the 
power to share in the properties of all other beings, according to his own free 
choice. He is a universal and protean agent of transformation, hence it 
behooves him to orient his soul properly towards the good, so as not to use his 
powers wrongly. (Pico, in Santillana, 1956, p. 15) 
At last it seems to me I have come to understand why man is the most 
fortunate of creatures and consequently worthy of all administration and what 
precisely is that rank which is his lot in the universal chain of Being—a rank to 
be envied not only by brutes but even by the stars and by minds beyond this 
world. It is a matter past faith [italics added] and a wondrous one. Why 
should it not be? For it is on this very account that man is rightly called and 
judged a great miracle and a wondrous creature indeed To him it is 
granted to have whatever he chooses, to be whatever he wills. (Pico, 1967, pp. 
425-426) 
With Pico and other Renaissance humanists one finds a shift from the medieval focus 
on predestination and other-worldly concerns to a sensual this-worldly appreciation 
for man and his potential works. Several great thinkers of the time dealt heavy blows 
to the medieval worldview and authority of the church. 
Erasmus, 1466-1536, the great humanist, dedicated the larger part of his life to 
an advocacy of human free will and individual responsibility. Martin Luther, 1483-
1546, the "Great Reformer" of the church and initiator of the Reformation 
movement, asserted the importance of this-worldly responsibility, but disagreed with 
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the free will assertions of the humanists.!^ Luther saw faith and reason as 
incompatible ways of knowing. According to Luther, "You cannot accept both the 
Bible and reason; one or the other must go" (Luther, in Donner, Eble, and Helbling, 
1967, p. 604). Indeed, across the West, faith in the church was progressively 
deteriorating. Concurrently, Copernicus, 1473-1543, proposed the heliocentric model 
of the solar system in which mankind is found, not in the center, but on the edge. 
This violated not only the scriptures but also the highly esteemed and orderly Earth-
centered celestial spheres of Aristotle and Ptolemy (even so, the heliocentric model 
was still not accepted due to the still-growing influence of and respect for Aristotle 
and his writings). The removal of man from his divine center in the universe was the 
final blow to the authority of the church and opened the way for this-worldly secular 
humanism as a predominant worldview. Such a worldview opens a whole new realm 
of intellectual possibilities previously closed by the other-worldly ideology of the 
church. 
With the freedom of thought and this-worldly focus of the Renaissance 
worldview, other ways of knowing manifested themselves within the culture of the 
times. Empirical and kinesthetic ways of knowing combined with aesthetic ways of 
Luther still saw God as the prime mover of men's wills and fates (i.e., predestination and divine 
order). What Luther sought was to shift "divine truths" from Catholic scripture and ritual to the everyday 
lives and responsibilities of men. He is often misinterpreted to be a proponent of individualism and free 
will, but this was an argument against, not for, individual free will and the general secular liberal-
humanist doctrine. However, his overt challenge to the authority of the church actually resulted in the 
further advancement of the humanist movement along side the spread of the Reformation across Europe 
over the next century. 
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knowing to create some of the greatest art, music, and architecture ever known. 
Aesthetic and affective ways of knowing also contributed to art, music, and especially 
romantic poetry.2° Other-worldly religious faith, authority, and tradition were 
replaced by a concern for the this-worldly ethical responsibilities of everyday men and 
women.2i 
Questions about the relationship of man, god, and nature became paramount 
not only in formal philosophy but to common citizens as well—this was before the 
fragmentation of knowledge into competing "disciplines" within the modern 
university system. Thus, the intellectuals of the Renaissance were eloquently versed 
in the arts, sciences, literature, philosophy, politics, and whatever else took their fancy 
at the time. Most importantly for the emergence of the Classical scientific paradigm, 
logic and reason became the accepted methods for the pursuit of knowledge about 
the world. Given that the primary epistemological shift in the Renaissance was from 
detached sanctimony to this-worldly aestheticism and sensuality, it follows that the 
logical way of knowing would attach itself to empirical-kinesthetic means of 
understanding. This is indeed what happened. The result was the "dawn of modern 
science" (Goldstein, 1980). 
Science itself profited greatly from the technical advances made in art—especially the scientific areas 
of anatomy and geography (see Goldstein, 1980, pp. 188-241). 
This-worldly ethical responsibility was the one thing that Luther and humanists agreed on. 
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Renaissance science was not limited to the modern day components of logic 
and empiricism. Renaissance science also relied heavily on revelation, aesthetic, and 
affective ways of knowing. In particular, the science of this period was closely tied to 
art.22 This is best illustrated by the work and life of Leonardo da Vinci, 1452-1519. 
Da Vinci remained on the fringes, if not outside the mainstream, of scientific 
thought (Goldstein, 1980, p. 231; Santillana, 1956, pp. 67-68). He lacked academic 
training and maintained an almost child-like fascination with nature and aesthetics. 
His indefatigable endeavor surveys the whole terrain of experience in search 
of the outline of a science as yet dimly seen but which he thinks can be 
eventually grasped only from the whole. (Santillana, 1956, p. 70) 
Da Vinci was obsessed with the "nature" of things and how we, as acting human 
beings, come to understand and appreciate them. 
Who would believe that so small a space could contain the images of all of the 
universe? O mighty process! What talent can avail to penetrate a nature such 
a thine? What tongue will it be that can unfold so great a wonder? (Da Vinci, 
in Santillana, 1956, p. 84) 
With da Vinci, science becomes irreversibly grounded in empirical observation. He is 
known to have solved various engineering problems experimentally through model 
building (Mason, 1962, p. 149). The scientific manner of thought drove da Vinci and 
all his work. He sought to understand and capture "reality" as it is experienced, and 
then represent that reality in such a way that others might experience and understand 
it in the same fashion. 
22 Art is typically understood as the result of combining aesthetic and affective ways of knowing. This 
combination typically relies on an empirical-kinesthetic or sensual process of creation. 
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Perception and creation went hand in hand. So did his science and art: he 
sketched while jotting down observations, often to illustrate a point. 
Frequently his notes related directly to his painting, in that he desired a more 
minute understanding of visual phenomenon—the way the sunlight's reflection 
on a leaf depended on the leafs transparency; the way a shadow is cast over an 
object or human face; the structure of a particular bone. The observer of 
nature was helped by the painter; the artist by the scientist. (Goldstein, 1980, 
p. 237) 
Da Vinci also recognized that mathematics could be used to describe reality. He is 
quoted (in Santillana, 1956, p. 78; also Mason, 1962, p. 149) as saying "There is no 
certainty where one of the mathematical sciences cannot be applied." In spite of his 
lack of a formal education and his general rejection by scientific peers,^ da Vinci 
epitomized what would become the "scientific mind" of the Classical paradigm. 
He was the culmination of the continuous Medieval and Renaissance tradition 
of science, as well as the first brilliant example of the modem scientific mind. 
More than anyone else, Leonardo, with his universal approach to the world, 
embodies the evolution of scientific thought from its medieval beginnings via 
the Renaissance to the present. (Goldstein, 1980, p. 239) 
If the first modern scientific mind is attributed to da Vinci, the modern scientific 
method must surely be attributed to Galileo. 
Galileo Galilei, 1564-1642, is sometimes referred to as the "father of modem 
science" (Capra, 1991, p. 22). According to Einstein and Infeld, 
The discovery and use of scientific reasoning by Galileo was one of the most 
important achievements in the history of human thought, and marks the real 
begiiming of physics, (Einstein & Infeld, 1938, p. 6) 
^ He was rejected for a variety of reasons. Within the literature one finds that he was openly criticized 
for his pauper background, his lack of academic credentials, and also his failure to publish any signiHcant 
scientific treatises. He had a few unusual habits including a paranoia which prompted him to write 
everything backwards such that a mirror was required to read it. Accusations of homosexuality and 
heresy also tarnished the man's reputation as a scholar and scientist. (And all these accusations 
flourished without a tabloid press!) 
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Galileo was the first to consistently rely on experimentation in his rational-scientific 
pursuits. He is referred to by Brownowski & Mazlish (1962, p. 119) as the "first 
leader of practical science and pioneer of the empirical method." Galileo anticipated 
Newton's laws of motion and, using the telescope which he invented, found 
irrefutable empirical evidence for Copernicus' heliocentric model of the solar system 
(in spite of the fact that, to save his own life after being accused of heresy by the still-
powerful church, Galileo would later be forced to recant his support for the model). 
He made many contributions to science, particularly in the areas of astronomy and 
physics, but his most significant contribution to the Classical paradigm was 
undoubtedly his insistence on empirical experimentation as the foundation of the 
scientific method. Galileo, however, was not the sole originator of the scientific 
method during this period. 
In France, René Descartes, 1596-1650, attempted to create a science based on 
pure mathematical deduction, or mathesis universalis. According to Descartes, there 
is a strict separation between the objective and subjective worlds. 
Ultimate or ontological reality, according to Descartes, consists of substance.. 
.. It is in reference to created substances, man and the universe [in contrast 
with God, which is taken a priori and makes "reality" possible], that Cartesian 
Metaphysical Dualism applies. That is to say, the ultimate universe is 
composed of two distinct and separate entities: mind and matter, or soul 
substance and corporeal substance (thinking substance and bodily substance).. 
.. Corporeal substance has the quality of filling space, spatiality, while 
thinking substance (soul, mind) has the quality of (non-spatial) consciousness. 
Whatever exists must be either one or the other, and whatever is not conscious 
must be spatial, and vice versa, so that everything is either body or mind, 
spatial or conscious. (Sahakian, 1968, pp. 137-138) 
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This assertion had important implications for the Classical scientific paradigm. 
The 'Cartesian' division [between mind and matter] allowed scientists to treat 
matter as dead and completely separate from themselves, and to see the 
material world as a multitude of different objects assembled into a huge 
machine. (Capra, 1991, p. 22) 
Given that all reality is either object or subject, thing or thought, matter or mind, 
Descartes concluded that "the only thing that can be esteemed true is that there is 
absolutely nothing certain" (Descartes, 1641/1961, p. 37). Thus science, according to 
Descartes, should start from the point of pure reason, since 
it is now manifest to me that bodies themselves are not properly perceived by 
the senses nor by the faculty of imagination, but by the intellect alone; and 
since they are not perceived because they are seen and touched, but only 
because they are understood [or rightly comprehended by thought], I readily 
discover that there is nothing more easily or clearly apprehended than my own 
mind. (Descartes, 1641/1961, p. 42) 
According to Descartes, if the starting point of the scientific method is in the intellect, 
the scientific process much follow a deductive course. 
Thought, in the form of critical doubt, was the only tool the scientist could 
trust. In solving problems, the simplest possible solution should be examined 
first and after that the more complex. Straight lines should be postulated 
before curves. In thinking through a problem, Descartes used the analytical 
approach. He imagined the problem solved and looked at the consequences 
of the solution. In doing so, he would quickly realise whether his solution had 
been right or wrong. (Burke, 1985, p. 155) 
Descartes distrusted the senses and placed the emphasis of science on reason and 
logical deduction. This formed the primary assumption of the Renaissance 
philosophical system referred to as rationalism. 
The Rationalist philosophy of Renaissance Continental Europe held that truth 
is derived from reason, that reason is superior to, as well as independent of. 
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sense experience, and that knowledge is deducible from a priori concepts or 
necessary ideas. (Sahakian, 1968, p. 132) 
Descartes also created a new language for the expression of these logical 
relationships in the objective world: analytical geometry. Thus, from Descartes, the 
Classical scientific paradigm acquired several essential attributes. These include the 
focus on analytical reasoning and mathematics, the strict separation of objective and 
subjective phenomena^ (i.e., metaphysical duaUsm), and a renewal of the 
Aristotelian deductive method which could now be adapted to quantitative analysis. 
Meanwhile, the scientific method in Great Britain was being formulated on more 
pragmatic and empirical foundations. 
William Gilbert, 1544-1603, as court physician to Queen Elizabeth I and 
James I, pursued complex scientific experiments with electricity and magnetism. 
Gilbert was the first to distinguish between electricity and magnetism, coining the 
term electricity circa 1600. Gilbert is known for his meticulous experimental 
procedures, the use of controls, and his reliance on empirical data. The Lord 
Chancellor of England under James I, Francis Bacon, 1561-1626, is also well known 
for his writings on the scientific method. His primary goal was to unite the existing 
craft traditions with the scholarly tradition, based on empirical experimentation 
(Mason, 1962, pp. 141-142). Bacon was philosopher, not a scientist (Mason, 1962, p. 
141). His first major work. The Advancement of Learning (1605), analyzed 
^ Previously referred to herein as a symptom of ontological "schizophrenia." 
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philosophy and the scholarly tradition from the Early Greeks through the scholastic 
period. In the preface to his unfinished and unpublished work The Great Instauration 
(circa 1620, reprinted in Kaufmann, 1961, pp. 3-9), Bacon lays out his famous method 
of induction based on an unyielding empiricism. 
Now what the sciences stand in need of is a form of induction which shall 
analyze experience and take it to pieces, and by a due process of exclusion and 
rejection lead to an inevitable conclusion... not merely out of the depths of 
the mind but out of the very bowels of nature I have sought on all sides 
diligently and faithfully to provide helps for the sense—substitutes to supply its 
failures, rectifications to correct its errors; and this I hope to accomplish not so 
much by instruments as by experiments. For the subtlety of experiments is far 
greater than that of the sense itself, even when assisted by exquisite 
instruments; such experiments, I mean, as are skillfully and artificially devised 
for the express purpose of determining the point in question. To the 
immediate and proper perception of the sense therefore I do not give much 
weight; but I contrive that the office of the sense shall be only to judge of the 
experiment, and that the experiment itself shall judge of the thing. (Bacon, in 
Kaufmann, 1961, pp. 5-6) 
Bacon's assertion was that experimentation could overcome the limitations of the 
senses, in addition to the limitations of logic alone. Bacon (1605/1973, pp. 33-34) 
openly spoke out against the "mixing" of different ways of knowing in the name of 
science. He spoke specifically of Plato's confounding of logic and theology, 
Aristotle's failure to distinguish between logic and philosophy (i.e., revelation), and 
the overall tendency to confuse true (i.e., inductive and empirical) knowledge with 
history and authority. Bacon concluded that the only true knowledge is knowledge 
derived through empirical experimentation—knowledge turned back on itself to press 
for empirical proofs of its own validity. Like Descartes, Bacon separated the 
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objective from the subjective and located the human mind outside of the "real" 
objective world. He also correctly identified the two ways of knowing which would 
form the basis of the Classical scientific paradigm: empirical-kinesthetic and logical-
rational. Bacon's method would supposedly unite these ways of knowing as the direct 
result of experimentation—thus minimizing the inherent limitations of the senses and 
the intellect when taken and applied in isolation of each other. 
The method of obtaining hypotheses from tables of facts could be applied, he 
thought, to hypotheses themselves to get axioms of wider generality. At each 
stage of the process the hypotheses, axioms, or theories were to be tested 
experimentally, and applied to human uses if suitable Bacon's view of the 
scientific method was essentially experimental, qualitative, and inductive. 
(Mason, 1962, p. 145) 
Mathematical descriptions were the only element of the Classical paradigm not found 
in the work of Bacon. This is probably due to the fact that he was more versed in 
philosophy than in the natural sciences, however, he did have strong attachments to 
the craft tradition. Bacon proposed qualitative and logical proofs other than 
mathematical ones (Galileo, in Italy, and Descartes, in France, would more than 
compensate for Bacon's quantitative shortcomings). Bacon's empirical-inductive 
methodology still forms the definitive basis of science as it is practiced today, 
particularly in its positive forms. The practical positivist in Bacon saw science as the 
tool to free man from the limits of nature. Nature appeared as a negative force to be 
conquered and scientific knowledge could provide the means by which man could 
wield the power to do so (Bacon, 1605/1973, pp. 56-57). 
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[The] commandment of knowledge is et higher than the commandment over 
the will; for it is the commandment over the reason, belief, and understanding 
of man, which is the highest part of the mind, and giveth law to the will itself. 
For there is no power on earth which setteth up a throne or chair of state in 
the spirits and souls of men, and in their cogitations, imaginations, opinions, 
and beliefs, but knowledge and learning. (Bacon, 1605/1973, p. 57) 
These ideas of the redeeming social value of science and knowledge formed the core 
philosophy and ideology of the Enlightenment. 
Although the Renaissance era and the emerging scientific perspective resulted 
directly from a diverse culture sympathetic to several different ways of knowing and 
understanding, by the end of the Renaissance, humanism was being transformed into 
scientific positivism, relying primarily on empirical and logical-rational ways of 
knowing and understanding. By the end of the Renaissance, the Classical scientific 
paradigm had nearly all of its assumptions laid out. These included an almost 
exclusive reliance on empirical and rational ways of knowing, a reliance on 
experimentation and proof as its primary methodology, and the systematic reduction 
of nature to mathematical relationships and forms as its goal. With the removal of 
the subjective from the "real world," many ways of knowing (e.g., affective-emotive, 
aesthetic, faith, history and tradition) were placed outside of—if not antithetical to— 
the new science. The rich Renaissance culture and sensual humanism that had 
spawned science from a multitude of ways of knowing now sought to separate the 
mind from the body, object from subject, and man from nature. Even so, the goal of 
the new science was emancipatory. Emancipatory not in the sense of saving man 
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from man, but to release man from the reigns of nature, which was now an enemy to 
be conquered both intellectually and pragmatically.^ Only one thing was lacking: a 
comprehensive scientific theory which explained, for man's benefit, the workings of 
nature once and for all. At the end of the Renaissance and dawn of the 
Enlightenment, Sir Isaac Newton would provide that final component. 
Newton and the crystallization of normal science 
Sir Isaac Newton, 1642-1727, mathematician, physicist, academician, and 
President of the highly esteemed Royal Society for 24 years, is "considered by many 
to be the greatest scientist of all time" (Concise Columbia Encyclopedia: Microsoft 
Bookshelf Edition. 1992). Einstein and Infeld (1938), though they attribute the title 
of "first scientist" to Galileo, award Newton the distinction of being the originator of 
the mechanical (i.e.. Classical) scientific worldview. 
Newton's mechanical approach first assumed that the universe, being created 
by God, was an orderly place operating in accordance with predetermined "natural 
laws." The goal of the scientist was to empirically seek out and understand these 
^ Note the shift in world view from one of almost childish curiosity about nature found at the beginning 
of the Renaissance to one of dominance and control over nature which predominates at the end of the 
period. 
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laws, aiming for the ability to predict future occurrences based on mathematical and 
empirical knowledge of what has happened in other cases.^^ 
In his discussion of the scientific method Newton adopted the view that the 
starting point for physico-mathematical deductions should be experimentally 
observed effects or laws and that the deductions should lead to the explanation 
or prediction of other observable effects Newton thus specified that it was 
the observed effects and laws of mechanical motion which should serve as the 
starting point for mathematical demonstrations in natural philosophy 
explaining the unknown in terms of the known was explicit in Newton's work. 
(Mason, 1962, p. 202) 
Newton proceeded to answer all the persistent questions of natural philosophy in an 
orderly and elegant manner, including the age-old problems of matter, motion, heat, 
light, etc. Newton's conclusion was that time, space, matter, and motion were 
measurable, predictable, absolute quantities working (like a clock) in accordance with 
predetermined natural laws. These laws could be expressed and understood 
mathematically and arrived at through empirical observations guided by logical 
deductions. This Classical scientific worldview has "persisted right down to the 
twentieth century" (Mason, 1962, p. 207). It could be said that all science up to the 
time of Maxwell and Einstein (and most thereafter) is no more than an addendum to 
Newton and Newton's empirical, mathematical, and logico-deductive method. 
Newton tended to follow the deductive, mathematical, empirically grounded path set by Galileo other 
than that pioneered by Descartes (deductive, mathematical, logcally grounded) or that of Bacon 
(inductive, qualitative, empirically grounded). Newton, however, did subscribe to Descartes' "machine 
view" of the universe and, whether admittedly or not, most often began with hypothetical situations (i.e., 
grounded only in logic) as opposed to strictly empirical (i.e., grounded specifically in sense data). See 
Mason (1962, p. 202-207) and also Burke (1985, pp. 159-161) for lively discussions as to the admitted and 
probable influences of Descartes and Galileo on Newton and Newton's scientific method. 
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Normal science and positivist thought in the Enlightenment 
According to McKay, Hill, & Buckler, "The scientific revolution was the single 
most important factor in the creation of the new world-view of the eighteenth-century 
Enlightenment" (1983b, p. 639). Enlightenment thought was characterized by three 
central concepts: (a) the predominance of the logical-rational way of knowing in the 
form of natural science, (b) the belief that the scientific method could be applied to 
the discovery of "natural laws" in both nature and society, and (c) the belief in and 
pursuit of progress through social and scientific engineering. 
The most important and original idea of the Enlightenment was that the 
methods of natural science could and should be used to understand all aspects 
of life. This was what intellectuals meant by reason, a favorite word of 
Enlightenment thinkers. Nothing was to be accepted on faith. Everything was 
to be submitted to the rational, critical, "scientific" way of thinking A 
second important Enlightenment concept was that the scientific method was 
capable of discovering the laws of human society as well as those of nature. 
Thus was "social science" born. Its birth led to the third key idea, the idea of 
progress. Armed with the proper method of discovering the laws of human 
existence [i.e., science], Enlightenment thinkers believed it was at least 
possible to create better societies and better people. (McKay, Hill, & Buckler, 
1983b, p. 639) 
John Locke, 1632-1704, was one of the most recognized of the Enlightenment 
thinkers. Locke rejected the philosophical Rationalism of Descartes and his 
followers which asserted that certain truths exist a priori and can be logical deduced in 
the absence of empirical sensory experiences. Locke, instead, constructed what is 
called British Empiricism. Locke thought that the mind, at birth, was a tabula rasa, or 
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blank slate. In other words, there are absolutely no a priori concepts that originate or 
exist outside of sensory experiences. 
Let us suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, 
without any ideas; how comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that 
vast store, which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with 
an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and 
knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from EXPERIENCE; in that all 
our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our 
observation, employed either about external sensible objects, or about the 
internal operations of our minds, perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is 
that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking. 
These two [i.e., sensation and self-reflection on those sensations] are the 
fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have or can naturally 
have, do spring. (Locke, 1690/1961, p. 193) 
Locke disagreed with the logical-deductive methodology of Descartes and the 
Rationalists, but followed their general assertion that "Ideas are within us, whereas 
real things are outside of us and possess the [real] powers or qualities which excite 
our ideas" (Sahakian, 1968, p. 155). Irish philosopher George Berkeley, 1685-1753, 
transformed Locke's empiricism to an extreme which identified all "reality' with sense 
experience itself. Berkeley denied the validity of Locke's "reflective" way of knowing, 
equating reflection with simple sense-experience, only in the passive as opposed to 
active sense. Berkeley also refused to accept Locke's view that physical objects 
"cause" those sensations. However, other than systematically addressing the 
epistemological problem of how we arrive at these experiences, Berkeley fell back on 
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faith in God as the originator of all that "is."^? David Hume, 1711-1776, was also 
considered one of the great British Empiricists. Hume accepted the "realness" of 
sense experience from both Locke and Berkeley, but, as a true skeptic, rejected all 
metaphysical sources of knowledge other than direct sense experience. In one sense, 
Hume could be thought of as the father of positivism, since "the theory that there is 
no genuine substance or ultimate reality beyond the phenomena of sense is a central 
concept of positivism" (Sahakian, 1968, p. 162). 
The emerging Classical scientific paradigm tended to follow the positivist 
approach to science (of Bacon, Berkeley, and Hume), relying almost exclusively on 
empirical observation and denying other ways of knowing and understanding 
(Concise Columbia Encyclopedia: Microsoft Bookshelf Edition. 1992), To Bacon, 
objective things outside our minds cause our perceptions of those things, which, for 
the most part, are fairly reliable perceptions. To Locke, objective reality emerged 
when a person connected the perception of a thing with the thing itself—particularly 
the primary qualities of an object. 
The primary qualities of an object are those qualities it has "in itself" quite 
apart from any perception, qualities it wouldn't have even if there were no 
sentient being to perceive them. These are, in general, the qualities that can 
be dealt with in science—those that can be measured. (Hospers, 1967, p. 497) 
Newton's epistemologcal basis for his own method was very similar to Berkeley's—things exist 
because God intended them to exist. Of course, faith makes allowances for tautological definitions (e.g., 
all natural order derives from God; the existence of God is proven by the existence of natural order) and 
also teleological fallacies (e.g., things exist because it is God's intention that they exist; this is to fulfill his 
"divine purpose"). Logic, of course, must reject all teleology and tautology. This is but another symptom 
of schizophrenia in the Classical paradigm. 
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Locke's brand of empirical positivism is often called representative realism.—the idea 
that sense data form ideas which represent some external reality which exists 
independent of any perception of it. To Berkeley, the epistemological problem of 
how we know precluded the acceptance of a reality existing independent of the 
observer.28 Berkeley is often referred to as an idealist. Idealism is defined as 
"accounting for all experience and reality as a direct product of the mind" (Concise 
Columbia Encyclopedia: Microsoft Bookshelf Edition. 1992). Upon careful 
examination, however, Berkeley appears to have turned ideahsm on its head in that 
he accounts for everything in the mind as a direct product of empirical experience, 
and thus equates perception with objective reality, as opposed to what might 
otherwise be considered to be "subjective" reality. In that Berkeley's "reality" is 
grounded first in sense data, he can also be considered a positivist (see Hospers, 1967, 
pp. 493-530). The bottom line for Berkeley was not whether there was an objective 
reality "out there" to be known, but how we come to know what we do and what the 
limits of that knowledge are. The positivist approach endeavors to explain that reality 
strictly in terms of sense data and sense impressions. The positivist agenda, however, 
as initiated first by Hume (and to some degree, by Bacon) and its influence on science 
and the scientific method took the cruder form of naive realism. Naive realism takes 
objective reality a priori. Matters of religion, relativity, and perception are ignored in 
^ This will be a central problem in Post-Newtonian science and Quantum Mechanics, which must focus 
primarily on phenomena working outside the range of human sensory perception. 
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the naive realist perspective, Hospers (1967, p. 494) identifies the main propositions 
of naive realism as: 
(a) There exists a world of physical objects (trees, buildings, hills, etc.). (b) 
Statements about these objects can be known to be true through sense 
experience, (c) These objects exist not only when they are being perceived but 
also when they are not perceived. They are independent of the perception, 
(d) By means of our senses, we perceive the physical world pretty much as it is. 
In the main, our claims to have knowledge of it are justified, (e) The sense 
impressions we have of physical things are caused by those physical things 
themselves. For example, my experience of the chair is caused by the chair 
itself. 
Naive realism came to form the philosophical assumptions behind positivism and the 
Classical paradigm during the Enlightenment. This reflected a general shift in world 
view from philosophical idealism to more practical means and ends. This was, in 
part, a result of the efforts of the French philosophe Voltaire, 1694-1778, who 
proposed the application of the Newtonian method of analysis to all 
knowledge. He advocated a concern with how things work and not with their 
"essence." For Voltaire, as for Newton, the fact came before the principle 
Naturally, Voltaire's attitude to Newton implied the acceptance of Locke's 
empirical psychology introducing the ideas of Newton and Locke was to 
change substantially the direction of French thought. The French, after 
Voltaire, wished to deal with "practical" matters. Such problems as the 
freedom of the will and the nature of grace were dismissed as meaningless. 
(Bronowski & MazUsh, 1960, p. 249) 
It was in France during the Enlighteimient that Science became removed from 
natural philosophy and turned toward more practical ends involving technology and 
progress in general. Meanwhile, in Germany, Immanuel Kant, 1724-1804, "combined 
the Rationalist's thesis that truth is attainable through sheer reason with the opposing 
thesis of the British Empiricists that valid knowledge can be acquired through sensory 
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experience" (Sahakian, 1968, p. 169). The German Idealism of Kant thus maintained 
the ontological agenda of natural philosophy, while British and French natural 
philosophy began to separate ontological from scientific concerns. 
Underpinning the shift from ontological to practical science in Great Britain 
and France was the predominance of naive realism, forming the ideological 
foundation of scientific positivism. Matters of ontology and epistemology were no 
longer "scientific" concerns for the British and French natural philosophers (now self-
proclaimed scientists). Natural law soon came to be taken a priori instead of as an 
ontological question. Bacon's agenda to conquer nature was combined with the 
Enlightenment ideal of progress and then applied to social, economic, and political 
variables. The Classical scientific paradigm, based on the empirical experimentation 
and naive reaUsm of Galileo, Bacon, and Newton, was now considered to be the 
highest form of knowledge and most esteemed way of knowing.^^ Science had 
conquered nature. The universe was knowable (through science), operated in 
accordance with predetermined natural laws which could be mathematically deduced, 
and could thus be predicted. Newtonian science had provided a thorough explanation 
of the natural world and all that remained was the question of how to use that 
information about natural laws to make the social world a better place—to 
Granted, counter movements have come and gone, e.g., Rousseau and the Romantic focus on 
affective-emotive ways of knowing, but none can claim the success and longevity of the Classical scientific 
worldview. 
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understand, explain, predict, and conquer human nature. Thus, on the heels of the 
priestly natural sciences, the social sciences followed. 
The Classical Paradigm as a Model for the Social Sciences 
The crystallization of the Classical scientific paradigm during the 
Enlightenment was the product of a number of concomitant intersecting 
developments. The most significant of these developments was the growing 
acceptance of logic and reason as a primary way of knowing—in this case, at the 
expense of all other "subjective" ways of knowing and understanding. The other 
necessary development was the focus on empirical sense data and sensory experience 
as a primary way of knowing which was inherited from the Renaissance, With 
Descartes, man became separated from nature and his biological self, and thus the 
church (now being concerned primarily with souls and salvations instead of first and 
final causes) could allow science to deal with nature without any threat to religious 
faith and authority.^ Thus, when Charles Darwin, 1809-1882, returned from his trip 
on the Beagle and announced that man is a natural evolutionary biological product, it 
was not seen as a religious or ontological crisis but, instead, as another triumph of the 
new science. The logical and rational Enlightenment mind could easily extend the 
idea of evolution from species to other human groups, e.g., societies, regions. Bound 
with the ideals of progress and enlightenment, and well protected under the umbrella 
^ The separation of this-worldly and other-worldly "realities" were now taken a priori also. 
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of naive realism, social scientists set out to discover and conquer the laws governing 
the evolution of societies. 
Social science, first, had to reconcile the schizophrenia between mind and 
body inherited from Descartes. "The very possibility of such an objective [i.e., 
positive] social science, of course, presupposed its accomplishment in the realm of 
psychology" (Matson, 1966, p. 33). To that end, Thomas Hobbes, 1588-1679, may 
have been the first social and behavioral scientist. 
For Hobbes ..., all mental operations were reducible simply to the "motions" 
of natural events; his psychology was "materialistic, mechanistic, and 
deterministic throughout"—an uncompromising effort to encompass all 
aspects of human existence within the iron laws of explanation. (Matson, 
1966, p. 31) 
With biological evolution as the prime mover of history, people like Hobbes, Herbert 
Spencer, 1820-1903, and later, the psychological behaviorists, e.g., John Watson, 1878-
1958, need not look in the "black box" of consciousness to explain human behavior. 
Sense is Motion in the organs and intérieur parts of mans body, caused by the 
action of the things we See, Heare, etc.; And that Fancy is but the Reliques of 
the same Motion, remaining after Sense. (Hobbes, 1651/1961, p. 97) 
Like the predictable machinery of Newton's universe, human behavior could also be 
understood, explained, and predicted using simple scientific methods of empirical 
observation and logical reasoning. This was the explicit goal of John Stuart Mill, 
1806-1873, and his assertion that empiricism forms the foundation upon which all 
knowledge is built. To Mill, the mind was simply a reflection of the empirical world. 
For Mill the human mind was not merely to be likened to a machine; it was in 
simple fact a machine, neither more nor less—a delicate mechanism whose 
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clockwork operations were automatically triggered by physical forces from the 
outside (sensory stimuli), and kept going by forces no less physical on the 
inside. It was this straightforward mechanical image of human nature which 
underlay the ultimate ambition of the philosophical radicals: to construct a 
science of legislation, and so of politics, resting squarely upon the foundation 
of the natural sciences. (Matson, 1966, p. 33) 
Given the a priori assumptions that (a) nature operates predictably like a clock, (b) 
man is a natural evolutionary product, and (c) evolution is in fact a progressive 
historical movement, the reasonable conclusion was that human and social evolution 
could be explained and controlled by using the same scientific methods applied to 
natural science—i.e., the idea of scientific progress. Progress was indeed the thread 
weaving throughout the alternative perspectives of the Enlightenment and driving its 
ideological influence on the emerging social sciences. Progress was also the central 
theme of the "Founder of Positivism" and "Father of Sociology," Auguste Comte, 
1798-1857. 
Human progress, from Comte's perspective, involved the evolution of human 
ways of knowing from superstition, faith, and theological authority to positive (i.e., 
progressive logical-empirical) science. 
According to Comte, a certain type of society is dying, another being born 
before his eyes. The dying type is characterized by two adjectives: theological 
and military. Medieval society was united by transcendent faith as expounded 
by the Catholic Church TTie type being bon is scientific and industrial. 
This society is scientific in the sense in which the moribund society was 
theological; the thinking typical of the modern age is that of scientists, just as 
the thinking typical of the past was that of theologians or priests. Scientists are 
replacing priests or theologians as the social category providing the intellectual 
and moral foundation of the social order. The scientists are inheriting the 
spiritual power of the priests. Spiritual power... is necessarily embodied in 
each age by those who provide the model for the predominant way of thinking 
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and the ideas which serve as the [unifying] basis of the social order. (Aron, 
1968, p. 74) 
Comte clearly saw science as a product of distinct logical and empirical ways of 
knowing, cast in opposition to traditional ways of knowing such as religious faith and 
authority (Ha%enny, 1982, p. 16). To Comte, this progressive evolutionary 
movement in human thought was both necessary and inevitable for the advancement 
of human society. Comte's law of three stages outlined his model of the progressive 
development of human understanding. 
The law of the three stages consists in the assertion that the human mind 
passes through three phases. In the first, the mind explains phenomena by 
ascribing them to beings or forces comparable to man himself. In the second 
phase, that of metaphysics, the mind explains phenomena by invoking abstract 
entities like "nature." Finally, in the third phase, man is content to observe 
phenomena and to establish the regular links existing among them, whether at 
a given moment or in the course of time. He abandons the search for the final 
principle behind the facts and confines himself to establishing the laws that 
govern them. (Aron, 1968, p. 76). 
Comte's new order was modern and industrial. Science could be used as a tool to 
discern the laws of social development so that man could shape them in his own 
design. Following Bacon's lead. Comte (in Aron, 1968) asserted 
Indeed, from the moment men think scientifically, the chief activity of 
collectivities ceases to be the war of man against man and becomes the 
struggle of man against nature, the systematic exploitation of natural 
resources, (in Aron, 1968, pp. 74-75) 
The purpose of positive science, according to Comte, was to guide the course of social 
and natural development to the greatest benefit of man. His classification of the 
sciences placed social physics (i.e., sociology) in a higher position than the natural 
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sciences. Comte's positive agenda, combining the law of three stages with his 
classification of the sciences, then becomes clear: 
The method which has triumphed in mathematics, astronomy, physics, 
chemistry, and biology must eventually prevail in politics and culminate in the 
founding of a positive science of society, which is called sociology 
[Sociology] can simultaneously determine what is, what will be, and what 
should be. But at the same time, what will be and what should be is justified 
as conforming to what the philosophers of the past would have called human 
nature or human destiny, or what Comte called simply the realization of the 
human social order. (>^on, 1968, pp. 76-79) 
Comte's emancipatory vision for a new social order of reason based on positive 
science was never realized. Though the influence of Comte within sociology is 
acknowledged by both Emile Durkheim, 1858-1917, and Karl Marx, 1818-1883, the 
inherent contradictions of a positive science^i of human nature still plague the social 
sciences today. 
For Comte no less than for Hegel, man acquired a degree of reason only 
through submission to the rational processes of society. As the source of 
reason was thus displaced from the individual to the collective, so liberal-
democratic conceptions of personal freedom and responsibility [i.e., free will] 
Halfpenny (1982) pointed out that "positivism" has a variety of connotations in the social sciences. 
See Halfpenny (1982, p. 114-117) for a summary of twelve different ways in which positivism is 
understood within the literature. Herein, for the most part, positivism refers specifically to Halfpenny's 
Positivism^ which he defined as "a theory of knowledge according to which the only kind of sound 
knowledge available to humankind is that of science grounded in observation" (italics added). In one 
sense, Halfpenny has broken the idea of positivism into different ways of knowing. Halfpenny defined 
Positivismio as "a theory of knowledge according to which science consists of a corpus of causal laws on 
the basis of which phenomena are explained and predicted, and Positivismn as Bacon's "theory of 
scientiHc method according to which science progresses by inducing laws from observational and 
experimental evidence" (1982, pp. 114-115). The primary difference between these different 
connotations of positivism is the primary way of knowing utilized, i.e., empirical or logical. The other 
distinction made by Halfpenny is the ori^ and intent of the exemplar, e.g., derivations made by Comte 
(Positivismsi.4), Spencer's focus on progress and evolutionary forms (Positivisms) Durkheim's addition 
of statistical methods (Positivismg), and the logical positivists' linguistic focus in Positivismg. He also 
alluded to what is referred to herein as a schizophrenia in the Classical paradigm between the empirical 
and logical as well as the ontologically and conventionally "real." Though all these "positivisms" form 
part of the Classical scientific paradigm, not all are compatible and complementary with each other. 
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gave way to an emphasis upon authority and social order—more exactly, upon 
the efficiency and rationalization of social engineering It was a tragic 
vision. The goal of the positive scientists of society was nothing less than the 
universal enlightenment and emancipation of mankind. But the outcome was 
otherwise. Science, enlisted in the case of reason, led in the end to the denial 
and abolishment of reason: "The logic and tyranny of progress gave to the 
world the progress of total tyrarmy." The first comprehensive attempt to apply 
scientific method to the rationalization of human conduct—what might be 
termed the first systematic program of behavioral engineering—turned out to 
be, not a dispassionate and positive science of behavior, but a wholly 
passionate and negative campaign to make men behave. (Salomon in Matson, 
1966, p. 36) 
Even if the emancipatory agenda of Comte's positivism failed miserably, the faith in 
positive science as an appropriate method for the social sciences lived on. 
Durkheim, expanding the positivist scientific approach, would introduce 
statistics and mathematical methods into sociology and, concomitantly, into education 
and the social sciences in general. Adam Smith, 1723-1790 applied Newton's 
machine model to economics and proposed that the market operates in accordance 
with natural laws (i.e., "the invisible hand") and these laws function for the 
progressive development of society as a whole (see Heilbronner, 1961, pp. 28-57). 
Herbert Spencer, 1820-1903, also advocated a positivistic understanding of the 
natural laws of society (e.g., survival of the fittest) but, unlike Comte, Spencer 
proposed that nature knew the path of progress far better than man, thus, a laissez 
faire social policy would best serve the interests of individuals and society. Marx 
formulated a positivistic theory of social change: science and technology would 
inevitably usher in a socialist Utopia after the inherent contradictions of industrial 
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capitalism precipitate its own demise. Max Weber, 1864-1920, documented the 
historical and positivistic shift in ways of knowing from traditional, faith, and 
affective-emotive to logical and rational (1921/1978; 1905/1958). Though Weber was 
mostly critical of crass empiricism and positivism, he still admired the scientific 
method and proposed that sociology and economics engage in scientific pursuits 
within a framework of "ethical neutrality" and "objectivity" (1903-1917/1949). Weber 
proposed that meanings and sentiments could be the object of scientific inquiry, but 
such inquiry necessitates the separation of the observer from what is observed. This 
Cartesian detachment is a fundamental tenet of the Classical paradigm and still 
contributes to the schizophrenia of modem science today. Upon examination, one 
finds that most of the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the social 
sciences are rooted deeply in the Classical scientific paradigm. 
This is not to deny that the Classical scientific paradigm has its critics in the 
social sciences. The debate may be best described by Halfpenny. 
At one extreme, sociologists have clung to the earlier, simpler solutions to the 
various epistemological problems, even where these answers are now 
commonly recognised by philosophers to be inadequate. In other words, they 
have continued to pursue a programme aimed at constructing a natural science 
of society centring on causal laws derived from or tested by observational data 
with the aid of statistical techniques, and they treat the philosophical problems 
as mere technical difficulties Among this group of statistical technicians, 
doubts about positivist presuppositions in social analysis are assumed to be 
resolvable by greater attention to the details of data collection and statistical 
techniques. 
At the other extreme, sociologists have taken the philosophical 
problems as grounds for rejecting the concerns of positivist philosophers 
altogether, and they have turned instead to anti-positivist programmes for 
sociological analysis and research. Indeed, attempts to establish any sort of 
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positivist hegemony in sociology have always faced numerous challenges that 
alternative understandings of the social world [i.e., ways of knowing] are more 
appropriate to the human nature of its subject matter. What is of interest here 
is not whether positivism of some sort is able to disarm or absorb them, but that 
the challengers take positivism, as their target, still assuming that it is the 
dominant form of sociology to be discredited and transcended by their preferred 
alternative (italics added). (Halfpenny, 1982, p. 120) 
Though Hal^enny's conclusion might sound a bit tautological, it is a fact that most 
social scientists agree that positivism, particularly the positivist belief in 
methodological neutrality and objectivity^^ ^  forms the primary methodological 
foundations of the social sciences (see Turner, 1991, pp. 1-4; also Abercrombie, Hill, 
& Turner, 1988, pp. 190-191, 233-234). Although it does not prove the primacy of 
positivism in the social sciences, the ongoing debate does lend support for the 
argument that the Classical scientific paradigm has been a strong ongoing influence 
on the social sciences. 
That influence, for the most part, still endures in the form of the social 
sciences' methodological detachment, objectivity, and the main ideological tenets of 
the Classical scientific paradigm; (a) the machine model of the universe built upon 
the methodological reduction of phenomena to fundamental "building blocks," 
structural determinism, and mathematical predictability, (b) the separation of mind 
and body, with the body and its observable behaviors also following the machine 
This is the Cartesian duality of mind and matter. It assumes that the observer can be physically and 
affectively detached from what is observed. It also assumes that the observer, given adequate 
experimental controls, will not influence the outcome of events. This point of the Classical paradigm will 
form part of the "crisis" of normal science as the quantum paradigm begins to emerge. 
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model with the mind falling outside the realm of "objectivity," and (c) the belief and 
trust in positivistic progress through science and technology (Capra, 1989, p. 325). In 
at least one sense, Comte has been proven right—his ranking of the sciences placed 
the social sciences, i.e., sociology and economics, as last in moving to a the new (then 
positivistic) scientific paradigm. Is this a case of history repeating itself? The natural 
sciences are now shifting away from the ontological and epistemological assumptions 
behind the Classical Newtonian scientific paradigm. This is a result of new findings in 
science which occurred around the early part of the twentieth century—findings 
which created a crisis in the classical paradigm which could not be resolved by the 
methods of normal science. While the social sciences are, for the most part, doggedly 
clinging to the classical Newtonian worldview, the natural sciences are being forced to 
question that paradigm. In fact, a new scientific paradigm is emerging. Though no 
consensus yet exists as to what that paradigm is or what is might be called, for 
practical purposes, this shift in scientific worldviews will herein be referred to as the 
Post-Newtonian paradigm. 
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REVIEW OF THE HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF WESTERN SCIENCE 
PART II: THE POST-NEWTONIAN PARADIGM 
Determinism to Relativity 
The Classical Newtonian paradigm provided the Post-Renaissance world with 
a comforting picture of the universe. The riddle of matter was solved by the 
reduction of all substances to finite particles, which could be examined to explain the 
"fundamental" properties of the whole. Heat was also explained by the movement of 
elementary particles, as well as the phenomenon of light. Motion and stability were 
explained by the relationship between the force of gravity, mass, and distance, which 
also provided a secular "cause" for the existence of the planets and their apparently 
orderly behavior. Nature operated in accord with natural laws, which directed the 
evolutionary process in the direction of positive progress. These universal regularities 
could be observed empirically, modeled mathematically, and then used to man's 
advantage in predicting and controlling the outcome of future events. The universe 
was a marvelous clock, operating for the benefit of mankind, which stood at the 
pinnacle of the evolutionary scale of progress. Thanks to Newton, the universe was a 
wonderful place indeed. 
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Thus, it was probably with considerable trepidation that Einstein announced 
the fall of the Classical mechanical worldview.^^ 
There are no eternal theories in science. It always happens that some of the 
facts predicted by a theory are disproved by experiment. Every theory has its 
period of gradual development and triumph, after which it may experience a 
rapid decline. The rise and fall of the substance [i.e., particle] theory of heat.. 
. is one of many possible examples Nearly every great advance in science 
arises from a crisis in the old theory, through an endeavor to find a way out of 
the difficulties created. We must examine old ideas, old theories, although 
they belong to the past, for this is the only way to understand the importance 
of the new ones and the extent of their validity. (Einstein & Infeld, 1938, p. 
75) 
The cracks in the Classical Newtonian universe began with the discovery of the 
relationship between magnetism and electricity. Originally, magnetism and electricity 
were explained by a mechanical "fluid" theory, i.e., they (in addition to heat) were 
viewed as moving substances comprised of unique and identifiable fundamental 
particles in themselves. The classical paradigm's demise began with early 
experiments in electromagnetism, starting with Gilbert in the seventeenth century, 
and progressing through Franklin's Leyden jar, Volta's voltaic cell, and Oersted's^^ 
discovery that the flow of electricity can affect the attractive properties of a magnet 
and vice versa (now the basis for electrical motors and generators). The behavior of 
the "substances" in these experiments did not lend credence to the fluid (i.e., particle) 
theory of magnetism and electricity. Einstein lamented that 
This passage from Einstein probably influenced Kuhn and his ideas about the rise and fall of scientific 
paradigms. 
^ Benjamin Franklin, 1706-1790; AUessandro Conte Volta, 1745-1827; Hans Christian Oersted, 1777-
1851. 
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Difficulties of this kind, sudden and unexpected obstacles in the triumphant 
development of a theory, arise frequently in science. Sometimes a simple 
generalization of the old ideas seems, at least temporarily, to be a good way 
out. It would seem sufficient, in the present case, for example, to broaden the 
previous point of view and introduce more general forces between the 
elementary particles. Very often, however, it is impossible to patch up an old 
theory, and the difficulties result in its downfall and the rise of a new one. 
(Einstein & Infeld, 1938, p. 90) 
Often, as Einstein pointed out (ibid.), scientists prefer to add stipulations 
and/or additional components to their theories other than give them up. This was 
also the case with the mechanical theory of light. Scientists following the mechanical 
model, naturally, treated light as a fundamental particle (which they called a 
corpuscle). The problem which Newton addressed was the problem of color. If light 
is a particle, how can it give the appearance of an infinite number of colors? Newton 
modified the corpuscular theory to account for color by proposing that each color of 
light is a different type of corpuscle. According to Newton, a prism "sorts" the 
corpuscles into distinct groupings which can then be "regrouped" if directed through a 
second prism. The idea of light existing as waves is also part of the Classical 
mechanical paradigm, though not supported by Newton, Christian Huygens, 1629-
1695, proposed a wave theory of light but, like Newton, had to add some stipulations 
and additional components to the existing mechanical model. Being that waves 
require a medium within which to travel, Huygens asserted that space was not a 
vacuum, but was composed of ether, a universal medium within which light can make 
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its journey.35 Both Newton and Huygens had empirical evidence in support of their 
model. What was inadequate, however, was the mechanical approach itself. Still, it 
would take over a century to resolve these crises in the Classical paradigm. 
As Einstein summarized: 
In the old theories of electric fluids, in the corpuscular and wave theories of 
light, we witness the further attempts to apply the mechanical view. But in the 
realm of electric and optical phenomena we meet grave difficulties in this 
application. (Einstein & Infeld, 1938, p. 122) 
A moving charge acts upon a magnetic needle. But the force, instead of 
depending only upon distance, depends also upon the velocity of the charge... 
. In optics we have to decide in favor of the wave theory against the 
corpuscular theory of light. Waves spreading in a medium consisting of 
particles, with mechanical forces acting between them, are certainly a 
mechanical concept. But what is the medium through which light spreads and 
what are its mechanical properties? There is no hope of reducing the optical 
phenomena to the mechanical ones before this question is answered. But the 
difficulties in solving this problem are so great that we have to give it up and 
thus give up the mechanical view as well. (Einstein & Infeld, 1938, p. 122) 
In the same manner that Newton challenged the paradigm put forth by Aristotle in 
regard to motion, light, and matter, late-nineteenth century scientists such as Oersted, 
Faraday, and Maxwell^^ challenged Newton's mechanical model. It was Maxwell and 
the identification of non-material that shattered the mechanical-particle 
assumption of the universe inherited from Newton. 
In Maxwell's theory there are no material actors. The mathematical equations 
of this theory express the laws governing the electromagnetic field. They do 
not, as in Newton's laws, connect two widely separated events; they do not 
^ Chemistry also had a universal medium which it called phlogfston, allowing for the loss of weight when 
a substance is burned. 
^ Michael Faraday, 1791-1867; James Clerk-Maxwell, 1831-1879. 
80 
connect the happenings here with the conditions there. The field here and now 
depends on the field in the immediate neighborhood at the time just passed. 
The equations allow us to predict what will happen a little further in space and 
a little later in time, if we know what happens here and now. They allow us to 
increase our knowledge of the field by small steps. We can deduce what 
happens here from that which happened far away by the summation of those 
very small steps. In Newton's theory, on the contrary, only big steps 
connecting distant events are permissible. (Einstein & Infeld, 1938, pp. 146-
147) 
This posed a crisis with the mechanical assumptions behind the Classical paradigm. 
To exacerbate the crisis, the Classical Newtonian model was flanked on more than 
one side. 
There are really two revolutions in paradigmatic thought that occur with 
Maxwell's theory. First, explicit in Einstein's evaluation {ibid.), is the shift from 
structural determinism to a focus on process. In Newton's clockwork universe, 
elementary particles behaved in accordance with natural laws—structure was taken a 
priori with process emerging from the structural relationships of the fundamental 
particles. Now, with Maxwell, there are no fundamental particles to determine how 
the phenomena will "behave," which, by necessity, shifts the causal mechanism from 
one of structural properties to one of process. 
The old mechanical view attempted to reduce all events in nature to forces 
acting between material particles. Upon this mechanical view was based the 
first naive theory of the electric fluids. The field did not exist for the physicist 
of the early years of the nineteenth century. For him only substance and its 
changes were real. He tried to describe the action of two electric charges only 
by concepts referring directly to two charges. (Einstein & Infeld, 1938, p. 151) 
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The second paradigmatic revolution of Maxwell is only implicit in Einstein's 
evaluation—that is the shift from empirical understanding of natural phenomena to 
logical-deductive methods. In spite of the extensive use of experimentation in 
ascertaining the nature of electromagnetic fields, the truth remains that such fields 
are outside of the realm of human sense-experience. A subtle shift in the accepted 
ways of knowing had to occur for Science to proceed—logic and reasoning had to 
move ahead of empiricism in explaining natural phenomena. According to Einstein 
& Infeld (1938, p. 151), "A new reality was created, a new concept for which there was 
no place in the mechanical description" (italics added). When the object of 
investigation lacks substance, empirical observation must shift from the observation 
of structural properties to the anticipation of procedural effects. Science in the Post-
Newtonian paradigm thus shifted, by necessity, from the study of "objective" reality to 
the study of the effects of that (now imperceptible) reality. As much as this relies on 
empiricism as a way of knowing, it even more relies on sequential reasoning (even 
intuition and revelation?) as a primary form of knowing and understanding. After a 
century of naive realism grounded in the omnipotence of the Classical Newtonian 
scientific paradigm, the cosmic soup was again being stirred. The man with the ladle 
was young Albert Einstein.^? 
Albert Einstein, 1879-1955. Birthdates and dates of death will no longer be provided herein since we 
are now discussing recent and current history. 
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Einstein is famous not only for his contributions to physics, but for the nature 
of those contributions—thought experiments. The problem with the Newtonian 
paradigm, according to Einstein and Infeld (1938, p. 157), is that it is wholly 
dependent on some God's eye view of the universe. According to Einstein, the 
empirical nature of reality is always relative to a particular coordinate system (CS), or, 
in layman's terms, the place of the observer. Famous thought experiments of Einstein 
illustrate the relativity of empirical reality: 
One way, though by no means the simplest, of not hearing what someone is 
saying, is to run, with a velocity greater than that of sound, relative to the air 
surrounding the speaker. The sound waves produced will then never be able 
to reach our ears. On the other hand, if we missed an important word which 
will never be repeated, we must run with a speed greater than that of sound to 
reach the produced wave and catch the word. (Einstein & Infeld, 1938, p. 166) 
A bullet fired from a gun actually moves with a speed greater than that of 
sound and a man placed on such a bullet would never hear the sound of the 
shot. (Einstein & Infeld, 1938, p. 166) 
Einstein gave a new answer to the age old question that "If a tree falls in the forest 
does it make a sound?" According to Einstein, it is a simple matter of physics and not 
an ontological issue: regardless of whether there is an observer or not, it still depends 
on the coordinate system or reference point of the observation. Einstein also 
extended his relativity theory to the phenomena of light and time. His famous 
thought experiments with observers both inside and outside sealed moving rooms 
indicate that 
Comparing the predictions of our two observers we find a most astonishing 
result which flatly contradicts the apparently well-founded concepts of classical 
physics. Two events, i.e., the two light beams reaching the two walls, are 
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simultaneous for the observer on the inside, but not for the observer on the 
outside. In classical physics we had one clock, one time flow, for all observers 
in all CS. Time, and therefore such words as "simultaneously," "sooner," 
"later," had an absolute meaning independent of any CS. Two events 
happening at the same time in one CS happened necessarily simultaneously in 
all other CS the relativity theory [forces] us to give up this [classical] view. 
(Einstein & Infeld, 1938, p. 179) 
Einstein used the thought experiment of two clocks moving in different CS to 
illustrate this point further. His unsettling conclusion was that time itself is relative to 
the point of observation or place of the observer. Another of Einstein's unsettling 
conclusions destroyed the very foundation of Newtonian physics: the assumption of 
some underlying material structure of the universe. 
Classical physics introduced two substances: matter and energy. The first had 
weight, but the second was weightless. In classical physics we had two 
conservation laws: one for matter and one for energy. We have already asked 
whether modern physics [i.e., relativity theory] still holds this view of two 
substances and the two conservation laws. TTie answer is: "No." According to 
the theory of relativity, there is no essential distinction between mass and 
energy. Instead of two conservation laws we have only one, that of mass-
energy The old energy-substance is the second victim of the theory of 
relativity. The first was the medium through which light waves were 
propagated [i.e., the ether] [Relativity theory] removes the difficulties and 
contradictions of the field theory; it formulates more general mechanical laws; 
it replaces two conservation laws by one; it changes our classical concept of 
absolute time. Its validity is not restricted to one domain of physics; it forms a 
general framework embracing all phenomena of nature. (Einstein & Infeld, 
1938, pp. 197-199). 
Though Einstein sought to remove the classical "God's eye view" from our 
understanding of the universe, he did not seek to remove God from the universe. 
Einstein saw his theory of relativity more as an extension of classical mechanics that 
takes different reference frames into account— relativity theory was more elegant 
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and less problematic than the Classical paradigm. At no time did Einstein doubt the 
existence of fundamental laws governing the universe or the classical vision of some 
divine purpose of it all. 
The simpler our picture of the external world and the more facts it embraces, 
the stronger it reflects in our minds the harmony of the universe. (Einstein & 
Infeld, 1938, p. 213) 
To Einstein, relativity did not mean uncertainty. In that sense, the Classical paradigm 
and the assumptions of order behind it lived on in the work of Einstein (Calder, 1980, 
p. 13), The next leap in physics was to unsettle even Einstein: the move from 
relativity to Quantum physics. The movement started in a rather typical and 
inconspicuous manner. 
Relativity to Uncertainty and the Quantum Revolution 
Fundamentals of the quantum paradigm 
Quantum mechanics starts where the Ancient Greeks left off: in search of a 
fundamental substance which comprises the universe. Recall, Democritus, in Ancient 
Greece, had proposed that atoms (trans, "not" "divisible") were the fundamental 
buildings blocks of all that exists. Robert Boyle, 1627-1691, the "Father of 
Chemistry," "used the concept of atoms [i.e., elements] in his work on chemistry in the 
seventeenth century" (Gribbin, 1984, p. 20; Lemer & Trigg, 1981, p. 63). Newton also 
operated under the assumption of some fundamental particle or substance, such as 
atoms, in his formulation of the Classical paradigm. (Gribbin, 1984, p. 20: The 
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Concise Columbia Encyclopedia: Microsoft Bookshelf Edition. 1992). While several 
attempts had been made to empirically establish the existence of atoms (e.g., 
Lavoisier; Proust; Dalton; Avogadro)^ it was not until Einstein's paper on Brownian 
motion (1906) that real proof of the existence of atoms was offered in a sufficiently 
convincing manner. 
In 1827, the English botanist, Robert Brown, was observing pollen with a 
newly improved microscope and noted that the pollen jumped around in a 
random fashion as if it were alive. He later observed the same random motion 
using small smoke particles and concluded that the motion was not caused by 
the smoke particle itself... A satisfactory explanation was finally given in 
1906 by Einstein (and separately by Smoluchowski) and constituted the most 
direct proof up to that time of the existence of atoms. (Blood, 1981, p. 93) 
Given the challenge to the Classical paradigm posed by electricity and magnetism 
many of the leading physicists of the era sought to reestablish deterministic laws and 
principles at the atomic level to affirm their faith in the divine order of the universe. 
A puzzling problem stood in the way of their lofty goal: the explanation of black body 
radiation. 
Blackbody or thermal radiation is the energy that results from the motion of 
atoms and molecules (Bedford, 1981, p. 83). All objects emit, and consequently, must 
absorb, this type of energy in accordance with the laws of thermodynamics. 
The simplest way to see (literally) how matter and radiation interact is to look 
at a hot object, A hot object radiates electromagnetic energy, and the hotter it 
is the more energy it radiates, at shorter wavelengths (higher frequencies). So 
a red-hot poker is cooler than a white-hot poker, and a poker that is too cool 
to radiate visible light may still feel warm, because it [still] radiates lower-
38 Antoine Laurent Laviosier, 1743-1794; Joseph Louis Proust, 1754-1826; John Dalton, 1766-1844; 
Amadeo conte di Quaregna Avogadro, 1776-1856. 
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frequency infrared radiation. Even at the end of the nineteenth it was fairly 
obvious that this electromagnetic radiation must be associated with the 
movement of tiny electric charges. The electron itself had only just been 
discovered, but it is easy to see how a charged part of an atom (which we 
would now identify with an electron) vibrating to and fro will produce a stream 
of electromagnetic waves, in a manner not too unlike the way you can make 
water ripples by wiggling a finger to and fro in your bath. The trouble was that 
a combination of the best classical theories—statistical mechanics, and 
electromagnetism—predicted a form of radiation very different from the kind 
actually observed coming from hot objects. (Gribbin, 1984, p. 35) 
Leaving aside the mathematical formulas and getting directly to the point, the 
Classical approach to blackbody radiation predicts a near-infinite amount of energy 
at the very shortest (i.e., highest) wavelengths. 
The calculations came from the seemingly natural assumption that the 
electromagnetic waves of the radiation could be treated in the same way as 
waves on a string... and that there can be waves of any size—wavelength or 
frequency. (Gribbin, 1984, p. 36) 
However, this was not the case. Experiments demonstrated that, at high frequencies, 
the energy of blackbody radiation is not very large, in fact, at extremely high levels, 
the energy actually falls back to near-zero levels. What was at stake here was not just 
the reputation of a few famous scientists. At stake was the assumption at the 
foundation of the Classical paradigm; structural determinism. If electrons were in 
fact small charged particles that gave atoms their electromagnetic properties, they 
should follow the Classical laws of thermodynamics and the energy they radiate 
should follow the Classical wave patterns laid out by Galileo. This was yet another 
anomaly in the Classical paradigm which threatened Classical structural determinism. 
Ironically, it was a German scientist of the old school who first resolved the crisis. 
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Max Planck, 1858-1947, originally thought he could resolve the crisis by 
applying the Classical laws of thermodynamics. With complete faith in the Classical 
model, he conservatively proposed that energy might only be admitted or absorbed by 
objects in discrete proportions, or quanta. This would indeed solve the blackbody 
problem. 
For very high frequencies, the energy needed to emit one quantum of 
radiation is very large, and only a few of the oscillators will have this much 
energy (in accordance with the statistical equations) so only a few high-energy 
quanta are emitted. At very low frequencies (long wavelengths), very many 
low-energy quanta are emitted, but they each have so little energy that even 
added together they don't amount to much. Only in the middle range of 
frequencies are there plenty of oscillators that have enough energy to emit 
radiation in moderate-sized lumps, which add together to produce the peak in 
the blackbody curve. (Gribbin, 1984, p. 43) 
Planck's discovery of quanta did not, however, propel quantum theory into the 
forefront of physics. Another crisis had to occur in the Classical paradigm before the 
significance of Planck's solution could be fully realized. That was the challenge 
Einstein posed to the Classical assumption of Cartesian dualism—the separation of 
mind and matter, subject from object, observer from observation. 
After Einstein, the appearance of structure was wholly dependent upon the 
action of observation, i.e., the God's eye view lost its place in Science. "The chief 
merit of the name 'relativity' is in reminding us that a scientist is unavoidably a 
participant in the system he is studying" (Calder, 1984, p. 13). Planck's solution was 
revolutionary because it called for something that the Classical conception of energy 
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didn't address—conservation of action?^ Einstein's special theory of relativity, which 
took into account observations of phenomena at high-speed motion, made a 
conservation of action possible by shifting the basis for "natural laws" from structure 
to process. Thus, the idea of quanta shifted physics away from structural determinism 
and led to a focus on process as the basis for order in the universe. Though Planck 
had not realized it, he discovered that the "elementary particles" forming the building 
blocks of the universe weren't particles at all. They are, instead, abstract potentials, 
events, or processes which allow matter to take on particular states, much like the 
outcome of the roll of a die. 
It was the final blow to the Newtonian worldview and, as such, opened up a 
new window from which to witness the workings of the universe. But it was a bizarre 
picture indeed. As Einstein put it, 
All my attempts to adapt the theoretical foundation of physics to this (new 
type of) knowledge failed completely. It was as if the ground had been pulled 
out from under one, with no firm foundation to be seen anywhere, upon which 
one could have been built, (in Capra, 1991, p. 53) 
Sir Joseph John Thomson, 1856-1940, had already discovered the electron by the time 
Einstein's paper on Brownian motion had been published. According to Pais, 
Ever since its discovery, the electron has been considered an elementary 
particle, a fundamental building block of matter that cannot be decomposed 
into more primary constituents Lorentz introduced the classical model of 
the electron: a charge distribution confined (at rest) to a small sphere of a 
[mathematically definable] radius. (Pais, 1981, pp. 235-236) 
See Gribbin (1981, pp. 35-49) for a more informed discussion of how Einstein took Planck's ideas— 
particularly the four dimensional "action" or "process" relationship between energy and time given in 
Planck's constant—and laid the groundwork for the quantum revolution. 
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Electrons then, in the Classical model, were charged particles, having a definable 
mass, orbiting atoms in much the same manner as planets in our solar system orbit 
the sun. This is but a restatement of Newton's corpuscular theory of matter. 
According to Heisenberg, this approach cannot apply at the quantum level of reality. 
The concepts of velocity, energy, etc., have been developed from simple 
experiments with common objects, in which the mechanical behavior of 
macroscopic bodies can be described by the use of such words. The same 
concepts have then been carried over to the electron, since in certain 
fundamental experiments electrons show a mechanical behavior like that of 
objects of common experience. Since it is known, however, that this similarity 
exists only in a certain limited region of phenomena, the applicability of 
corpuscular theory must be limited in a corresponding way. (Heisenberg, 
1949, p. 13) 
The famous double slit experiment demonstrated that electrons and other minutely 
small "particles" would take on the properties of either a particle or a wave, 
depending on the experimental context. When passing a single electron through a 
pinhole, the electron acts like a particle beam and leaves a small round image on a 
photoelectric plate. However, when another hole is added, the pattern on the 
photoelectric plate changes to a band of light and dark stripes. This puzzled even 
Einstein. 
There may be some hope of explaining this phenomenon [of the circular ring] 
by interaction between the electron and rim [of the hole], though such an 
explanation does not seem to be very promising. But what about the two 
pinholes? Stripes appear instead of rings. How is it possible that the presence 
of the other hole completely changes the effect? The electron is indivisible [in 
the Classical understanding of it] and can, it would seem, pass through only 
one of the two holes. How could an electron passing through a hole possibly 
know that another hole has been made some distance away? (Einstein & 
Infeld, 1938, p. 279) 
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Thus, the Classical conception of fundamental particles as the building blocks of the 
universe had to be abandoned. Even so, physicists of the time still had faith in 
natural laws and were certain that science could still serve its explanatory and 
predictive functions for the community. Again, empirical experimentation proved 
them wrong again. 
The proof of the quantum pudding remained in the ability to measure the 
transformation of mass and energy in accordance with Einstein's' theory of relativity. 
Both Neils Bohr, 1885-1962, and Werner Heisenberg, 1901-1956, sought to determine 
and measure the structure of the atom in such relativistic quantum terms. In this 
attempt it was Heisenberg that pulled the rug out from under any hopes of resolving 
the crisis between the Classical and quantum paradigms. Heisenberg's discovery 
became known as the indeterminacy or uncertainty principle. The tenets of the 
uncertainty principle are best explained by Sullivan: 
The principle of indeterminacy is founded on the fact that we cannot observe 
the course of nature without disturbing it. This is a direct consequence of 
quantum theory An electron in complete isolation would be unknowable. 
It is only when an electron is interchanging energy with some other part of the 
universe that we can become aware of its existence [i.e., through process]. But 
no interchange of energy can take place that does not involve at least one 
quantum or atom of energy. Now the electron is so small and light a body that 
this amount of energy is sufficient seriously to disturb it. Let us suppose, for 
example, that we are observing the electron's position through some sort of 
super-microscope, so as to calculate where it will be a second hence. In order 
to see the electron we will have to use light. At least one quantum of energy 
will be involved, and this is sufficient to disturb the electron in an 
unpredictable maimer. By using light of long wave-length, and therefore of 
little energy, we would not greatly disturb the velocity of the electron, but its 
position would be very hazy, since we cannot distinguish objects that are small 
compared with the wavelength of the light we are using. If on the other hand. 
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in order to determine the position accurately, we used light of very short wave­
length, its great energy would hopelessly disturb the motion of the electron. 
Now for accurate prediction we must know both factors; we must know both 
position and velocity. But these two factors are so connected that the more 
accurately we know the one the less accurately we know the other..,. We see, 
then, that we cannot accurately determine an electron's future behavior. Any 
observations we make in order to get the necessary data disturb the electron in 
an unpredictable way, and therefore our data become useless in the very act of 
obtaining them. What, then, becomes of the determinism hitherto assumed by 
physical science? It becomes a useless principle. (Sullivan, 1933, pp. 70-71) 
Sullivan asserts that Heisenberg's uncertainty principle challenges the very core of the 
Classical paradigm: determinism and predictability. Heisenberg was willing to take 
the argument even a step further—to the rejection of causality as a principle in itself. 
As is clear from what has been said, the resolution of the paradoxes of atomic 
physics can be accomplished only by further renunciation of old and cherished 
ideas. Most important of these is the idea that natural phenomena obey exact 
laws—the principle of causality. In fact, our ordinary description of nature, 
and the idea of exact laws, rests on the assumption that it is possible to observe 
the phenomena without appreciably influencing them. To co-ordinate a 
definite cause to a definite effect has sense only when both can be observed 
without introducing a foreign element disturbing their interrelation. The law 
of causality, because of its very nature, can [therefore] only be defined for 
isolated systems, and in atomic physics even approximately isolated systems 
cannot be observed. (Heisenberg, 1949, p. 63) 
So what does this tell us about our preconceptions of the universe? Where does it 
leave Science as a way of knowing and understanding the ontological world? In fact, 
there are several interpretations of quantum theory in the literature. Some are 
fantastic, some are easily anticipated, but none resemble the Classical Newtonian 
universe we once thought was ours. Different interpretations of the quantum facts 
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lead us to very different ontological understandings of the universe. These various 
interpretations can be summarized as follows/^ 
Interpreting quantum reality 
Summarizing the various ontological interpretations of quantum theory is not 
an easy task for several reasons. First, the nature of the subject matter is abstract and 
exceeding complex, rendering it vulnerable to a broad scope of interpretation ranging 
from science fiction and magic to mundane mathematical mechanisms. Second, most 
of the primary actors on the quantum stage have changed their own ideas about the 
ontological meaning of quantum reality, sometimes more than once or twice. Finally, 
we cannot escape the epistemological problems that have plagued us since the days of 
the first natural philosophers, i.e., how do we overcome the gap between what "is" 
and the limits and/or distortions of our perception? In spite of these difficulties, the 
literature is rich with ontological speculation in regard to quantum reality. Discussed 
herein are the Copenhagen Interpretation, the Weak Copenhagen Interpretation, the 
Consciousness Interpretation, the Austin Interpretation, Heisenberg's Duplex 
Interpretation, the Many-Worlds Interpretation, the Wholeness Interpretation, and 
two of the several Realist Interpretations or arguments: the Quantum Logic 
argument and the Reactionary or Hidden Variables argument. The most accepted of 
This classification is taken in part from Herbert (1985) and also Casti (1989). 
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the various interpretations of the quantum puzzle is also the first on the scene, and 
perhaps the most discomforting: the Copenhagen Interpretation. 
The Copenhagen Interpretation, offered by quantum pioneer Neils Bohr and 
supported by Werner Heisenberg during his work at Bohr's Institute in Copenhagen, 
is simply stated: There is no deep reality. The first reaction people have to Bohr's 
statement is that Bohr really means (in the positivist sense) that reality is "fuzzy" and 
can't be empirically studied therefore people can't conclude anything about it in a 
satisfactorily scientific manner. To that reaction Bohr replies, with more emphasis 
(In Herbert, 1985), THERE IS NO DEEP REALITY. This does not, however, mean 
you should feel safe pulling your Buick into the path of a Mack truck; for Bohr 
everyday reality exists, but not as the deterministic outcome of events at the quantum 
level. According to Bohr, the meaning of life is not to be found in quantum 
mechanics. To recapitulate his thesis, there is no deep reality, Bohr's nihilist position 
is sometimes referred to as the Strong Copenhagen Interpretation. 
"The majority of physicists swear at least nominal allegiance to Bohr's anti-
realist creed" (Herbert, 1985, p, 16). Even so, many of Bohr's followers prefer the 
version of the Copenhagen Interpretation that Heisenberg tended to favor, 
sometimes called the Weak Copenhagen Interpretation. This interpretation reads: 
Reality is created through the process of observation. 
Although the numerous physicists of the Copenhagen school do not believe in 
deep reality, they assert the existence of phenomenal reality. What we see is 
undoubtedly real, they say, but these phenomena are not really there in the 
absence of an observation. (Herbert, 1985, p. 17) 
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The physics of this interpretation has an ontological component. In the Weak 
Copenhagen Interpretation, reality comes into being when the "wave potential" or 
"wave function" is collapsed and material (i.e., particle) reality is realized. As 
Heisenberg asserted, the process of observation collapses that wave function and 
turns a potential reality into a fully realized one. One of the main criticisms of the 
Weak Copenhagen Interpretation (other than the standard critique by the naive 
realists) is that it is dealing with apples and oranges, not a discrete level or condition 
of reality. It treats the observer and the measuring instrument in Classical terms 
while treating the phenomenon under study in quantum terms. As Casti (1989, p. 
444) points out, this is the same schizophrenia that Descartes infected the Newtonian 
paradigm with. There have been basically two ways out of this conundrum, neither 
being any more satisfactory to the naive realists. 
John von Neumann, 1903-1957, offered an elegant mathematical solution to 
the dualistic reality of the Weak Copenhagen Interpretation, resulting in what is 
called the Consciousness Interpretation: consciousness creates reality. 
[The] Copenhagen position maintained that there was a definite separation 
between the measuring device and the quantum object being measured, and 
that the wave function collapse was assumed to occur in some vague 
neighborhood between the two. To everyone's surprise and consternation, 
when he put the object and the device on the same footing by thinking of them 
both as quantum objects,... [he] discovered that as far as the final observed 
results were concerned, he could put the "cut" between the two anywhere he 
pleased in the system, in the device, or anywhere in between. (Casti, 
1989, p. 44) 
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This implied that there could be no "innate" properties of ordinary objects to be 
realized when the wave function collapsed. "In fact, by this result the world cannot 
even be constructed out of combinations of unobservable ordinary objects" (Casti, 
1989, p. 444). Von Neumann concluded that such "attributes" were no more than the 
"real" products of human consciousness. In sum, consciousness creates reality. It is, 
for the most part, a reversion to philosophical idealism.^! Of course, the persistent 
problem with von Neumann's interpretation, as with all idealist philosophy, is that it 
can't be disproved. The other escape from the dualism of the Weak Copenhagen 
Interpretation is the Austin Interpretation. 
The Austin Interpretation also contends that reality is a product of the process 
of observation. This approach treats reality as the combination of all possible 
histories and futures, with the human act of observation (or choice) determining what 
becomes ontologically real. 
We should hasten to note that the Austin Interpretation champions an 
observer-created reality, not a consciousness-created one. The Austin view, 
while differing from the Copenhagen in significant ways, still accepts some of 
the crucial aspects of Bohr's position. Most important, the two schools agree 
Philosophical idealism comes in a variety of forms. Berkeley's "metaphysical idealism" suggested that 
ideas originate through the process of conscious thought as opposed to originating in the external world. 
Kant's "transcendental idealism" pitted a world of "things-in-themselves," i.e., noumena, which eluded 
sensory experience against a phenomenal world of sensory experience which bound man to a two-
dimensional existence (Kant, 1781/1934). Kant's great contribution was the conclusion that the 
noumenal world becomes the "real" world through the ideal and active reconstruction of everyday life 
(see Sahakian, 1968, pp. 172-172 for an excellent summary). Hegel's "absolute idealism" externalized 
Kant's marriage of intuition and reason into what Hegel called the weltgeist, or universal human spirit. 
Regardless of the variety, philosophical idealism challenges the classical contention that the "real" world 
exists independent of and/or external our conscious awareness of it. Of course, given that our 
consciousness is the only means of perception we have, it is impossible for consciousness to negate itself 
in order to prove the existence of anything "not consciousness" On the other hand, idealism can 
neither disprove the possibility of an external objective world. 
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that scientists can communicate unambiguously only about the final results of 
a measurement. For Wheeler, the essence of existence (reality) is meaning, 
and the essence of meaning is communication defined as the joint product of 
all the evidence available to those who communicate. In this view meaning 
(i.e., reality) rests on action, which means decisions, which in turn force the 
choice between complementary questions and the distinguishing answers. 
Putting all these links together, out pops the Austin Interpretation of reality 
generation by exercise of the quantum measurement option. (Casti, 1989, p. 
449) 
Thus, in the Austin Interpretation, ontological reality is contingent upon a Habermas-
like this-worldly social constructionism where meaning (i.e., reality) is determined by 
the questions we ask, the measurements we take, and the solutions we communicate. 
Interestingly, supporters of the Austin Interpretation contend that this need not 
involve human consciousness. As long as the results of the measurement are 
communicated, the wave function can be considered as collapsed.'*^ 
Heisenberg, in his later years, rejected the nihilist position of Bohr and the 
phenomenal orientation of the Weak Copenhagen Interpretation. Heisenberg 
wanted to delve deeper into the ontological implications of quantum mechanics. As 
he considered the alternative interpretations put forth by his colleagues, the 
persistent question was not how reality was made (this was still a sociological process 
according to Heisenberg), but out of what it was made. His eventual conclusion 
formed the Duplex Interpretation. Heisenberg's Duplex Interpretation contends that 
ontological reality is comprised of two parts: Potential and Actuality. Ontological 
Obviously, the sociological question remains as to whether communication implies consciousness and 
vice-versa. 
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reality, according to Heisenberg, consists of both the objective outcomes of events 
and all the potential outcomes of events from the past through the future. 
Phenomenal reality—the reality of everyday life—consists of the actualization of a 
potential event outcome which occurs at the moment the process of observation and 
measurement collapses the probability wave function relating to that particular event. 
Keep in mind that there are no longer fundamental particles forming the glue of our 
world. The fundamental process at the base of the physical worW^ is a tendency or 
potential set of event outcomes in which the material world may or may not manifest 
itself. This results in two universes, so to be speak: one of potentiality and the other 
of actuality. In light of these considerations, Heisenberg's Duplex Interpretation 
offers a satisfactory ontological interpretation of reality. However, following the 
same logic as Heisenberg, another interpretation sounds more like science fiction 
than reasoned fact: Everett's Many-Worlds Interpretation. 
The Many-Worlds Interpretation (in Herbert, 1985, p. 19; also Wolf, 1988) 
claims that reality consists of a steadily increasing number of parallel universes. The 
main appeal of the Many-Worlds Interpretation is that it overcomes the dualism of 
quantum measurement. It does this, however, by proposing that every potential 
outcome of every potential event creates an alternative universe regardless of 
whether any particular outcome was measured or not. This interpretation is, perhaps, 
The question still remains whether this can be called a "deep reality" or not. 
98 
the hardest to swallow since it is the farthest removed from our everyday experiences. 
Less bizarre, but more often misinterpreted and misunderstood, is the Wholeness 
Interpretation. 
The Wholeness Interpretation states that ontological reality is an undivided 
wholeness which cannot be understood in terms of the structural properties of its 
constituent parts. This is the position put forth by Fritjof Capra and the late David 
Bohm.')^ The key to understanding the Wholeness Interpretation is understanding 
nonlocality. John Bell first proposed the nonlocality assumption in what is now called 
Bell's Theorem.''® Bell offered a mathematical proof that Einstein was wrong in his 
contentions that the quantum indeterminacy problem was the result of hidden 
variables operating at the local level. Bell concluded that, given the speed of light as 
a mathematical constant and physical limit, "local" realities cannot explain all 
quantum events. Nonlocality is rather difficult to conceptualize. Bohm gives the 
example of a universal domino effect in which the quantum world is like a huge row 
of dominoes. The twist is that the dominoes are all hooked together at the top of 
each piece such that the movement of one simultaneously results in the movement of 
all others. Capra's analogy is a web (think of a spiderweb) of interconnected 
processes where a disturbance or event in one area is immediately felt in all other 
The wholeness theme runs throughout the voluminous works of both Bohm and Capra. See in 
particular Capra (1983; 1989; 1991), Capra & Steindl-Rast (1991), Bohm (1983), and Bohm & Hiley 
(1993). 
See Herbert (1985, pp. 211-231) for an excellent summary of Bell's Interconnectedness Theorem, its 
various nuances, implications, and critics. 
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areas. Regardless, the Wholeness Interpretation dismisses any discrete boundaries 
between objects and events, particularly between the observer and what is observed. 
Time itself is considered as an undivided whole in the Wholeness Interpretation, thus 
the concept of cause and effect becomes meaningless. The difficulty with the 
Wholeness Interpretation is its intangible abstract nature. How does one "know" this 
ontological reality—especially since a theory that explains everything in terms of 
everything else is no more valuable than no theory at all? Capra (1991, p. 287) 
contends that Science is limited as a way of knowing and understanding this vast 
multi-dimensional ontological reality. Thus, people socially construct a reality in 
which they are comfortable and can impose some sense of regularity on. These social 
constructions in the form of scientific theories are "necessary approximations" of 
ontological reality—and, as such, make Science (and human survival) possible 
(Capra, 1991, p. 287). Thus, the Wholeness Interpretation asserts that there is an 
ontological reality which transcends, yet includes, phenomenal reality. Bohm makes a 
similar statement in regard to the epistemological and ontological limits of Science. 
[Appearances are] what arise in our perception of the world. As we have seen, 
the appearances in sense perception give rise to inferences about an essence 
that might be their origin, but this essence, which is seen in thought, turns out 
to be yet another appearance and therefore still part of our overall perception. 
Our theories are not primarily forms of knowledge about the world but rather, 
they are forms of insight that arise in our attempts to obtain a perception of a 
deeper nature of reality as a whole In all this, scientific theory may even 
go so far as to throw some light on the observer, to whom all these 
appearances are supposed to be taking place. But as with everything else, 
even such theories are only further extensions of appearances, so to speak, 
which give the observer a mental mirror in which he or she is reflected. There 
will therefore be no final theory of the observer. The ultimate nature of 
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awareness is unlimited and unknown, like that of the universe as a whole of 
which it is a part. (Bohm & Hiley, 1993, p. 324) 
The Wholeness Interpretation rejects the assumption that local events collapse the 
wave function and create reality. In this approach, the question itself is immaterial. 
In a strictly non-deterministic sense, ontological reality was always there—the proper 
question is a sociological one: What role do we and our decisions play in how this 
"wholeness" unfolds? The Wholeness Interpretation is an elegant philosophical 
doctrine. Even so, such questions and interpretations offer little comfort for the 
pragmatic realists. The remaining interpretations of quantum theory^® all share the 
assumption that ontological reality has real attributes completely independent of the 
observer and the process of measurement. 
Of the proponents of the Realist interpretations of quantum theory, Einstein 
was the most famous and most vocal. Einstein remained a naive realist until the end. 
Along with the other realists (which includes most of the applied scientists who spend 
their time working on everyday problems), Einstein treated the objective material 
world as an a priori concept. Realists are confident that something with real 
empirically-identifiable attributes is there whether one is looking at it or not and that 
science can explain where it came from in addition to where its going, in accordance 
with the inherent laws'*' of nature. Most realists are content to limit themselves to 
The list and discussion herein is intended to be somewhat representative, but by no means exhaustive, 
of all the different interpretations of quantum theory. 
In effect, Classical laws. 
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solutions of everyday problems that fall within the bounds of the Classical scientific 
paradigm. Quantum theory, to them, is only a tool to be used if the problem at hand 
falls outside of the bounds of Classical concepts. With the possible exception of 
Einstein, most realists are not bothered with epistemological and ontological 
questions about the nature of reality. Those that are take one of two popular 
neorealist stands in regard to the ontological implications of quantum theory: the 
Quantum Logic argument and the Hidden Variables argument. 
The first neorealist position is that of Quantum Logic. The Quantum Logic 
Interpretation contends that quantum reality is no more than a subset of reality in the 
Newtonian sense, except that it requires a language and logic which we don't yet have. 
To these neorealists, quantum reality is a "deep reality" that we don't have the tools 
to understand yet. An analogy is often given that quantum physics needs to create a 
new language of understanding in the same manner that Newton created calculus to 
understand the universe, or Reimann created non-Euclidean geometry through which 
we can better understand relativity. 
Of course, according to the proponents of the Realist Interpretation, what is 
needed to resolve this problem is more empirical science in the spirit of the true 
Classical paradigm. This is the basis of the alternative neorealist position: the 
Reactionary Interpretation. Assuming that the Classical model is correct, the 
reactionaries propose that ontological reality is exactly as Newton explained it; 
however, at the quantum level, it must have hidden variables which cause the 
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unanticipated effects in quantum experiments. In spite of the neorealist faith in the 
Classical Newtonian model of a wholly objective and predictable universe, quantum 
theory remains the ghost in Newton's machine. 
Any effort to integrate or summarize these several wide-ranging 
interpretations of quantum theory is difficult. What do these various interpretations 
of quantum theory have in common? What generalizations can be made in the quest 
for a better understanding of ontological reality? At first, one notices that the 
concept of ontological reality varies from interpretation to interpretation. In some 
cases, e.g., the Many-Worlds Interpretation, the Duplex Interpretation, and the 
Wholeness Interpretation, ontological reality encompasses events which are not only 
outside our epistemological frame of reference, but even outside the range of 
probability. In such an ontological framework, our knowledge (i.e., epistemology) 
will remain, by necessity, very small. In the other direction, other interpretations, e.g., 
the Weak Copenhagen Interpretation, equate ontological reality with phenomenal 
reality, or in the extreme cases with consciousness (the Consciousness Interpretation) 
or crass empiricism (the realist and neorealist positions). Some fail to adequately 
distinguish between ontology and epistemology (e.g., the Austin Interpretation). 
Many reject any ontological implications all together; 
Physicists do of course carry around with them a working philosophy. For 
most of us, it is a rough-and-ready realism, a belief in the objective reality of 
the ingredients of our scientific theories. But this has been learned through 
the experience of scientific research and rarely from the teachings of 
philosophers [We] should not expect [philosophy] to provide today's 
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scientists with any useful guidance about how to go about their work or about 
what they are likely to find. (Weinberg, 1992, p. 167) 
The most common feature of the various interpretations of quantum theory is 
that the place of the observer must be taken into consideration. Even though Bohm 
(1993) argues that, in his theory, the essence of nonlocality removes the observer 
from the high throne of reality creation, it still does not negate the impact of the 
observer on the system as a whole. The antithesis of the "role of the observer" thesis 
is offered explicitly by the naive realists who still assume the validity of the Cartesian 
dualism between mind and matter. However, it could be argued that the role of the 
observer in the neorealist interpretation is to not interfere with the phenomena under 
study.''® Most scientists today agree that the possibility of objectively detached 
observation is an impossibility. Quantum physics has, for all practical purposes, 
destroyed the Cartesian separation of object and subject, mind and matter, observer 
and observed. In its place it has made an explicit call for sociological variables to 
help explain the process in which we actively participate in reality building. In doing 
so, it has also challenged the Newtonian assumption of structural determinism. 
As Heisenberg (1949) pointed out, it is only in closed systems that we can 
make the assumption of complete determinacy. For all practical purposes, even at 
the "material" level of reality, closed systems seldom exist outside of the laboratory. 
Whether one accepts the existence of any deep reality or not, the random nature of 
Whether this is possible or not is entirely another question. The sociological variable of observation is 
still a significant one in the interpretation. 
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event outcomes seriously challenges the assumption of discrete fundamental particles 
which obey innate natural laws. Such a revelation also opens another can of worms, 
i.e., if the universe is, at the most basic level, random, from where does order come? 
The search for fundamentals has, since the general recognition of quantum theory 
and its ontological implications, turned into a search for the nature of order. Though 
much more time could be devoted to the discussion of the essentials of quantum 
theory, the discussion must now turn to the question of order and disorder. Several 
derivatives of and spin-offs from quantum theory have tried to locate the nature of 
order in an otherwise indeterminate and probabilistic universe. Though the list is not 
all-inclusive, a least a few of these attempts warrant discussion. 
The Search for Order 
The death of determinism 
Newton's world was a world of order and determinism. Newton firmly 
believed that the most useful tool in understanding the innate order of the universe— 
to determine cause and effect—was mathematics. 
The most perfect mathematical expression of determinism is the differential 
equation. It is the mathematical tool which was created by Newton to derive 
Kepler's laws from the gravitational pull. Even today, a deterministic system is 
a system which can be modeled by a differential equation. It has the 
fundamental property that its state at any time completely determines all 
subsequent (and preceding) states, and there are numerical procedures to 
compute the state at any time t from the initial state and the equation. 
(Ekeland, 1988, pp. 20-21) 
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Quantum theory rejected Newtonian determinism and replaced the linear 
mathematical modeling with nonlinear probability models. This was necessitated by 
two previously discussed theoretical shifts in the move from Classical to quantum 
thought. The first was the quantum measurement problem and Heisenberg's 
uncertainty principle, which confirmed the impossibility of any precise measurements 
of linear space-time relationships. The second theoretical shift was the move from 
structural antecedents to the primacy of process, e.g., in Planck's blackbody radiation 
studies Newtonian linearity broke down at certain points, resulting in the "blackbody 
catastrophe." The idea of indeterminate and/or catastrophic systems formed the 
basis for several branches of quantum theory, all having the common goal of trying to 
explain the nature of order. 
Catastrophe theory 
Catastrophe theory is a mathematical model which can be traced back to the 
blackbody radiation problem. This theory suggests that order is innate in the universe 
and can be modeled linearly using mathematics. Yet, at certain conjunctures of 
variables, linear systems sometimes take on a nonlinear form with unpredictable 
consequences. Several assumptions are made in catastrophe theory (see Ekeland, 
1988, pp. 88-108). The primary defining assumption is that the system under 
observation is a closed system in a state of equilibrium. The parameters of the system 
can be defined in a quantum manner as "the totality of all its possible responses to 
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the world outside" (Ekeland, 1988, p. 91). External variables (usually three for 
optimal modeling flexibility) with random values are then introduced into the system, 
which alter the system in a typical linear fashion. At some point, however, the 
equilibrium of the system dissipates, and the system may jump to a visibly different 
state of equilibrium. The mathematical model lends itself to graphical illustrations in 
which the data take regular shapes and forms, e.g., folds, cusps, swallowtails, elliptic 
umbilic, hyperbolic umbilic, butterfly, parabolic umbilic, etc. (Toulouse, 1981, pp. 
101-103). An example of such a system in nature is the combination of one oxygen 
and two hydrogen atoms. As temperature variation is introduced, the internal state of 
the water varies linearly with the external temperature until the critical value of 
freezing, at one end, and boiling, at the other. Theoretically, the model suggests that 
even disorder in the universe takes on regular shapes and forms—in fact, Thom^^ 
suggested that all apparent order in the universe resulted from catastrophes in 
otherwise stable closed systems. However, in spite of its broad application and 
popularity during the 1970s, catastrophe theory has not experienced much success in 
explaining real-world phenomena. 
In the twenty years of its existence, there has not been a single undisputed 
success of catastrophe theory in the field of experimental science, that is, and 
undisputed fact that could be explained more adequately by catastrophe 
theory than by other means. (Ekeland, 1988, p. 103) 
Rene Thorn introduced catastrophe theory in his 1972/1975 book Structural Stability and 
Morphogenesis; An Essay on the General Theory of Models. 
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In the sense of taking order and stability a priori, catastrophe theory may fit better 
into a Newtonian framework and not in the Post-Newtonian or post-quantum 
theoretical categories. A close cousin of catastrophe theory is the theory of chaos. 
Chaos theory 
The theory of chaos started with Lorenz in 1960, but did not reach its zenith 
until the publication of James Gleick's (1987) book Chaos: Making a New Science. 
Like catastrophe theory, its link to quantum theory is the use of mathematical 
modeling to illustrate the nature of order in natural systems. Like quantum theory 
itself, chaos theory was born out of a search for the Classical regularities supposedly 
inherent in nature. As told by Gleick (1987), Edward Lorenz sought to model 
meteorological patterns using an early primitive computer (affectionately named the 
Royal McBee). Lorenz defined several variables and formulated a routine which 
could reasonably approximate normal weather patterns in its output. As the story 
goes, he sought to repeat a series of runs that he found interesting, so he entered in 
the variable values where the interesting pattern started and then went for coffee (the 
Royal McBee was not famous for its speedy calculations). Upon his return over an 
hour later, Lorenz was wholeheartedly disappointed to find that the output did not at 
all resemble what he had wanted. Something had gone wrong—possibly a failure of 
one of the mighty McBee's vacuum tubes. However, upon retracing his steps, he 
found that one of the variable values, .506127, had been rounded to .506 at the start 
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of the new run. Lorenz was awestruck. Assuming, in the Classical deterministic 
sense, that random errors and events in a normal system inevitably cancel themselves 
out, Lorenz could not understand how such a different outcome could result from 
such a mathematically insignificant change in a single variable among so many others. 
If a weather satellite can read ocean-surface temperature to within one part in 
a thousand, its operators consider themselves lucky. Lorenz's Royal McBee 
was implementing the [CJlassical program. It used a purely deterministic 
system of equations. Given a particular starting point, the weather would 
unfold exactly the same way each time. Given a slightly different starting 
point, the weather should unfold in a slightly different way. A small numerical 
error was like a small puff of wind—surely the small puffs faded or canceled 
each other out before they could change important, large-scale features of the 
weather. Yet in Lorenz's particular system of equations, small errors proved 
catastrophic. (Gleick, 1987, pp. 16-17) 
Lorenz did not know enough about digital computing to realize that computers 
perform this type of rounding all the time in the normal course of their operations. 
Given the fact that not all numbers are discrete, small deviations from the true values 
of variables are inevitable. In the Classical paradigm, errors occur in a random 
fashion and can be expected to cancel themselves out.^" However, in mathematical 
models which use recursive calculations, small deviations and errors become 
multiplied exponentially at each recursion. Similarly, any linear equation in which 
variables are combined to form exponential values, small errors and deviations can 
quickly become large ones. The idea that any small perturbation in a normal linear 
Note that this applies to closed systems only—the type that Newton saw as the structural framework 
of the universe. Quantum mechanics recognizes that most systems are in fact open systems where 
perturbations and new variables occur in ways which will deÔnitely not "average out" over time or 
produce the same anticipated results. 
109 
system can produce catastrophic results is called the Butterfly Effect. This term came 
from Lorenz's findings that something as apparently insignificant as the flapping of a 
butterfly's wings can significantly affect the weather, even on the other side of the 
world. Lorenz did not stop there, for he then sought to extend his findings to 
nonlinear systems—systems in which the variables did not have specific relationships 
over time. He began modeling nonlinear number systems on the computer, i.e., 
recursively plotting three random variables as a point in space on a three dimensional 
coordinate system. Common sense tells us there should be no recognizable pattern. 
Lorenz's results did not complement common sense. 
[T]he map displayed a kind of infinite complexity. It always stayed within 
certain bounds, never running off the page but never repeating itself, either. It 
traced a strange, distinctive shape, a kind of double spiral in three dimensions, 
like a butterfly with its two wings. The shape signaled pure disorder, since no 
point or pattern of points ever recurred. Yet it also signaled a new kind of 
order [It said] "this is complicated." All the richness of chaos was there. 
(Gleick, 1987, pp. 30-31) 
This type of mathematical modeling became quite popular, particularly after Benoit 
Mandelbrot devised a set of computer algorithms which resulted in aesthetically 
stunning and complex pictures. Mandelbrot advanced chaos theory another step with 
models that produced the same complex patterns at multiple degrees of 
magnification. Call it "random order" or "ordered randomness," but chaos theoiy 
suggests that random events can take on complex and apparently orderly behaviors. 
Chaos theory, like catastrophe theory, tried to restore a Newtonian faith in the 
regularity of the world—even random events (i.e., at the micro and/or quantum 
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level) can evolve into regular orderly systems. The primary distinction between 
catastrophe theory and chaos theory is that catastrophe theory assumes an initial and 
innate state of order while chaos theory need not make that assumption. Another 
difference is that catastrophe theory relies primarily on mathematical equations while 
chaos theory utilizes visual models and places less emphasis on mathematical 
equations. In spite of this aesthetic appeal, chaos theory can be criticized on several 
counts. First, chaos theory ignores the epistemological foundation of its own success, 
i.e., humans perceive complex patterns in randomly constructed pictures. Is this 
"order" inherent in the model or a result of the human attribution process, i.e., a 
gloried Rorschach test? Chaos theory fails to take into account the place and role of 
the observer. Second, especially in the Mandelbrot sets, is this apparent order simply 
a result of recursive mathematical structures built in to the equations that produce 
the fractal images? If so, such results, though aesthetically awesome, are not 
unexpected. Third, given the fact that computers cannot generate true random 
numbers in a recursive fashion, are the models simply reflecting some innate "order," 
i.e., random limit, in digital information processing? The most serious critique of 
chaos theory is that it fails to answer the question which spurred its own development: 
Where does order come from? In response to this question, the science of complexity 
picks up where the science of chaos left off. 
I l l  
The science of complexity 
Of all its supporters, Ilya Prigogine (1980) has probably offered the best 
outline of the basic tenets of complexity theory (also see Glansdorff & Prigogine, 
1981; Prigogine & Stengers, 1984; Nicolis & Prigogine, 1989). Prigogine is especially 
interested in time, change, and the process of entropy. Einstein had originally 
proposed that time was a human construct and could, at least in theory, be reversible. 
Prigogine, in his search for order, wanted to identify those things in the material 
world which could not be reversed, even if time itself could—this could be the key to 
how order unfolds in the universe. Drawing from the existing tenets of catastrophe 
and chaos theories, Prigogine's goal was nothing less than showing how random, yet 
irreversible, fluctuations in the microscopic environment lead to enduring structural 
consistencies in the macro-environment which, in turn, have reciprocal effects on the 
microscopic environment. This is possible because time and entropy have different 
implications in open systems than in closed systems. In closed systems, entropy is well 
defined—the possible options for the system inevitably and progressively decrease 
over time as the system evolves. In closed systems, the second law of thermodynamics 
actually supersedes the first, i.e., system equilibrium is achieved at a zero-state of 
energy transfer. Most systems, however, are open systems and can exchange energy 
with other systems in the environment—here the first law of thermodynamics can 
supersede the second and equilibrium can be maintained at high energy transfer 
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levels/i Given that the continuity of any system depends on its ability to postpone its 
own entropie demise, order in the natural world arises when the mutual energy 
exchange between systems and/or subsystems optimizes this energy exchange 
function. Such systems are referred to as self-generating systems, since they are able to 
regenerate (at least most) their energy lost to entropy through exchange with other 
systems. For self-generating systems, entropy is not so much a dissipation of energy, 
but a progressive reduction in possible event outcomes for the system itself. 
Ironically, the reduction of possible event outcomes also gives the appearance of an 
increase in order, since, for irreversible processes, fewer possible outcomes translate 
into a higher probability of the occurrence of any single outcome. Complexity theory 
sees this as an ongoing process of change (i.e., becoming), and invokes the 
inevitability of catastrophe as well as the emergence of recursive random patterns like 
those illustrated by chaos theory. Complexity theory shows great promise in uniting 
the macro and micro levels of reality in an understandable way. It has also achieved 
some success in modeling social phenomena, e.g., economics, population dynamics 
(see Waldrop, 1992). With Prigogine and his science of complexity, the Newtonian 
paradigm can be formally declared dead in the natural sciences. 
Both at the macroscopic and microscopic levels, the natural sciences have thus 
rid themselves of a conception of objective reality that implied that novelty 
and diversity had to be denied in the name of immutable universal laws. They 
have rid themselves of a fascination with a rationality taken as closed and a 
knowledge seen as nearly achieved. They are now open to the unexpected. 
This does not negate the second law of thermodynamics, it just shifts the entropy function to a 
different part of the larger system. 
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which they no longer define as the result of imperfect knowledge or 
insufficient control. (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984, p, 306) 
In contrast with mankind's position in Aristotle's or even Descartes' world, we are 
now fairly comfortable with our place on the edge of a universe hanging precariously 
between order and chaos. The idea of detached observation, linear causality, and 
innate natural laws exists only in a parallel universe where humankind did not happen 
to evolve the way they did. We are not passive observers, but active creators of the 
universe we seek to understand. As a product of nature that has come to realize 
itself,52 we have also inherited our own destinies. The quest for order in Post-
Newtonian science has come full circle and dumped the problem back in our laps. 
We can no longer accept the old a priori distinction between scientific and 
ethical values. This was possible at a time when the external world and our 
internal world appeared to conflict, to be nearly orthogonal. Today we know 
that time [and science itself] is a [social] construction and therefore carries an 
ethical responsibility. (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984, p. 312) 
The idea of nature realizing itself transcends the Classical dualism of mind and matter, putting 
another tenet of the Newtonian worldview to rest. It also changes humankind's position in the 
universe—previously, man was thought to have been the center of the universe and "above" nature itself. 
Knowing the mechanics of quantum theory and self-generating systems, we can now understand how 
humans evolved along with other natural systems and subsystems. However, the result (as opposed to 
cause) is that this natural process of evolution has acquired the ability to realize itself. The Wholeness 
Interpretation of quantum theory addresses this directly and relocates humankind not in the center of the 
geographic universe, but in the center of a universal responsibility to create and recreate the most viable 
world vis-à-vis the entropie process. As Prigogine points out (1984), our origin and success as a species 
is due to thwarting our own entropie demise by borrowing resources from other natural systems. The 
larger problem, according to Capra and the Wholeness Interpretation of quantum mechanics (1983, pp. 
15-18), is in the fragmented, dominating, deterministic assumptions of the Classical Newtonian 
paradigm. What is needed is a "new paradigm" and a "fundamental change in our thoughts, perceptions, 
and values we need an ecological perspective which the Cartesian world view does not offer" 
(Capra, 1983, p. 16). 
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Thus, according to the physicists, in an unpredictable world where every decision we 
make closes future opportunities (i.e., the entropy function for open systems) the last 
remaining variables are, by necessity, sociological. How are the social sciences 
addressing these issues? Has there been a comparable scientific revolution in the 
social sciences as there has been in the natural sciences? 
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POST-NEWTONIAN FOUNDATIONS FOR A NEW SOCIAL SCIENCE 
Paradigms Revisited 
Before examining the paradigmatic state of the social sciences, a few 
qualifications are in order. First, one cannot assume that a great deal of consensus 
exists in the natural sciences in regard to the shift from the Classical Newtonian 
worldview to a Post-Newtonian worldview. By far, the majority of practicing scientists 
in the natural sciences are not concerned with natural philosophy, ontology, nor 
epistemology. The state of Science^^ in the Western world might be compared to the 
science of the Ancient Roman world: The question is not "what is?" but "what is the 
use?". Thus, the case for a narrower definition of paradigm could be made when 
considering science as simply a modern way of knowing. Disciplines are fragmented 
and knowledge itself is disseminated in a highly stratified manner and form. 
Scholarly journals within disciplines have policies as to what constitutes "knowledge" 
in their field and what falls outside of that definition. Similarly, the use of 
mathematical and statistical modeling takes on specific forms within specific 
disciplines, and noticeably different forms in different areas. Seldom does one find 
the philosophy department located anywhere near the physics laboratories. At the 
same time, most school children and college freshmen are still taught science and 
Recall the previous distinction made between Science and science. 
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physics from the Classical perspective.^ In sum, one cannot assume that there has 
been, or will be, a widespread move in the natural sciences toward a Post-Newtonian 
worldview. This is not to say that such a shift is not taking place. Just as people at 
one time were afraid they would fall off a spherical world, people also fear the 
responsibility implied by a non-deterministic world where man is a product of nature 
as well as a progenitor of nature itself. To reiterate a statement by Kuhn, such 
paradigmatic revolutions require "the reconstruction of prior theory and the re-
evaluation of prior fact, an intrinsically revolutionary process that is seldom 
completed by a single man and never overnight" (Kuhn, 1970, p. 7). 
A second issue must also be addressed. In spite of August Comte's 
popularization of the concepts of positivism, one cannot assume that the social 
sciences, and sociology in particular, are completely organized around Classical 
Newtonian principles and perspectives. The reason is that the social sciences have 
always been home to strong anti-positivist factions. Sociology, in particular, has 
several theoretical divisions, ranging from hermeneutical to humanistic, which 
explicitly critique positivism and scientism in general, even to the point of openly 
rejecting the basic tenets of positivism altogether. However, to reiterate the analysis 
of Halfpenny, 
What is of interest here is not whether positivism of some sort is able to 
disarm or absorb [its critics], but that the challengers take positivism, as their 
^ Of course, we're still waiting for an alternative to the Classical perspective as it applies to the social 
sciences. 
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target, still assuming that it is the dominant form of sociology to be discredited 
and transcended by their preferred alternatives. (1982, p. 120) 
Thus, in spite of the fact that the Classical worldview and method is not without 
critics, by most accounts, it forms the dominant worldview of the social sciences and 
sociology. 
The goal herein is not to resolve the debate, nor to extol the merits and pitfalls 
of any particular perspective. However, it can be demonstrated that many of the 
perceived "crises" in the social sciences derive from similar crises in the natural 
sciences, resulting directly from the historical influence of the natural sciences on the 
social sciences. What is interesting is that, in the natural sciences, many of these 
obstacles are being overcome in the paradigmatic shift from the Newtonian to a Post-
Newtonian worldview, while the social sciences are still awaiting a resolution to their 
crises. Finally, of interest herein, is the fact that the Post-Newtonian worldview 
emphasizes sociological variables and principles in its ontological and epistemological 
foundations. What conclusions can be arrived at in regard to crises and paradigm 
shifts in the natural and social sciences? Can a complementary and/or encompassing 
worldview be constructed? Can the social sciences meet the quantum call for 
sociological variables? 
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Old Paradigm Crises in the Social Sciences 
The first and foremost crisis in the social sciences is the nature of order. Most 
all questions in the social sciences can be either directly or indirectly traced back to 
this initial conceptual problem. The origin and nature of order has, since the dawn of 
history, been attributed to the clockwork-like machinery of nature.^^ In the Classical 
paradigm it was believed that the machinery of nature could be best understood by 
understanding the structure and functions of each constituent part. Few historians of 
science or society would disagree with the notion that the machine paradigm has 
dominated our understanding of the world since the time of Newton, if not before. 
As Toffler contends, 
Nevertheless, despite all the ifs, ands, and buts, it remains fair to say, as 
Prigogine and Stengers do, that the machine paradigm is still the "reference 
point" for physics and the core model of science in general. Indeed, so 
powerful is its continuing influence that much of social science, and especially 
economics, remains under its spell. (Toffler, in Prigogine & Stengers, 1984, p. 
xiv.) 
Early sociologists, psychologists, political scientists, economists, and other social 
scientists developed "real," discrete, and deterministic structures and forms within 
their respective disciplines. This was especially true in sociology. 
Although critics have focused on the distant influence of Aristotle or the 
authority of organic metaphors in the romantic and Darwinian nineteenth 
century, the underlying premise for the practice of treating "society" or 
"history" as a unitary organism was the belief in deterministic natural laws [i.e., 
The importance of a clock-keeper (i.e., God or gods) has fallen in and out of our collective worldviews 
throughout history, while the notion that "order" is inherent in the universe has remained, for the most 
part, in tact. 
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the machine model]. Just as the "economy" had tended to be a closed system 
of variables from whose action all change in the system could be deduced, so 
too did society. Once the chief dynamic factors had been specified, rooted in 
nature, and the trajectory of their action set, history developed by an iimer 
logic along a precharted course, substantially immune to the contingencies of 
historical change. (Ross, 1991, p. 18) 
Thus, as the social sciences developed around the machine model, they quite 
naturally took structure a priori and treated process as a "function" of structure itself. 
Order and structure were treated as synonymous concepts as opposed to discrete 
emergent ones. In sociology. Comte based his "social physics" on the assumption that 
society is a separate structure and level of reality vis-à-vis the individuals that 
comprise it. Durkheim carried Comte's assumption to its logical extreme and 
concluded that society existed sui generis, inevitably determining the properties of its 
constituent members. Durkheim's attempt (1897/1951) to [re]establish this link 
between society and individuals in his study of suicide illustrates too well how social 
structures came to be taken a priori and process variables treated as functions or 
effects of these structures. The result was a pronounced gap between the macro-level 
reality of "invisible determining structures" and the micro-level reality of everyday 
people, personalities, and lives. This led to several other crises in the social sciences. 
The ideas of Hobbes and Descartes combined to give us a fragmented self to 
complement our fragmented external reality. The mind-body problem still plagues 
the social sciences and philosophy. Hobbes and Freud both located order external to 
individuals. Descartes divided reality into discrete objective and subjective realms. 
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Newtonian science declared the subjective realm as antithetical to the new scientific 
method. Thus, by necessity, the observer had to be separated and removed from the 
object of observation. The result was that the social sciences, like the natural 
sciences, ignored most of the "ways of knowing" that contribute to the very essence of 
social reality, i.e., tradition, aesthetics and culture, authority, faith, intuition, etc. In 
spite of the explicit humanism of prophets like Saint-Simon and Marx, the positivism 
and scientism of progress negated the "social" dimension of man they sought to 
understand and control. 
The Copernican revolution had dislodged man from the center of the universe; 
it remained for the Galilean-Newtonian revolution to remove him from the 
universe altogether. Through the inexorable reduction of all knowable reality 
to the dimensions of objective mechanism, the gap between the knower and 
the known, between the subjective self and the world, came to be the measure 
of the distance between appearance and reality. Only the primary qualities 
(number, figure, magnitude, position and motion), inhering in the object "out 
there," were henceforth to be regarded as substantially real; the secondary 
qualities (all else which the sense perceive or the mind assembles), inhering in 
the human subject, were in effect unreal. (Matson, 1966, p. 4) 
The result was an objective-subjective gap in the social sciences. This gap also 
extended to social science methodology, creating a crisis in the form of animosities 
between those making use of quantitative descriptive measures versus those relying 
primarily on qualitative ones. Quantum science now informs us that the observer, the 
observation, the mechanism of observation, the object, and the conclusion all form 
part of the reality under study and cannot be understood apart from each other. By 
ignoring epistemology and following the machine model of a detached independent 
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external reality, the social sciences have lost the ability to detect how and why we 
construct the world as we do—ithat is to say, the parameters and essence of our very 
humanness. The result is a crisis of reductionism in the social sciences. Following the 
Classical model, once structures and objects can be isolated it is then possible to 
make cause-effect determinations. Aside from the arguments surrounding the human 
capacity for free will, the machine model of the social sciences seeks to reduce all 
phenomena to cause-and-effect relationships. 
Taking social structure a priori raises a number of crucial questions and 
problems. The first is that cause-effect determinations, taken to their logical extreme, 
become an exercise in teleologyAssuming that natural laws determine structural 
and behavioral outcomes, what else can be concluded except that social events either 
support (i.e., provide order) or don't support (introduce disorder) into the progressive 
evolution of society? What constitutes a discrete social structure? Can structures be 
understood by reduction to their fundamental parts, i.e., substructures? How do we 
know a social structure when we see one? By what mechanism does it impose itself 
on us? How are these structures maintained and reproduced, or, even more 
fundamentally, how did we get here from there? If we can't see them—or if we can 
only perceive them indirectly—how do we study them? By ignoring epistemological 
variables and taking social structure a priori, these questions remain major obstacles 
Of course, an alternative to strict causal relationships is the comparative-historical method proposed 
by Weber (1903-1917/1949) in which only "necessary" causes are examined. 
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in the machine model of the social sciences—much like the "invisible particles," 
forms, and "substances" that make up the parts of Newton's grand universe. Yet the 
natural scientists are now calling for sociological variables in their understanding of 
the universe, specifically variables of process. Given the pervasive crises which now 
characterize the social sciences, how can the social sciences possibly hope to meet this 
call? 
The Quantum Call for Sociological Variables 
Before the social sciences can consider the quantum call for sociological 
variables in understanding how the world is created, ordered, and perceived, a 
summary of the shift from the Classical scientific paradigm to the Post-Newtonian 
worldview is in order. The best account of this shift is given by Fritjof Capra (1991) 
in The Tao of Physics. Capra openly subscribes to the "wholeness" interpretation of 
quantum reality, however, his summary can also be applied to the general 
understanding of quantum physics without excessive distortion.^^ 
The first and most obvious shift involves the abandonment of the machine 
model as an explanatory concept. Explanation in the Classical paradigm involved 
Capra's account has been sharply criticized by the naive realists; not because of factual inaccuracies 
but because of his detailed analogies between the new Post-Newtonian paradigm and the tenets of 
Eastern philosophy and mysticism. Note, however, that this similarity is recognized by other physicists, 
in particular, Paul Davies (1983). 
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isolating specific structures and then reducing those structures down to their 
constituent parts. 
Once you knew the parts—their fundamental properties and the mechanisms 
[i.e., functions] through which they interact—you could derive, at least in 
principle, the dynamics of the whole. Therefore the rule was: in order to 
understand any complex system, you break it up into its pieces. The pieces 
themselves cannot be explained nay further, expect by splitting them into 
smaller pieces. But as far as you want to go in this procedure, you will always 
end up, at some stage, with fundamental building blocks: elements, 
substances, particles, and so on—with properties you can no longer explain. 
From these fundamental building blocks with their fundamental laws of 
interaction you would then build up the larger whole and try to explain its 
dynamics if terms of the properties of the parts. This started with Democritus 
in ancient Greece; it was the procedure formalized by Descartes and Newton, 
and it has been the accepted scientific view until the twentieth century. 
(Capra, 1991, p. 328) 
Now, with the quantum paradigm, we find that the "fundamental" particles, 
structures, and building blocks of material reality are not material at all. They are 
potentials—statistical possibilities in which structure (i.e., recurrent patterns) may or 
may not emerge. Thus, the laws of nature are not innate in the material 
manifestations of everyday life. Quantum physics offers us a fundamentally different 
view of the relationship between the parts and the whole. In the Post-Newtonian 
paradigm, the parts and whole cannot be reduced to a linear cause-and-effect 
relationship. According to Capra, "Whatever we call a part is merely a pattern that 
has some stability and therefore captures our attention" (1991, p. 329). Thus, the 
fundamental "nature" of reality is neither structural nor deterministic. Patterns, 
however, do exist. This leads to Capra's second criterion of new-paradigm thinking. 
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Since the time of Aristotle, the primacy of structure has been at the foundation 
of our science. Capra explains that 
In the old paradigm is was thought that there were fundamental structures, 
and then there were forces and mechanisms through which these interacted, 
which [eventually] gave rise to processes. (1991, p. 329) 
For example, in the Classical Newtonian world, mass was considered to have the 
innate properties of attraction and repulsion (i.e., gravity and magnetism), which 
caused matter to move and organize itself in specific ways. All "objective" reality had 
mass and, thus, was required to obey the laws of gravity and motion. In the Post-
Newtonian world, it was realized that mass is really a form of energy, gravity is a 
function of warped time-space, and attraction and repulsion are properties of 
inanimate fields, not particles. The Post-Newtonian paradigm shifts the focus from 
the primacy of material structures to the primacy of processes. 
This process thinking came into physics with Einstein's relativity theory. The 
recognition that mass is a form of energy eliminated the concept of material 
substance from science and with it also that of a fundamental structure. 
Subatomic particles are not made of any material stuff; they are patterns of 
energy. Energy, however, is associated with activity, with processes, and this 
implies that the nature of subatomic particles is intrinsically dynamic. When 
we observe them, we never see any substance, nor any fundamental structure. 
What we observe are dynamic patterns continually changing into one 
another—a continuous dance of energy. (Capra, 1991, p. 329) 
The major criticism of Capra is to be found here, for one scientist put it, "He [Capra] 
thinks we're all electrons." Capra's goal here, however, is not to explain the 
pragmatic aspects of matter and motion, but to describe the ontological implications 
of the quantum paradigm. This is particularly significant for the social sciences, since 
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the ontological assumptions of the social sciences were initially founded upon the 
assumption that structure precedes process and determines functions. Ontologically, 
the Post-Newtonian paradigm turns social science on its head. It implies that process, 
i.e., action, makes structure possible—it implies that human actors are, to at least 
some degree, the active creators of objective reality. Keep in mind that the 
"wholeness" interpretation implied by Capra {ibid.) is not as strong as many others in 
the call for sociological variables; some interpretations favor an objective reality 
created exclusively through the process of observation. In either case, the Classical 
deterministic primacy of structure must give way to the primacy of process, action, 
and potentiality. 
The image of the universe as a machine has been replaced by that of an 
intercormected, dynamic whole whose parts are essentially interdependent and 
have to be understood as [recurrent] patterns of a cosmic process [in which we 
play an active part]. In order to define an object in this interconnected web of 
relationships, we [as observers] cut through some of the interconnections— 
conceptually, as well as physically with our instruments of observation—and in 
doing so we isolate certain patterns and interpret them as objects. Different 
observers may do so in different ways What you see depends on how you 
look at it. (Capra, 1991, p. 330; italics added) 
This brings us to Capra's third criterion for new-paradigm thinking in science: the 
shift from objective science to what he calls epistemic science. The necessity of 
epistemology in science derives from Heisenberg's uncertainty relations and operates 
on two different levels. First, given that our empirical sensory experiences are limited 
to the three primary dimensions, there are limits to the accuracy as well as the extent 
of our understanding. We cannot directly observe or experience phenomena above 
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or below the threshold of our own perceptions; this includes "social" phenomena as 
well as physical phenomena of the very small and very large. All we can do is utilize 
other ways of knowing, i.e., logical-rational, intuition, historical-traditional, etc., in 
inferring the nature of those phenomena given their apparent effects. The second 
dimension of epistemic science arises from the conclusion that the observer is a 
critical component of the phenomena under study. As Capra points out. 
In the old paradigm, scientific descriptions were believed to be objective, that 
is, independent of the human observer and the [interpretive] process of 
knowledge. In the new paradigm, we believe that epistemology—the 
understanding of the process of knowledge—has to be included explicitly in 
the description of natural phenomena. At this point, there is no consensus 
among scientists about what is the proper epistemology, but there is an 
emerging consensus that epistemology will have to be an integral part of 
everyday scientific theory. (1991, p. 330) 
It has already been demonstrated that the epistemology of science has changed over 
the course of history. At various times, Science has focused on various ways of 
knowing, including aesthetics, authority, empiricism, intuition, and logic. An 
epistemic approach to the new paradigm would recognize that all ways of knowing 
potentially form part of (a) the observer, (b) observation, and (c) that which is being 
observed. This is especially true for the social sciences. The Classical paradigm 
relied on crass empiricism as the ultimate measure of objective reality. Most of the 
the objects of Post-Newtonian science fall outside of the limits of our senses, so we 
must rely on ways of knowing other than strict empiricism. Given that the observer 
cannot be separated from the observation or object, we must also conclude that 
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ontological reality encompasses all possible alternative ways of knowing and forms of 
knowledge. Within this ontological reality, normal science remains a social 
construction by which we collectively define what is objective and what falls outside of 
our definitions. Thus, if Science wants to make the shift from describing objective 
reality to the search for the meaning of ontological reality, an epistemic Science is 
clearly demanded. 
The next shift is one from Classical descriptions of linear cause-and-effect 
descriptions to spatial descriptions of networks, interrelationships, and 
interconnected processes. Bohr used the term "complementarity" to replace the 
Newtonian notion of cause-and-effect. 
Bohr regarded the concept of complementarity as a generalization of causality 
appropriate to the mechanical description of objects whose behavior in 
principle cannot be separated from the measurement interactions that reveal 
this behavior. He saw the deterministic description of classical mechanics as 
intimately related to the classical notion of an object, characterized by a set of 
properties [i.e., structure] attributed to the object at each instant of time, quite 
independently of the physical systems required to observe these properties 
The quantities, or sets of quantities, associated with complementary 
phenomena can only be statistically related, since their mutual definition 
requires physical conditions which are not simultaneously applicable. The 
indeterminacy relations therefore express a reciprocal limitation on the extent 
to which complementary quantities may be defined simultaneously, and hence 
a limitation on the possibility of a causal description of events. (Bub, 1981, p. 
139) 
Complementarity means that complex interrelationships cannot be defined in terms 
of linear cause-and-effect. As Capra explains. 
Things exist by virtue of their mutually consistent relationships [i.e., 
complementarity], and all of physics has to follow uniquely from the 
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requirement that its components be consistent with one another and with 
themselves. (1991, p. 332) 
Statistically, complementarity implies that reciprocally related variables should not be 
isolated and used in linear models for the purposes of explanation or prediction. The 
Post-Newtonian paradigm contends that few, if any, causal-linear models are 
appropriate—real world phenomena are reciprocally related through a web of 
interconnected multidimensional interrelationships. No event outcomes are entirely 
predictable. However, by examining the potential outcomes of any event, the 
probability of any single outcome could be determined if enough information were 
available.^® This turns the idea of scientific progress, as defined in the Classical 
paradigm, on its head. It implies that the only variables we can really manipulate are 
sociological ones—and even then the outcomes are unpredictable, or "fuzzy" at 
best.^' This leads to Capra's fifth criterion for new-paradigm thinking: the relativity 
of science itself. 
Note that this applies to well-defined closed systems only; there is no way to determine all possible 
variables in open systems, let alone all possible event outcomes. 
The question must be raised as to the tautological implications of such a statement. If natural open 
systems evolve in a random manner, and human intervention—in the form of nature realizing itself— 
exists as one of the few variables influencing the outcome of these otherwise random events, isn't the 
process by definition sociological? Many of the physicists examined herein contend that what is 
important is not the logeai implications but the ethical implications of the role of the observer in 
constructing reality. Clearly, the idea that nature operates according to some deterministic formula or 
plan has to be abandoned. Though more often misinterpreted than not, the new theories deriving from 
Post-Newtonian assumptions (e.g., complexity, implicate order, wholeness) do NOT take order a priori . 
The defining characteristic of Post-Newtonian thought is that order is an emergent process, ultimately 
grounded in probability as opposed to "natural laws," and influenced greatly by the active awareness 
participation of the human species. Science is still possible, but science must also realize that it is a 
human creation which must ultimately understand itself before it can provide a window to the ontological 
world. Again, we are left with human sociological varaibles. 
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The Post-Newtonian paradigm suggests that the observer plays a critical part 
in the process and outcome of observation. Concomitantly, the observer plays an 
active creative role in the generation of the reality under observation. As Prigogine 
has already pointed out, Post-Newtonian science has shifted from an emphasis on 
"being" to the realization of "becoming" (1980). This always makes reaUty and our 
knowledge of it tentative and relative to the place and orientation of the observer. 
The Cartesian [Newtonian] paradigm was based on a belief in the certainty of 
scientific knowledge, which had been clearly stated by Descartes. In the new 
paradigm it is recognized that all scientific concepts and theories are limited 
and approximate. Science can never provide any complete and definitive 
understanding. Scientists do not deal with truth .. .they deal with limited and 
approximate descriptions of [phenomenal] reality. (Capra, 1991, p. 333) 
The strength of science as a way of knowing is not found in its ability to distinguish 
fact from fiction. In this area, science is no better than other ways of knowing. Yet as 
any naive realist will tell, the strength of science as a way of knowing is found in its 
sociological dimension, i.e., the collective definition, pursuit, observation, explanation, 
and verification of worldly phenomena. Science is not synonymous with truth or with 
ontological understanding. Scientific descriptions are sociological approximations of 
the world which reflect the position^ of those who observe it. In addition, the only 
variables within our immediate grasp are sociological ones; otherwise—in spite of 
how uncomfortable it makes us feel—all that remains is a throw of the dice. 
^ "Position" in the geographic as well as epistemological sense. 
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Thus, the Post-Newtonian call for sociological variables is becoming clear. 
What would a social science based upon Post-Newtonian premises look like? What 
does this imply for the conduct of science within the social science disciplines? Can 
the social sciences meet the Post-Newtonian call for a sociological understanding of 
ontological reality? These are the critical questions to keep in mind as we proceed. 
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A NEW PARADIGM MODEL FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
The social sciences have inherited many of their a priori assumptions about the 
world from the Classical scientific paradigm. The first is the notion of nature as a 
vast machine which must be understood in terms of the structures and functions of its 
fundamental parts. The social sciences, ironically, placed man outside of this vast 
machine. Theories of society (e.g., Comte, Durkheim) postulated real structures and 
changeless forms which existed independent of the actions of the people that 
comprised them—in spite of the fact that these people and their actions were 
"determined" by these structures. Theories of the individual (e.g., Hobbes, Spencer) 
also removed the individual from society, but saw determinism operating in the other 
direction—from hedonistic individuals. Order was located in the structure of society. 
Through detached analytic reductionism, one could determine the laws of society as 
well as the laws of nature. 
In the course of the nineteenth century the systematic projection into the 
"humane studies" of the spirit and method of Newtonian physics was carried to 
its extreme in nearly every direction. The two fundamental postulates of the 
scientific mechanist—those of neutral objectivity and analytic reductionism— 
came to be reflected, with varying degrees of accuracy and distortion in many 
of the most influential social theories of the period. (Matson, 1966, p. 15) 
Recall Capra's statement that "Whatever we call a part is merely a pattern that has 
some stability and therefore captures our attention" (1991, p. 329), and that these 
patterns are really processes, actions, or potentials, which logically precede structure 
and make structure possible. In a Post-Newtonian model for the social sciences 
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neither society nor the individual can be awarded primacy over the other. It is a 
dialectical and reciprocal relationship, one of Bohr's complementarity in which no 
linear cause-and-effect can be attributed. The social sciences can then be 
transformed and redefined as the study of recurrent patterns of human actions and 
action potentials. There still exists a macro-objective world of human and natural 
artifacts as well as a micro-subjective world of individual-level phenomena. 
Nonetheless, the first criteria for a Post-Newtonian model for the social sciences is 
that it must focus on the primacy of process above macro and micro level structures or 
functions. 
Following the lead of Capra's new-paradigm thinking, a Post-Newtonian 
model for the social sciences must have a firm epistemological base. Knowledge 
cannot be viewed as a structure located either within or outside individuals. 
Knowledge and knowledge acquisition must be seen as a process through which we 
actively (individually as well as collectively) construct objective as well as ontological 
reality. This knowledge cannot be exclusionary like the knowledge inherent in the 
Classical paradigm. As active creators of ontological reality, our worldviews are 
comprised of all different ways of knowing (refer back to Table 1). Thus, a Post-
Newtonian paradigm for the social recognizes that it is the variety of all ways of 
knowing which gives us our humanness. Science can still be defined in terms of the 
utilization of logic as a primary way of knowing, but this cannot be to the exclusion of 
all other ways. Our faith, values, emotions, etc., are part of us, and we are irreducibly 
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part of the reality we wish to study. Thus, criterion two of a Post-Newtonian model 
for the social sciences is that knowledge must be seen as the process by which we 
individually and collectively construct ontological reality, and by definition must 
include all ways of knowing. This is an open rejection of the Classical Cartesian 
separation of mind, body, matter, and reality in general. Epistemologically, this 
means that knowledge is not an innate (or an ideal) structure, or a state of being, but 
a process of becoming. As such, it is relative, not quantifiable, enabling, and should 
not be treated as a commodity or tool of power and authority. It is the means by 
which we actively construct and reconstruct a viable world. Exclusionary tactics in 
regard to the knowledge process defeat the enabling epistemological and ontological 
purposes of the knowledge process itself. 
The third criterion for a Post-Newtonian model for the social sciences is the 
rejection of linear cause-and-effect models. For the most part, the objects studied by 
the social sciences are parts of open systems. Statistical probabilities of event 
outcomes are usually not calculable in open systems since all variables cannot be 
known or controlled for. Even in closed systems, most real world phenomena are 
reciprocally related through a web of interconnected multidimensional relationships 
where assumptions about time order and causal relationships cannot be logically 
assumed. This is not to say that social phenomena cannot be modeled using 
mathematics, however, the search for the "natural laws" of human organization must 
be abandoned. In turn, that energy might be redirected into the search for ways in 
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which we can reduce social entropy: the progressive reduction in available options for 
our continued survival/^ According to the quantum physicists, these are the only 
variables which we can manipulate in which the outcomes are not entirely up to 
chance. This leads us to the fourth criterion for a Post-Newtonian social science. 
Last, but not least, a Post-Newtonian social science must answer the quantum 
call for sociological variables. It must identify and address the role of the observer in 
the active creation of ontological reality. This is perhaps the hardest task at hand. It 
will undoubtedly take all our knowledge and all our ways of knowing to accomplish it. 
Yet this is the task at hand. Figure 1 is a graphical depiction of a Post-Newtonian 
"process" model for the social sciences. 
The first thing to notice about this process model is that no linear cause-and-
effect relationships are specified. There are no specific structures—only the process 
by which we collectively construct (i.e., objectification) and, in turn, collectively 
The Classical Newtonian description of entropy was an extension of the second law of 
thermodynamics (i.e., energy moves from a state of high concentration to a state of lower concentration) 
and depicted the universe and all its parts as moving in a predetermined manner from a state of material 
order to a state of complete disorder (i.e., thermal equilibrium). Entropy in the Post-Newtonian sense 
does not assume any a priori state of order or disorder (see Prigogine & Stengers, 1984). In the Post-
Newtonian explanation, entropy refers to the potential outcomes a set of interconnected events over 
time. Entropy in this sense refers to the progressive reduction in the number of possible end-states in a 
system as initial outcomes are resized and alternatives are reduced. Simultaneously, as potential 
outcomes are reduced, the probability of individual outcomes—relative to the total number of potential 
outcomes—increases. In terms of social entropy, this implies that every decision we make closes off an 
(as yet) unknown number of potential event outcomes in our future. The historical implication of social 
entropy is seen in the relative success of the humn species—we have eliminated or conquered many of 
the obstacles in our path, but at what cost? The future implications—given the human ability (even 
desire?) to destroy itself—place a grave responsibility in the hands of humankind to optimize diversity, 
adaptability, and viability in the face of an unpredictable and unknowable future. Such a future is 
unlikely to be realized on the basis of Classical concepts and methods. 
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experience (i.e., subjectification) the world in which we live. In this model, 
"objective" reality is a collective social construction where epistemology forms the key 
to understanding. Therefore, structure is not taken a priori but is a result of an 
ongoing process between collective action and common experiences. The 
assumptions and main tenets of the model are as follows. First, people share 
common experiences of the external world.^^ These experiences are then subjectified 
(i.e., abstracted) by each individual as symbols which represent that experience. 
Using various ways of knowing, each individual constructs a cognitive symbolic 
representation of reality upon which individual actions are based. 
Unknown 
Objectification through 
Collective Actirai 
w 
Subjectification throi%h 
Collective Bcperiences 
Micno-Sulgective *. r Unknown 
Figure 1. A Post-Newtonian "process" model for the social sciences 
This, in a sense, is an affirmation of realism. Reality, herein, is assumed to exist prior to every 
individual. This is not the problem—recall Einstein's answer to the philosophical question about the tree 
falling in the forest... 
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Proposition 1 states that the more individual experiences are shared and 
perceived to be similar, the more "real" the resulting symbolic representations become. It 
makes no difference whether these experiences reflect "truth" or not. As W.I. 
Thomas has said, if these things are perceived to be real, they will have real 
consequences in terms of the resulting human actions. Proposition 2, then, states that 
people act based on individual symbolic representations of reality which are always 
incomplete and seldom an accurate reflection of any ontological reality. However, as 
people act on these symbolic representations and assumptions, they actively create 
and change that ontological reality, i.e., regardless of the integrity of our motivations, 
our actions have real consequences. Proposition 3 states that the more people base 
their actions on common or like symbolic representations of the world, the more 
objectively "real" those symbolic representations become. This is what makes science, 
society, and knowledge possible. Once these symbolic representations form a 
continuing basis for collective action, patterns of action start to emerge—some would 
call these patterns "structures," but such a definition tends to artificially separate the 
actor, action, and context. These recurring patterns catch our attention and form the 
basis of objective reality. Proposition 4 states that the more patterns of action and 
interaction tend to recur, the more likely they are to become part of our collective 
Also recall Kant's assertion (1781/1934) that, through purposive human interaction with the external 
world, the reality of ideas (the noumena) tends to actively become the reality of experience 
(phenomena). The Post-Newtonian perspective would unite these in a fashion similar to that of Hegel, 
but always emerging from the process of human action and active interpretation instead of assuming 
some a priori order or ideal. 
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experience over time and space. In other words, through subjectification, these 
recurring patterns become our collective objective reality and form part of the a priori 
assumptions we share about the ontological world. Proposition 5 takes into account 
the gap between epistemology and ontology. It states that there will always be 
phenomena of which we are not aware but still have real effects and consequences. This 
is true in regard to our deepest internal motivations as well as in the farthest reaches 
of external reality, removed from all human experience whatsoever. As in 
Heisenberg's Duplex Interpretation, this epistemological limit to our everyday 
understanding forms an action potential. It also reaffirms our inability to take all 
variables into account in our explanations and predictions. Similarly, it is only 
through our collective actions and experiences that reality is objectified and thus 
realized. 
At the same time, we must recognize that nature can continue to function 
without human beings if we were to disappear. But even the physicists say that this is 
not the question. As a part of nature that has evolved to the extent that it can 
consciously realize itself, we have acquired the ability—through our individual and 
collective actions—to influence the roll of nature's dice. Nature may unfold like the 
roll of dice, but we, as conscious products of nature, actively seek to influence the 
outcome of the rolls to our own benefit. However, our collective vision is limited. As 
we influence the roll of the dice, we concomitantly eliminate—for better and for 
worse—potential outcomes for our own future (i.e., we are subject to social entropy). 
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Nonetheless, the need or desire for order in our world encourages us to pursue a 
meaningful collective definition and understanding of ontological reality. At the 
same time, we seek to assure the continuance of our own species by robbing energy 
and resources from other open systems to cheat entropy in the short run—with long-
term implications for the viability of both natural and social processes and systems. 
Given the vast influence of the human specieis as active observers and participants in 
the otherwise random outcome of the unfolding universe, ontological reality becomes 
more of a sociological event than a random outcome of nature's dice. Taking this 
into consideration, the final proposition in the Post-Newtonian process theory for the 
social sciences is more an edict than a description of process. Proposition 6 states 
human beings are responsible for the world they create. As sentient, yet corporeal, 
beings we are bound to the here and now. Even so, the future does not lie in some 
divine plan or, for that matter, a roll of the dice. It is in our hands. The secrets of the 
universe are thus, in the final analysis, sociological—they are what we make of them. 
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APPLICATION; REFLECTIONS ON AN INFORMATION SOCIETY 
The dominance of the human species over all others on Earth is the result of 
two innate human capacities. The first of these capacities is the ability to 
intentionally adapt the environment to us, as opposed to waiting for evolution to 
adapt us to the environment. This ability is the basis for technology: the utilization of 
material and nonmaterial resources to alter our adaptive capacities. The second 
human capacity which has allowed us to rise to a place of dominance in nature is the 
ability to transform everyday information into symbols and transfer those symbols 
across time and space. Though other species demonstrate abstract reasoning and are 
able to communicate using symbols, humans are the only species known to transfer 
these symbols across generations, thus allowing subsequent generations to not only 
possess knowledge, but to accumulate it outside everyday socialization and 
experiences. This is our capacity for collective knowledge, and it is what makes 
Science—the knowledge of, and methods of acquiring knowledge of, the ontological 
world— possible.^ For millions of years, these two human capacities worked 
separately to bring the human species to its present position in the natural hierarchy. 
However, it has only been within the last two centuries that these capacities have 
been combined and utilized together—this combining of science and technology is 
^ "S"cience, as opposed to "s"cience, as mentioned earlier, refers to the pursuit of ontological 
understanding, utilizes a variety of ways of knowing, and is closer to what has in the past been called 
"natural philosophy." 
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one of the defining characteristics of modernity, and has moved us from a hunting 
and gathering, to an agricultural, then an industrial society. These two basic human 
processes—adaptive environmental transformation and cultural transmission—are 
now undergoing a major revolution. Over the last fifty years, the processes of science 
and technology have joined in such a way that knowledge itself has been 
manufactured and commodified. According to Bell, "Knowledge is di social product 
and the question of its cost, price, or value is vastly different from that of industrial 
items" (1973, p. xiv). The processes by which we exercise our distinctly human 
capacities are thus altered by the combining of science and technology and the 
resulting emergence of an information-based society. The vast success of information 
technology has changed our world and, consequently, the way we look at it. It 
challenges some of the traditional ways of understanding human processes and 
relationships (see Toffler, 1990). At the most basic level, it calls for a new paradigm 
for the natural sciences as well as the social sciences. 
There are three basic indicators of an emerging information society. The first 
is the breakdown of traditional political, economic, and social structures. On the 
macro level, these traditional structures are being replaced by global processes of 
capitalist economic exchange and the globalization of commodity and labor markets. 
At the same time, traditional political structures are losing dominance in the global 
arena. Every war now fought is fought in the virtual backyard of every other country 
on the globe. Local and national exchange structures are being replaced by flexible 
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regional and international agreements such as NAFTA and the EEC. A new 
multinational corporatism is emerging, linked not by formal structures, but by a 
network of exchange and decision making processes which affect the economic and 
political community as a whole. This is made possible by information technology. 
The need for local structural controls has vanished along with the geographic limits of 
the decision making process. In 1994, the president of the United States, and also the 
attorney general, conducted "town meetings" in a virtual reality of computer 
facilitated "live" communication across time and space. People across the globe 
engage in virtual communication—even virtual sex—in real time through computer 
assisted processes and networks of communication. Whether these things are "real" 
or not is not the issue—they are, as W.I. Thomas precisely pointed out, real in their 
consequences. The challenge to our traditional ideas about high technology and high 
science is that such things are thought to be possible only through complex 
bureaucratic structures and a hierarchy of authority. This is not so in the virtual 
community, says Howard Rheingold. 
The word anarchy is frequently used to describe the Usenet, not in the sense of 
chaotic and disorganized, but in the sense that the whole enterprise of moving 
all these words from all these people to all these other people is accomplished 
with no central governing hierarchy on either policy or technical levels. This 
grew directly out of the way Usenet postings were designed to be passed 
around and the loosely coupled UUCP network. From the beginning, there 
was no emphasis on a central organization Over time, the ongoing 
conversations often create communities among the regulars of newsgroups. 
And other newsgroups are more like battlefields than communities, although 
they also have their regulars and their [social] norms. (Rheingold, 1993, pp. 
119-122). 
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At the regional, national, state, and local levels we find that traditional political, 
economic, and social structures have disappeared into a "virtual" interaction process, 
facilitated by information technology, which knows no structure or bounds. The 
immediate consequences of this shift bring us to the second indicator of an emerging 
information society: the shift from resource intensive production to knowledge 
intensive production. 
In the global arena the new form of capital is knowledge (Toffler, 1990). 
Work, in the economic sense (i.e., adding value to capital) in the global arena now 
inevitably involves the encoding, transmission, storage, decoding, and interpretation 
of information and data. Recent advancements in information technology have 
resulted in an exponential increase in the amount of data available for examination. 
But data in its raw form is relatively worthless. According to Wurman (1989), the 
new information economy will be based on the effective and efficient transformation 
of data into useful information and knowledge. Wurman suggests that work in the 
information economy will involve turning simple data into information, with 
information being defined as data that has been organized in some logical manner. 
Another tier of work in the information economy will involve manipulating that 
information back and forth between its organized and raw symbolic forms and either 
storing or transmitting that information across time and space. This is the manual 
labor of the information age; information becomes the "raw material" of production 
to be mined, transformed, stored, etc. Information itself, though possessing a "value-
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added" component, is insufficient to guide us in effective decision making. 
Information (as ordered and/or categorized data) must be applied to problems and 
processes in the everyday world. In fact, Wurman equates "knowledge" with the 
ability to apply information effectively to everyday phenomena. If there is to be a 
new middle class in the emerging information society, it will, in all likelihood, involve 
the level of production which turns information into useful knowledge. Normal 
science is good at knowledge production. The expansion rate of knowledge since the 
Enlightenment is staggering. However, normal science has traditionally rejected the 
final tier of production in the new information economy: transforming data, 
information, and knowledge into wisdom. Wisdom takes information and knowledge 
and places it in a moral-ethical context. This is the new challenge of the information 
age: to be guided by wisdom in the collection, transformation, and interpretation of 
data. It is precisely what the Post-Newtonian paradigm is reffing to in its call for 
sociological variables. Classical Newtonian science rejected the introduction of moral 
and ethical variables into its epistemology. It removed human consciousness and 
human understanding from "reality" itself. To exacerbate matters even more, the 
product, process, and purpose of information production falls outside of the realm of 
our immediate sensory experience. Thus, Classical concepts do not appear to be of 
much help in making an effective transition to an information society. The task of 
translating information and knowledge to wisdom is complicated by the third 
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indicator of an emerging information-based society: the progressive abstraction of 
everyday life. 
If any empirical observations can be made about information society at all, 
they would have to be that everyday life in information society is becoming more and 
more symbolic and abstract. The most obvious is in the economy, where money is no 
longer the primary medium of exchange. People now work every day and never see a 
direct product or compensation for their labors.^ Quite often, payroll is directly 
deposited (no money or paper actually changes hands) in the employee's bank 
account. Note that no money actually exists there—the record of the account exists 
only as magnetic symbolic coding on computer disks. When purchasing necessities, 
the employee may use a magnetically coded card, which transmits an electronic 
record of the exchange to a central processing facility which, in turn, routes this 
electronic information back to the employee's bank where a computer adjusts the 
balance in the virtual bank account. This symbolic exchange of virtual resources 
occurs at the global level in the same manner as at the local level, with no tangible or 
visible structure. The process itself only requires an information infrastructure and 
the faith—repeat: FAITH—of the individuals engaging in the activities. Political 
processes are also disappearing into virtual realities. Various forms of media produce 
human experiences for mass consumption which, in turn, transforms each individual's 
Marx would indeed be perplexed by the information economy. 
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"reality" to reflect this "virtual" representation. Researchers have determined that 
the strongest agent of socialization on youth is the mass media, particularly television. 
Thus, human interaction and socialization have also become abstracted into virtual 
realities. People can longer look to recognizable and tangible structures for the 
appearance of order. What holds us together—information technology makes this 
exceedingly clear— is an interconnected web of complex interrelated processes. 
What does this imply for our everyday lives as producers, consumers, and inhabitants 
of the real world? 
The crisis of an information society is not in the disappearance or 
virtualization of structure, but in the failure to recognize the primacy of symbolic 
interactive processes, and in recognizing that our theories and Science need to make 
this conceptual shift. It also implies a serious responsibility for humans as active 
creators and participants in the world. If we are, in fact, responsible for the world we 
create, people need to transform data, information, and symbolic processes into 
knowledge and the moral context of wisdom. However, it must be recognized that, in 
this process, information technology can be both enabling and oppressing. The 
decisions we make now will determine the options we will have left in the future. 
Still, these sociological variables remain in our control. Now, more than ever, the 
decisions are up to us. 
146 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Abercrombie, N., Hill, S., & Turner, B. (1988). The Penguin dictionary of sociology 
(2nd ed.). London: Penguin Books. 
American Heritage Dictionary: Microsoft Bookshelf 1992 Edition (1992). 
[Computer program]. Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation. 
Aquinas, T. (1967). The sunmiation of theology. In M. Donner, K. Eble, & R. 
Helbling, (Eds.V The intellectual tradition of the West: Readings in the history 
of ideas/Volume I: Hesiod to Calvin (pp. 315-335). Glenview, IL: Scott, 
Foresman and Company. 
Aron, R. (1968). Main currents in sociological thought: Volume I (R. Howard & H. 
Weaver, Trans.). New York: Anchor Books. (Original published 1965) 
Bacon, F. (1961). The great instauration. In W. Kaufmann (Ed.), Philosophic 
classics: Bacon to Kant (pp. 3-9). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Bacon, F. (1973). The advancement of learning (new ed.). London: Dent. (Original 
published 1605) 
Bedford, R. (1981). Blackbody radiation. In R. Lemer & G. Trigg (Eds.), 
Encyclopedia of physics (p. 83). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Bell, D. (1973). The coming of post-industrial society: A venture in social 
forecasting. New York: Basic Books. 
Blood, F. (1981). Brownian motion. In R. Lerner & G. Trigg fEds.l Encyclopedia 
of physics (p. 93). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Bohm, D. (1983). Wholeness and the implicate order. London: Ark. 
Bohm, D. & Hiley, B. (1993). The undivided universe: An ontological interpretation 
of quantum theory. London: Routledge. 
Brownowski, J., & Mazlish, B. (1962). The Western intellectual tradition: From 
Leonardo to Hegel. New York: Harper Torchbooks. 
Bub, J. (1981). Complementarity. In R. Lerner & G. Trigg (Eds.). Encyclopedia of 
physics (pp. 138-139). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
147 
Burke, J. (1985). The day the universe changed. Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company. 
Calder, N. (1980). Einstein's universe. London: Penguin Books. 
Capra, F. (1983). The turning point: Science, society, and the rising culture. New 
York: Bantam. 
Capra, F. (1989). Uncommon wisdom: Conversations with remarkable people. New 
York: Bantam. 
Capra, F. (1991). The tao of physics (3rd ed., updated). Boston: Shambala. 
Capra, F. & Steindl-Rast, D. (1991). Belonging to the universe: Explorations on the 
frontiers of science & spirituality. New York: HarperCollins. 
Casti, J. (1989). Paradigms lost: Tackling the unanswered mysteries of modern 
science. New York: Avon. 
Concise Columbia Encyclopedia: Microsoft Bookshelf 1992 Edition (1992). 
[Computer program]. Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation. 
Cornford, F. (1968). Before and after Socrates. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Davies, P. (1983). God and the new physics. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Descartes, R. (1961). Meditations on the first philosophy. In W. Kaufmann (Ed.), 
Philosophic Classics: Bacon to Kant (pp. 28-76). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice Hall. (Original published 1641) 
Dewey, J. (1968). Reconstruction in philosophy (enlarged ed.). Boston: Beacon. 
(Original published 1920) 
Donner, M., Eble, K., & Helbling, R. (Eds.). (1967). The intellectual tradition of the 
West: Readings in the history of ideas/Volume I: Hesiod to Calvin. Glenview, 
IL: Scott, Foresman and Company. 
Durkhiem, E. (1951). Suicide. New York: Free Press. (Original published 1897) 
Einstein, A., & Infeld, L. (1938). The evolution of physics: From early concepts to 
relativity and quanta. New York: Touchstone. 
Ekeland, I. (1988). Mathematics and the unexpected. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
148 
Featherstone, M. (1992). Postmodernism and the aestheticization of everyday life. 
In S. Lash & J. Friedman Œds.). Modernity & identity (pp. 265-290). Oxford, 
UK: Blackwell. 
Garraty, J., & Gay, P. (Eds,). (1972). The Columbia history of the world. New York: 
Harper & Row. 
Glansdorff, P., & Prigogine, I. (1981). Thermodynamics, nonequilibrium. In R. 
Lerner & G. Trigg (Eds.l Encyclopedia of physics (pp. 1029-1035). Reading, 
MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Gleick, J. (1987). Chaos: Making a new science. New York: Viking. 
Goldstein, T. (1980). Dawn of modern science. Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company. 
Gribbin, J. (1984). In search of Schrfldinger's cat: Quantum physics and reality. New 
York: Bantam Books. 
Halfpermy, P. (1982). Positivism and sociology: Explaining social life. London: 
George Allen & Unwin. 
Heilbronner, R. (1961). The worldly philosophers: The lives, times. & ideas of the 
great economic thinkers (rev. ed.). New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Heisenberg, W. (1949). The physical properties of the quantum theory (C, Eckart & 
F. Hoyt, Trans.). New York: Dover. 
Heraclitus (1967). Fragments. In M. Donner. K. Eble. & R. Helbling. (Eds.). The 
intellectual tradition of the West: Readings in the history of ideas/Volume I: 
Hesiod to Calvin (pp. 65-66). Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman and Company. 
Herbert, N. (19851 Quantum reality: Beyond the new physics. New York: Anchor 
Books. 
Hobbes, T. (1961). Leviathan. In W. Kaufmann (Ed.). Philosophic classics: Bacon to 
Kant (pp. 94-124). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. (Original published 
1651) 
Hospers, J. (1967). An introduction to philosophical analysis (2nd ed.). Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
149 
Kalberg, S. (1980). Max Weber's types of rationality: Cornerstones for the analysis 
of rationalization processes in history. American Journal of Sociology. 85(5). 
1145-1179. 
Kant, I. (1934). Critique of pure reason (J. Meiklejohn, Trans.). London: J.M. Dent 
& Sons. (Original published 1781) 
Katovich, M., & Reese, W. (1993). Postmodern thought in symbolic interaction: 
Reconstructing social inquiry in light of late-modern critics. The Sociological 
Quarterly. 34(3). 391-411. 
Kaufmann, W. (Ed.) (1961). Philosophic classics: Bacon to Kant. Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Kuhn, T. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions (2nd ed., enlarged). 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Lemer, R., & Trigg, G. (Eds.). (1981). Encyclopedia of physics. Reading, MA: 
Addison-Wesley. 
Locke, J. (1961). Of human understanding. In W. Kaufmann (Ed.). Philosophic 
classics: Bacon to Kant (pp. 188-228). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
(Original published 1690) 
Macionis, J. (1993). Sociology (5th ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Marcuse, H. (1964). One dimensional man: Studies in the ideology of advanced 
industrial society. Boston: Beacon Press. 
Marcuse, H. (1969). An essay on liberation. Boston: Beacon Press. 
Mason, S. (1962). A history of the sciences (new revised ed.). New York: Collier 
Books. 
Matson, F. (1966). The broken image: Man, science and society. New York: 
Anchor. 
McConnell, J. (1986). Understanding human behavior (5th ed.). New York: Holt, 
Rinehart, and Winston. 
McKay, J., Hill, B., & Buckler, J. (1983a). A history of western society: Volume I: 
From antiquity to the enlightenment (2nd ed.). Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company. 
150 
McKay, J., Hill, B., & Buckler, J. (1983b). A history of western society: Volume II: 
From absolutism to the present (2nd ed.). Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company. 
Milbrath, L. (1989). Envisioning a sustainable society: Learning our way out. 
Albany, NY: SUNY Press. 
Nicolis, G., & Prigogine, I. (1989). Exploring complexity: An introduction. New 
York: W.H. Freeman and Company. 
Northrup, F. (1946). The meeting of East and West: An inquiry concerning world 
understanding. New York: Macmillan. 
Outwaithe, W. (1987). New philosophies of social science: Realism, hermeneutics 
and critical theory. New York: St. Martin's Press. 
Pais, A. (1981). Electron. In R. Lerner & G. Trigg Œds.l Encyclopedia of physics 
(pp. 235-238). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Pico. (1967). Oration on the dignity of man. In M. Donner, K. Eble, & R. Helbling, 
(Eds.), The intellectual tradition of the West: Readings in the history of 
ideas/Volume I: Hesiod to Calvin (pp. 424-431). Glenview, IL: Scott, 
Foresman and Company. 
Popper, K. (1957). The poverty of historicism. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Prigogine, I. (1980). From being to becoming: Time and complexity in the physical 
sciences. New York: W.H. Freeman and Company. 
Prigogine, I., & Stengers, I. (1984). Order out of chaos: Man's new dialogue with 
nature. New York: Bantam. 
Rheingold, H. (1993). The virtual community: Homesteading on the electronic 
frontier. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Robertson, I. (1987). Sociology (3rd ed.). New York: Worth. 
Ross, D. (1991). The origins of American social science. Cambridge, U.K.: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Sahakian, W. (1968). History of philosophy: From the earliest times to the present. 
New York: Barnes & Noble. 
151 
Santillana, G. (Ed.) (1956). The age of adventure: The Renaissance philosophers. 
New York: Meridian. 
Sullivan, J. (1933). The limitations of science. New York: Mentor. 
Theodorson, G., & Theodorson, A. (1969). A modern dictionary of sociology. New 
York: Barnes & Noble. 
Thorn, R. (1975). Structural stability and morphogenesis: An essay on the general 
theory of models (D. Fowler, Trans.). Reading, MA: W.A. Benjamin. 
(Original published 1972) 
Toffler, A. (1984). Foreword: Science and change. In I. Prigogine & I. Stengers, 
Order out of chaos: Man's new dialog with nature (pp. xi-xxvi). New York: 
Bantam. 
Toffler, A. (1990). Powershift: Knowledge, wealth, and violence at the edge of the 
21st century. New York: Bantam. 
Toulouse, G. (1991). Catastrophe theory. In R. Lerner & G. Trigg (Eds.), 
Encyclopedia of physics (pp. 101-104). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Turner, J. (1991). The structure of sociological theory (5th ed.). Belmont, CA: 
Wadsworth. 
Waldrop, M. (1992). Complexity: The emerging science at the edge of order and 
chaos. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Weber, M. (1949). The methodology of the social sciences (E. Shils & H. Finch, Eds. 
& trans.). New York: Free Press. (Original pubUshed 1903-1917) 
Weber, M. (1958). The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism (T. Parsons, 
Trans.). New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. (Original published 1905) 
Weber, M. (1978). Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology. 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. (Original work published 1921) 
Webster's New World Dictionary (3rd College ed.) (1988). New York: Simon & 
Schuster. 
Weinberg, S. (1992). Dreams of a final theory. New York: Pantheon. 
Wolf, F. (1988). Parallel universes: The search for other worlds. New York: Simon 
& Schuster. 
152 
Wurman, R. (1989). Information anxiety. New York: Doubleday. 
